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The recent proliferation of hedge funds suggests that capital markets present windows 
of opportunity to realise substantial arbitrage profits thus violating the 'no arbitrage' 
condition of efficient markets. This thesis examines several observed return patterns 
that have raised questions about the efficiency of capital markets and/or the validity of 
the asset pricing models used to analyse them. The study focuses on the Japanese stock 
market which is under-analysed despite being the second largest in the world. We first 
look at three stock attributes that can arguably differentiate between future winners and 
losers. These are size, price and book value to market, hi contrast to older studies, we 
find no significant evidence of a size effect. The price and book value to market effects 
however are statistically significant although both appear to be cyclical in nature 
suggesting that they are at least partially driven by macroeconomic risk factors and so 
are not pure anomalies. The short term reversal of stock returns is investigated next. 
Unlike previous studies, a strategy that utilises optimal investment portfolios is 
simulated. By avoiding previously documented methodological problems, it is shown 
that contrarian profits are statistically and economically significant and that they are 
overwhelmingly attributed to investor over-reaction to firm-specific events, implying 
that significant short term inefficiencies occur in the Japanese stock market. Finally the 
effectiveness of the law of one price and its implications for the relative pricing of 
assets is examined. It is shown that the returns of securities with similar systematic risk 
are highly correlated and their relative prices oscillate around an equilibrium value. 
Large deviations fi-om that value can be exploited by a trading strategy known as pairs 
trading. Simulations of several strategy variants generate statistically and economically 
significant profits which are not attributable to systematic risk. It is concluded that 
relative stock prices are not always efficient in the short term. Such inefficiencies can 
be profitably exploited as prices are eventually driven to equilibrium. 
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During the 52 weeks between January 2004 and January 2005, The Economist, 
a weekly politics, business and finance magazine, published no less than 78 articles 
relating to hedge funds. That's an average of 1.5 articles per issue. During the same 
period 684 articles with the phrase 'hedge fund(s)' in their title appeared in the 
Financial Times a daily business newspaper. That's more than 2 articles per day. What 
a few years ago appeared to be an exclusive area of finance reserved for a few very 
wealthy individuals and financial institutions has now become mainstream, hiitially 
hedge fiands were being set up by investment banks as a way of investing their own 
money in financial markets as part of their overall investment portfolio. Banks paid 
handsome rewards to bright and talented individuals with postgraduate degrees in 
engineering and mathematics mainly, to apply the analytical tools of their chosen 
discipline on financial assets in order to identify investment opportunities. Some of 
these individuals were later able to set up their own hedge funds and offer their 
services to other wealthy individuals and institutions. The recent lackluster 
performance of developed stock markets around the world and the promise of high 
returns (many times higher than the average straight investment fund) resulted in a 
proliferation of such funds. However the term 'hedge fund' has changed over the 
years. It used to be that hedge funds engaged mainly in arbitrage, buying undervalued 
assets and selling short over valued assets believing that market forces wi l l eventually 
drive asset prices closer to their fair value thus leaving the fund with an almost risk-
less arbitrage profit. Nowadays, managers engaging in a spot of short selling call 
themselves hedge-fund managers and command high premiums for their services. In 
all cases the main motivating force of these funds is the belief that financial assets are 
not valued fairly and the extent of the miss-pricing is such that allows for transaction 
cost to be covered and a profit to be made by taking the appropriate positions. This 
runs contrary to one of modem finance theory's most contested assertions, the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). 
The concept of market efficiency in modem finance was introduced by Fama 
(1970) and is inextricably linked to the advent of asset pricing models. Asset pricing 
models revolutionized the way we look at financial markets by formalizing the relation 
between risk and return. The first such model was the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). The CAPM was developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin 
(1966) and stipulates that the market is the only priced risk factor and that asset returns 
are linear functions of their co-variability with the market return. The main criticism of 
the CAPM (Roll, 1977) is that it is not feasible to test its empirical validity since it is 
impossible to identify the composition of the true market portfolio, as specified in the 
theoretical form of the model, and calculate the market return. The Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) emerged as a result of an attempt by Ross (1976) to develop an asset 
pricing model that relies on weaker assumptions than the CAPM. The APT improved 
on the CAPM by suggesting that there are more than one factors affecting asset 
returns. However it failed to specify how many and which these factors are. Asset 
pricing models attracted a lot of interest from researchers. A large number of empirical 
versions of both types of models have appeared through the years but all have failed to 
explain the cross-sectional and temporal variation of asset returns adequately. 
Researchers started observing patterns in asset prices that could not be explained by 
the available asset pricing models. One of the first to be identified and probably the 
most frequently reported anomalous pricing pattern is the size effect (Banz 1981) i.e. 
the consistent out-performance of large by small capitalization stocks. Other effects 
identified early on relate to variables such as dividend yield (Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy, 1979), price/earning ratios (Basu 1977, Reinganumn, 1981) and price 
(Blume and Husic, 1973). More recently, De Bondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) 
showed that past loser stocks tend to outperform past winners and Fama and French, 
(1992) identified the book value to market equity ratio as another characteristic that 
differentiates stock returns strongly. 
The two main explanations for the observed patterns are that either the asset 
pricing model is miss-specified or the market does not price assets efficiently. Early 
on, pricing anomalies were usually attributed to the inadequacy of the asset pricing 
model. The identified anomalies were believed to be proxies for risk factors absent 
from the model so the model was extended to include portfohos mimicking the pricing 
anomalies as explanatory variables. However even these extended models failed to 
explain all the pricing irregularities thus raising questions about market efficiency. The 
degree to which a market is efficient measures its ability to allocate resources 
efficiently and maximize wealth. Hence testing for market efficiency has attracted a 
vast amount of academic interest. There are two alternative definitions of efficient 
markets reflected in the strong and weak formulations of the EMH respectively. The 
strong form (Fama, 1991) states that in efficient markets, prices reflect instantly all 
publicly and privately held information thus making it impossible to predict their 
fiiture course based on this information. The weak form of the EMH (Jensen, 1978, 
Ross, 1987) is more amenable to testing and states that efficient markets are 
characterized by the absence of arbitrage opportimities, implying that economic profits 
fi-om trading, net of all costs are zero. The main difficulty associated with EMH testing 
is the 'joint hypothesis problem'. Hakkio & Rush (1989) note that the EMH is a joint 
hypothesis that (a) investors are risk neutral and (b) they make rational use of all 
available information so that speculators have a zero expected return. Violation of 
either hypothesis wi l l lead to rejection of the joint hypothesis but does not mean that 
the market is inefficient. Furthermore, EMH tests require the use of an asset pricing 
model to generate equilibriiun prices against which actual prices are compared and 
judged to be efficient or not. As Fama (1991) points out, the EMH may be rejected 
because the asset pricing model used is miss-specified, the market is not efficient or 
both. This joint hypothesis problem makes the interpretation of the test results very 
difficult and is echoed in the alternative explanations given for the observed pricing 
anomalies. Nevertheless it is not entirely impossible to determine whether a market is 
efficient or not. Absence of efficiently performing markets has very serious, directly 
observable consequences for society. For example, the astronomical valuations of 
telecommunications and internet related firms in recent years were believed to reflect 
the very favorable growth prospects of these industries in the coming years and so 
were believed to be efficient. However a closer look would reveal that the stock prices 
were discounting unrealistic growth rates in perpetuity. The subsequent collapse of the 
stock prices, failure of many businesses and reporting of huge losses by others resulted 
in massive wealth destruction and thus failure of the market to allocate resources 
efficiently. By the same token, the creation of an entire industry whose purpose is the 
profitable exploitation of market inefficiencies should point to the fact that such 
inefficiencies do probably exist. 
It is the weak form of the EMH that we think is being continually disproved by 
the survival of hedge funds and the preeminence they have attained over the years. The 
impression one gets fi-om reading newspaper articles on the subject is that hedge funds 
have the mystical ability to generate very large returns with very little risk. With the 
exception of the spectacular failure of the Long Term Capital Management fiind of 
Professors Myron Scholes and Robert Merton there are mainly success stories 
reported. Then again, the success of hedge funds-is disputed in a recent" Financial 
Times article by Prof. Malkiel ('The return of the blindfolded monkey', FT, 1 Feb 
2005). He argues that these retums are nothing but a self-promoting fiction advertised 
by the industry itself and cites the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund index which has under-
performed the S&P 500 over the last two years. However there are quite a few caveats 
in his argument. The CSFB index is by no means conclusive in that many funds are not 
reported. Funds that are closed to new money for instance do not have the need to 
advertise their performance. Furthermore many funds are set up internally by 
investment banks and are not reported separately. Other funds, as mentioned before, 
are only hedge funds in name. Nevertheless Prof. Malkiel makes the point that hedge 
funds are probably becoming the victims of their own success. The fact that too many 
funds are chasing a fixed number of opportunities makes the market more efficient 
thus hampering their performance. I f the higher retums are accompanied by ever 
higher risk, one should expect more fi-equent failures which wil l eventually mitigate 
investor interest. The proliferation of such funds and their ability to generate large 
retums has therefore serious implications about the efficiency of the markets in which 
they operate. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine various aspects of efficiency of the 
Japanese stock market. This is done examining whether the Japanese market is also 
susceptible to some of the pricing anomalies identified in the US market and by 
simulating some of the trading strategies popular with hedge funds over the years. The 
main contribution of the thesis is threefold. First, we bring to the fore the Japanese 
stock market which despite being the second largest developed market in the world, 
has largely been neglected by the academic community. Instead the vast majority of 
the efficiency literature is concentrated on the US market. The thesis therefore helps us 
assess the efficiency of the Japanese market per se and relative to the US market. 
Second we use a simulation design that is more akin to a practitioner's point of view 
and hence closer to real trading conditions thus minimizing the probability that our 
results are driven by methodological flaws. Finally we systematically examine a 
trading strategy, namely statistical pairs trading, which has not appeared in the 
academic literature before but has been popular with proprietary trading desks around 
the world for a long time. 
Many results in the efficiency literature can be attributed to methodological 
flaws. One very important issue that emerges throughout the thesis is the measurement 
of the performance of the simulated trading strategies. The way portfolio retums are 
calculated for example can often make the difference between statistical significance 
and insignificance and hence between market efficiency and inefficiency. Great care is 
therefore taken to avoid introducing positive biases in performance measures. The 
performance of the trading strategies is evaluated by examining both the retum of the 
strategy and the risk associated with it. A lot of emphasis is put on examining and 
comparing the Sharpe ratios of the respective profit and loss streams as they measure 
the reward received for each unit of risk home by the strategy. The breakdown of the 
total risk into a systematic and a residual risk component is also examined. However, 
constmcting the risk profile of a particular profit and loss streams is particularly 
difficult because it involves the use of an asset pricing model implying that the 
systematic risk measures are encumbered by the 'joint hypothesis problem' mentioned 
before. For this reason we avoid making conclusive remarks on whether a market is 
efficient or not. In any case, this would be self-contradictory since two of the trading 
strategies tested herein rely on the market being 'ultimately' efficient for the prices to 
converge to their 'fair' model value. A more productive use of the efficiency tests, as 
suggested by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) is to assess the relative efficiency 
of a market. Markets can be more or less efficient but not perfectly efficient. Perfect 
efficiency in finance is a rather idealistic concept and would be equivalent to 
frictionless motion in engineering, thus improbable. This is the approach adopted in 
this thesis when interpreting the various test results. The magnitude of the miss-pricing 
and the speed of the correction can be indicative of the extent to which the market is 
efficient. The smaller the miss-pricing and the speedier the correction the more 
efficient the market is. The speed of the correction is reflected in the strategy's 
turnover, i.e. the number of positions opened and closed during the simulation period. 
The magnitude of the perceived miss-pricing is reflected in the magnitude of the 
profits themselves. In order to alleviate the join hypothesis problem further, we report 
risk measures that are independent of any asset pricing model, such as descriptive 
statistics of the distribution of the strategy's retum, historical VAR and total variance 
measures. 
The thesis comprises three empirical chapters in total. The first chapter is 
devoted to examining the size, price and book-value-to-market effects in Japan. Al l 
three effects have been analyzed in the US market and have been characterized as 
pricing anomalies. The chapter is divided in four parts. The first part examines all three 
effects-separately and attempts to establish whether each effect is observed in the 
sample under investigation. The effect of the portfolio weighting scheme and 
transactions costs on the portfolio premiums is also examined. We present evidence 
that points to a weak size effect but very strong price and book value to market effects. 
A closer look at the armualized standard deviations of the relevant portfolios reveals 
that the weak statistical significance of the small size premium is due to the excess 
volatility of the small size portfolio compared to the large size portfolio. Since the 
evidence on the size effect is not strong the rest of the chapter concentrates on the price 
and book value to market effects. The second part investigates whether the effects exist 
independently of one another. This is done by double-sorting price portfolios on book 
value to market and vice versa using two alternative methodologies. We show that the 
conditional price effect is weaker but still significant. In contrast the book value to 
market effect remains unaffected when conditioned on price. The third part examines 
the correlation of the effects to the macro-economy. The magnitude of the correlation 
between a given effect and various macro-economic scenarios would reveal the extent 
to which the effect is driven by risk factors underlying the economy. It is shown that 
both the price and book value to market effects are stronger when certain 
macroeconomic conditions occur so they cannot be entirely characterized as 
anomalous. The final part of the chapter examines the existence of seasonal patterns in 
the effects under examination. A large volume of literature in the US shows that the 
size effect is seasonal in nature and is stronger on January (e.g. Keim, 1983). This 
coincides with the financial year end which for most US companies occurs in 
December and so prompted researchers to offer explanations for the phenomenon that 
relate to investor behavior during the end of the year. These are formally known as the 
Tax Loss Selling Hypothesis (Dyl, Branch, 1977), the Risk Measurement Hypothesis 
(Rogalski and Tinic, 1986) and the Portfolio Rebalancing Hypothesis (Hansen and 
Lakonishok, 1987). The financial year end for most companies in Japan falls in March 
and April. We show that the effects under investigation are positive and statistically 
significant during the first half of the year and become insignificant thereafter. 
The second chapter examines a trading strategy popular with hedge fimds 
known as return or residual reversal. The strategy is based on the observed negative 
serial correlation exhibited by stock returns which has been a well-documented 
phenomenon since the 1960's. The presence of serial correlation in stock returns 
directly contradicts the efficient market hypothesis- according to which all past 
information is already reflected in current stock prices and cannot be a guide for future 
performance. The basic form of the strategy calls for selling short stocks that 
performed extremely well in the past and buying stocks that did poorly. As such the 
strategy is characterized as contrarian because it takes action that is contrary to that 
followed by 'naive' investors. Academic interest in contrarian strategies mushroomed 
since the publication of a very influential article by De Bondt and Thaler, (1985) who 
linked contrarian profits to the over-reaction hypothesis. The over-reaction hypothesis 
states that investors tend to over-react to good news and bad news about a firm thus 
driving its stock price away from its fiindamental value. Therefore a central 
assumption of the EMH, namely that investors are rational, is violated. Many empirical 
estimates since suggest that contrarian strategies can consistently yield substantial 
profits with serious implications about the weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. In addition to the over-reaction hypothesis, the other main explanation is 
that the contrarian profits are justified by their accompanying systematic risk. This 
again reflects the joint hypothesis problem as in the case of the anomalies literature. 
This chapter contributes to the debate in a variety of ways. We examine 
optimal investment portfolios that have zero (or near zero) exposure to systematic risk 
factors. To this end we use a commercially available, APT type multifactor model. 
This wil l help alleviate any concerns about the risk associated with the simulated 
profits. In contrast all empirical studies so far adopt portfolio weighting schemes that 
do not optimize portfolio performance. The implication is that the portfolios under 
consideration are not on the efficient frontier and so are inconsequential. It is shown 
that contrarian profits are very sensitive to the asset-pricing model used to estimate 
risk-adjusted returns and the systematic covariance matrix of the investment universe. 
Liquidity is shown to be another factor affecting the magnitude of contrarian profits. 
The simulated strategy is subject to realistic trading costs. Trading costs have largely 
been ignored in the extant literature despite the fact that they simulate very high 
turnover strategies whose performance is naturally very sensitive to fransaction costs. 
Portfolio returns are calculated using prices that are readily and cheaply delivered by 
Japanese stock brokers and so portfolio returns are more realistic. Finally the sfrategy 
is simulated entirely out of sample meaning that no information is assumed known 
until after it becomes available. This is in stark contrast to many empirical studies so 
far whose portfolio returns invariably suffer from in-sample bias. The main finding of 
the chapter is that the simulated strategy generates significant profits subject to 
negligible systematic risk. This lends support to the over-reaction hypothesis and raises 
questions regarding the short-term efficiency of the Japanese stock market. 
The final chapter of the thesis explores the law of one price. This is done by 
simulating a trading strategy called pairs trading. The law of one price is yet another 
aspect of market efficiency and states that equivalent future payoffs with identical risk 
profiles should carry the same price. Otherwise a risk-less profit could be made by 
selling short the relatively expensive and using part of the proceeds to buy the 
relatively cheap payoff. Pairs-trading is a trading strategy that is based on the law of 
one price and exploits perceived pricing anomalies between pairs of highly correlated 
securities. It calls for selling the relatively expensive and buying the relatively cheap 
one of a pair of highly correlated securities whose relative price appears to diverge 
from the perceived equilibrium level in the belief that the law of one price wil l 
eventually drive the two prices back to a level justified by their risk profiles. We 
differentiate between two types of pairs, statistical and fundamental pairs. Statistical 
pairs are those whose high correlation is induced by an indirect relationship between 
the paired assets such as membership of the same industry group for example. The 
correlation of fundamental pairs on the other hand is due to a more direct link between 
the paired assets. Different classes of shares of the same company, dual listings and 
shares of companies with large cross-ownership interests are all examples of 
fundamental pairs. The chapter concentrates on the systematic examination of 
statistical pairs. The existence of statistically significant profits from the strategy 
violates the 'no-arbitrage' definition of the efficient market hypothesis and so has very 
serious implications for the efficiency of relative asset pricing in particular and for 
market efficiency in general. We examine two versions of the strategy based on the 
method used to assess the stability of the relative price of the pair over time. Relative 
share prices are analyzed using two altemative cointegration techniques namely the 
Johansen procedure and the augmented dickey-Fuller test. The two procedures differ 
mainly in terms of the restrictions imposed on the cointegrating relationship. We 
present evidence that shows that both versions of the strategy generate profits that are 
statistically and economically significant. The results of the two procedures are not 
substantially different. This implies that economically significant violations of the 'no 
arbitrage' condition do occur in the short-term. Such violations eventually are 
-corrected by the market and can be profitably exploited. 
The chapter contributes to the extant literature by examining a profitable trading 
strategy which is popular with investment professionals but has attracted little attention 
from the academic community. It provides a generalized fi-amework for identifying 
and analj'zing pairs of highly correlated stocks which can be applied to any developed 
stock market. As such it highlights another aspect of efficient markets which may have 
been ignored by academics. 
CHAPTER 1 
Size, Price and Book Value to Market: Anomalies or 
priced risk factors? 
10 
Introduction 
The advent of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has fundamentally 
changed our understanding of capital markets. It has helped investors develop a more 
structured approach to making investment decisions and has attracted the interest of a 
countless number of empirical researchers and academics. The CAPM stipulates that 
market risk is the only priced risk factor and that asset returns are linear functions of 
their covariability with the market return otherwise known as Beta. The main criticism 
of the CAPM came from Roll (1977) who argued that the portfolios used in empirical 
tests of the model are not good proxies of the portfolio of all risky assets (market 
portfolio) specified by the theoretical form of the model. In fact it is impossible to 
identify the composition and calculate the return of the true market portfoUo. 
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory developed by Roll and Ross took the CAPM one 
step fiirther by suggesting that the market is not the only priced risk factor. There are 
economic state variables that drive returns and a methodology was developed to 
identify those variables. The APT though fails to suggest how many and which these 
variables are. Empirical forms of all available asset pricing models have failed to give 
an adequate explanation of the cross-sectional and temporal variation of asset returns. 
This prompted researchers to look for 'regularities' or 'anomalies' in the behaviour of 
the capital markets. The presence of empirical anomalies in asset returns suggests that 
empirical forms of asset pricing models are miss-specified and/or that capital markets 
are not efficient. One of the most frequently reported anomalies in the empirical 
finance literature is the so called size effect. Firms with a small market capitalisation 
are noted to have both higher risk adjusted and unadjusted retimis than firms with a 
large market capitalisation. There is a vast volume of literature, the majority of which 
is concentrated on the US market, documenting the effect and offering competing 
explanations. Notwithstanding the methodological issues, there are two main 
rationalisations on offer for the observed size anomaly. The first argues that the CAPM 
betas are not estimated correctly thus leading to spurious estimates of excess returns 
e.g. Roll (1981). The second argues that risk is in fact multidimensional and therefore 
the CAPM does not explain the cross-variation of stock returns adequately (e.g. Chen 
1981, 1983). Fama and French (1992) argue that size alongside with other observed 
anomalies like E/P, leverage and Book to Market Equity (BE/ME) proxy for 
underlying macro-economic risk factors not captured by the CAPM. Others like Kross 
11 
(1985) and Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that the size effect is really a price 
effect. Finally a number of studies (e.g. Keim, 1983) have linked the size effect with 
the January effect noticing that most of the small size premium is realised in January 
and therefore the anomaly is seasonal and not constant throughout the year. 
The aim of this study is to examine the existence and viability of the size, price 
as well as the BE/ME anomalies in the Japanese stock market using a broad sample of 
stocks from Jan 1985 until Aug 2003. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.1 
reviews the relevant literature, Section 1.2 describes the methodology and the data set 
used, Section 1.3 describes the portfolio formation procedure in detail. Section 1.4 
presents results on the unconditional percentile portfolios, Section 1.5 presents the 
results on the conditional percentile portfolios. Section 1.6 examines the correlation 
between the effects under investigation and several macro-economic scenarios and 
finally Section 1.7 examines the existence of seasonal patterns in the studied effects. 
12 
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 The Size Effect 
The size effect was first reported by Banz (1981) who examined the 
relationship between the return and the market value of NYSE common stocks. He 
found that smaller firms had larger risk adjusted returns than larger firms for more than 
forty years. The persistence of the size effect manifests misspecification of the CAPM 
rather than lack of market efficiency. Banz also found that the relationship between 
the size effect and market value is not linear. There is little difference between the 
return of medium sized and large firms, the main effect occurring for very small firms. 
Finally, he suggested that size may be a proxy for one or more true but unknown risk 
factors correlated with size. By examining both NYSE and AMEX securities, 
Reinganumn (1981) also found evidence in support of the size effect. In addition, he 
found that portfolios consisting of securities with high earnings/price (E/P) ratios had 
systematically larger returns than portfolios of low E/P securities. This effect though 
vanished once security returns were controlled for the size effect. The abnormal returns 
of portfolios formed on size or E/P persisted for longer than two years, in support of 
the hypothesis that the CAPM is miss-specified. Roll (1981), argued that the abnormal 
risk adjusted returns associated with size might be due to miss-estimated betas caused 
by infrequent trading. Reinganumn (1982) responded that the size effect could not be 
accounted for even when betas estimated with methods designed to correct for non-
synchronous and infi-equent trading were used. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) show 
that the portfolio formation technique used by Reinganumn i.e. daily portfolio 
rebalancing so that security weights are kept equal, may induce a positive bias to the 
portfolio returns. This bias is inversely related to firm size and when avoided, they find 
that the difference between small and large firm portfolio returns is halved. 
In a very extensive study of the size effect, Keim (1983) used daily returns of 
NYSE and AMEX common stocks for the period 1963-1979. He examined the 
distributions of the abnormal returns of portfolios formed on size, for each month 
separately. Keim found that the return distributions in January had larger means than 
those for the remaining months. Abnormal returns were always inversely related to 
firm size but even more so in January. This was true even in years when large firms 
had higher risk adjusted returns than small firms. Keim showed that nearly fifty 
^percent oj" the small pap premium was due to January abnormal returns and that more 
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than fifty percent of the January premium occurred during the first week of trading, 
particularly on the first day. A January seasonal in stock returns was first reported by 
Officer (1974) and Rozeff and Kinney (1976) but Keim was the first author to link the 
January effect with the size effect, hi an attempt to explain the January effect, Dyl 
(1977) and Branch (1977) developed the Tax Loss selling Hypothesis (TLSH). 
According to the TLSH, investors will engage in selling of shares that have declined in 
value in the previous year in order to realise losses before the new tax year and thus 
postpone taxes on the realised capital gains. This will initiate a downward pressure on 
the price of these stocks near the end of the year. The pressure dissipates at the 
beginning of the new tax year and the price rebounds. The possible association 
between the January-size effect and the TLSH was investigated by Reinganumn (1983) 
whose results corroborate those of Keim. Although the abnormally high returns in 
January seemed to be consistent with tax-loss-selling, Reinganumn argued that the 
TLSH cannot explain the entire January effect. Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh 
(1983) argued that since Australia has similar tax laws to the USA but a July-June tax 
year, there should be a small firm July premium in stock returns according to the 
TLSH. Nevertheless Australian data showed a pronounced December-January and 
July-August seasonal and a premium for small firms of about four percent for all 
months. They concluded that the relation between the US tax year end and the January 
effect could be more correlation than causation. Cook and Rozeff (1984) investigated 
January and all other months separately for the period 1968-1981 and found that there 
was both a size and an E/P effect. Both effects were significant in all months with no 
effect dominating the other. Nevertheless Banz and Breen (1986) and Rogers (1988) 
suggested that both effects are present but size dominates E/P. 
Chen (1981,1983) argued that the size effect is captured by the factor loadings 
of an Arbitrage Pricing Model and so the risk adjusted returns of portfolios of different 
size firms are not significantly different. These results are consistent with the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis and lend support to the hypothesis that the CAPM is miss-
specified. Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) also used identifiable economic factors in a 
pricing equation and their results indicated that a measure of the changing risk 
premium explained much of the size effect. Rogalski and Tinic (1986) argued that 
there is nothing in asset pricing theory that requires stock risk to remain constant over 
time, as assumed in most of the previous studies of-the size effect. If the risk of small 
firm stocks increases at the beginning of the year; their required rates of return should 
14 
also increase. This became known as the Risk Measurement Hypothesis (RMH). They 
found that small firm stocks had higher returns and significantly higher risk in January 
compared to other months. Ritter and Chopra (1989) found that even in Januaries with 
a negative market return, small firm portfolio returns were positive and the magnitude 
of the return was directly related to the portfolio beta. More specifically they showed 
that high-beta small stocks had higher excess returns in January than low-beta small 
stocks. They found that both the TLSH and the RMH were unable to explain their 
results which were more consistent with the Portfolio Rebalancing Hypothesis (PRH) 
developed by Hausen and Lakonishok (1987). According to the PRH, institutional 
investors engage in 'window dressing' by rebalancing their portfolios prior to year end 
to remove securities which might be embarrassing if they appeared in the year-end 
balance sheets. As soon as December 31 is over they rebalance their portfolios 
investing in more speculative securities including high risk small firm stocks. 
Jegadeesh (1992) evaluated the claim in some papers that betas that were precisely 
estimated could explain the cross-sectional differences in expected returns of portfolios 
formed on size. He argued that the correlation between betas and firm size across the 
test portfolios in these studies was close to one, leading to potentially spurious 
inferences. He went on to show that when the test portfolios were constructed so that 
the correlation between beta and size was small, the betas explained almost none of 
cross-sectional variation in returns. 
Fama and French (1992) tried to capture the cross-sectional variation of NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stock returns by combining market beta, size, E/P, leverage and 
Book to Market Equity (BE/ME) in a multivariate framework. They found that beta 
did not seem to help explain the cross-section of average stock returns. The 
unconditional relations between average returns and each of the variables were strong; 
however size and BE/ME seemed to absorb the effect of E/P and leverage and BE/ME 
had a considerably stronger effect than size. He and Ng (1994) investigated whether 
size and BE/ME are proxies for macroeconomic risks found in Chen, Roll and Ross's 
(1986) (CRR) multifactor model or are measures of the stocks' exposure to relative 
distress. They found that the effect of size overwhelmed that of the risk exposures 
associated with the CRR factors and that the CRR model could not explain the BE/ME 
effect. They also found that size, BE/ME and relative distress are interrelated and that 
relative distress could explain the size effect but only partially the BE/ME effect. Berk 
(1995) pointed out that the type of risk that size will proxy for is entirely determined 
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by the asset pricing model that is being tested: if two different pricing models miss 
different factors in the risk premium, then size will proxy for different factors in the 
two tests. Fama and French (1993, 1995) demonstrated that size and BE/ME can proxy 
for risk factors that capture strong common variation in stock returns. They also 
showed that the two variables help explain the cross section of average returns since 
they are related to profitability. Their research was so influential that exposure to 
book-value-to-market was used to distinguish between value and growth investing 
styles. However, the Fama/French results were contested by Daniel and Titman (1997) 
who provide evidence suggesting that the Fama/French factors rather than explaining 
the cross sectional variation of stock retums by being proxies for underlying risk 
factors, are directly related to these retums for reasons relating to market structure and 
investor behaviour. By examining Compustat data from 1976 to 1995, Kim and Bumie 
(2002) show that the size effect is affected by the economic cycle with the small cap 
premium being significant during expansionary periods of the economy but not during 
recessions. Wang (2000) examined the same data and concluded that the size and book 
value-to-market effects are spurious statistical artefacts resulting from the fact that 
small companies are more likely to drop out of the sample by failing to meet the stock 
exchanges listing criteria thus inducing survivorship bias in the sample. 
Finally, Chan and Lakonishok (2004) provide an excellent up to date survey of 
empirical academic research on value and growth investing. Furthermore they update 
the existing research by examining datasets from various developed economies that 
span time periods ending as recently as 2001. They show that despite recent experience 
in the 90's value investing still outperforms growth investing with small capitalisation 
value stocks outperforming their large cap peers. 
1.1.2 The size effect in Japan and the rest of the World 
The size and the January effects have also been docimiented by a number of 
studies for markets other than the US. In Japan, Kato and Schallheim (1985) report a 
significant January-size effect using data on Tokyo common stocks. Rao, Aggarwal 
and Hiraki (1992) confirm the existence of significant size and seasonal anomalies in 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In addition they report a significant dividend yield effect 
which persists even after confroUing for size. Daniel et al. (2001) examine a sample of 
companies listed on the Tokyo stock exchange to test whether the higher retums 
associated with small size and high book-to-market stocks arise because these 
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attiibutes are proxies for risk factors. Their evidence suggests that, for reasons such as 
behavioural biases or liquidity, the superior returns are directly related to the stocks' 
attributes rather than the covariance structiu-e of the returns. Their results corroborate 
those of previous studies using US data. Chiao and Hueng (2004) challenge the 
validity of Daniel's (2001) findings by showing that the returns of zero investment 
portfolios that sell short past winners and buy past losers cannot be fully attributed to 
their size and book-to-market characteristics. They analyse monthly data of companies 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1975 to 1999 to show that in addition to size 
and book-to-market yet another effect should be taken into consideration in order to 
explain the cross-sectional variation of returns namely the overreaction effect. They 
find that the expanded Fama/French model is better at explaining stock returns both in 
Japan and the US. 
In the UK, Levis (1985) reported that the size effect in the London Stock 
Exchange was not significant. Banz (1985) though contradicts that claim by examining 
29 years of monthly returns arranged in ten value weighted portfolios. Eraser (1995) 
found that the size effect is present prior to mid 1989 but vanishes thereafter. Examples 
of other international studies are Berges et. al. (1984) for Canada, Herrera and 
Lockwood (1994) for Mexico, Wong and Lye (1990) for Singapore, Brown et al. 
(1983) and Gaunt (2004) for Austraha, Ma and Chow (1990) for Taiwan, Rubio (1988) 
for Spain, Hawawini (1988) for Belgium, Walilros and Berglund (1986) for Finland 
and finally Stehle (1990) for Germany. 
1.1.3. The price-effect 
Some studies have presented evidence of a relationship between share price and 
future stock returns. For example, by regressing market model residuals on share 
prices, Blume and Husic (1973) found that current share prices are inversely related to 
future stock returns. They argued that the reason for this association is either 
transaction costs, or the possibility that the share price is a surrogate for the underlying 
ex ante beta. Using NYSE and AMEX stocks, Rross (1985), deconstructed the 
measurements of market value and earnings yield into separate components, and 
presented evidence that approximately three fourths of the relationship between stock 
returns and size, and stock returns and earnings yield, is represented by share price. 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) also demonstrate that the January effect is primarily a low-
share price effect and less so a market value effect. More specifically, they show that low-
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share-price stocks earn abnormal retums in January, before transaction costs, and in 
addition this 'low-price-effect' seems to be stable over time and to subsume the size 
effect. However, once transaction costs and the bid-ask bias in computed retums are taken 
into account, no positive abnormal retums are found. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), also 
investigate whether excess retums on neglected stocks are a manifestation of a stock price 
effect, i.e. whether the neglected-firm effect is really a low-price effect. The neglected-
firm effect states that firms which are not regularly followed by financial analysts and 
which are not widely held by institutional investors tend to outperform firms which are 
scmtinised by analysts. Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) have argued that the size-effect 
is really a neglected-firm effect (since small firms are not frequently followed by a 
sufficiently large number of analysts, the size effect may simply reflect a premium to 
individuals who choose to obtain information about small frnns). Although Bhardwaj and 
Brooks present material evidence supporting an independent neglected firm effect, the 
results are much weaker than in prior studies. Examining a large sample of New York 
Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks fi-om 1977 to 1988, they fovmd 
that both January and non-January months do not have a statistically significant neglect 
effect after controlUng for a price effect. 
1.2 Data and Methodology 
The sample used in the analysis consists of all common stocks traded in both 
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange at any time between January 1985 and August 
2003. There are 4215 such companies of which 1125 no longer exist due to cessation 
of trading or merger/takeover. Non-established companies with fewer than 12 monthly 
observations are excluded from the analysis. There are 54 such companies in total. 
Month end closing prices from the Datastream database were used for the calculation 
of stock returns and other variables involving prices. Total returns indices and balance 
sheet data were also extracted from the same database, hi order to examine the size 
effect the companies are grouped into ten percentile portfolios based on market 
capitalisation which is calculated as the product of the month-end price and the total 
number of shares outstanding. The values used for the number of shares outstanding 
are those reported at the end of the test period (August 2003) as prices are adjusted for 
stock splits and therefore reflect all changes in the number of shares during this period. 
Portfolios are also formed on the stocks' month end price before the rebalance date in 
order to determine the possible existence of a price anomaly as suggested by some of 
the studies mentioned in the introduction. Any systematic difference in the mean and 
standard deviation of the monthly returns of the bottom and the top percentile 
portfolios will be indicative of the existence of a size or price effect. Throughout the 
analysis outlier portfolio returns are dealt with by truncating them to be equal in 
absolute value to the mean return plus three standard deviations. Portfolio premiums 
(which are defined as differences of portfolio returns) are calculated using the portfolio 
returns before truncation. Any outlying premiums observations are subsequently 
truncated in a similar manner. All portfolio returns as well as all premiums are tested 
for normality using the Berra-Jarcques statistic. The critical values for the 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance are 5.99 and 4.6 respectively. Failure to accept the null 
hypothesis would not justify the use of regression based tests to examine different 
hypotheses. Two types of portfolios are examined: equally and capitahsation weighted. 
Once formed the portfolios are rebalanced every twelve months. The first portfolios 
are formed in January 1985 and rebalancing occurs on a regular basis thereafter in 
January of each year. This is done in order to determine whether the size effect is 
iihfhuhe to the way portfolios are formed. A more detailed description of the portfolio 
fbrriiatianpfocedwe is giVOT^  " ~ ' , „ 
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hi order to establish the existence of any seasonal pattems in the portfolio 
retums as well as in the small size and price premiums, their means and annualised 
standard deviations are calculated separately for each of the twelve months in the year. 
To test the null hypothesis of equal expected portfolio retums for each month of the 
year, the following regression is used as in Keim (1983): =6 ,M, + ... + 6 i 2 M , 2 + M, 
where r, is the portfolio return and M,,« = 1...12 are dummies indicating the month in 
which each retum is observed. The same regression is used to test the hypothesis that 
the premiums are spread equally over all months, hi order to determine what 
macroeconomic variables, if any, affect the small-size and price premiums and in what 
way, the means and annualised standard deviations of the portfolio retums and the 
premiums are calculated conditional on various macroeconomic scenarios. For 
example average retums are compared when inflation is above or bellow its median 
over the entire analysis period. 
Finally, once the existence of a size and a price effect has been established 
separately, it needs to be determined whether the two effects exist independently of 
each other and if not whether one effect dominates the other. The degree of 
independence between the two effects is examined by forming portfolios on either 
variable conditioned on the other. Conditional portfolios can be formed in either of two 
ways. In order to explain the two procedures, the example of forming size portfolios 
conditioned on price will be used. The first procedure used by Fama and French (1995) 
sorts all the stocks in the universe into P percentile price groups and S percentile size 
groups independently. The intersections of the P and the S groups are then used to 
define P*S conditional portfolios. This procedure reduces the differences in the 
average stock prices between the portfolios. The number of securities allocated in each 
portfolio though may be quite different thus making some portfolios more susceptible 
to idiosyncratic stock behaviour than others. The properties of the size-effect are 
subsequently analysed by examining the portfolio retums within each price group 
separately and by combining corresponding size portfolios across price groups into a 
new set of portfolios. The retums of the new portfolios are calculated by taking the 
average of the retums of their constituent portfolios. According to the second 
procedure, the universe of stocks is sorted by price into P percentile groups. Each of 
the P price groups is subsequently sorted by size into S percentile portfolios resulting 
in P*S portfolios in total. This procedure ensures that all P*S portfolios have the same 
number of constituent firms and exhibit therefore the same degree of diversification. 
20 
The procedure also mitigates the differences in the average price of each size portfolio 
within each price group thus alleviating to a certain extent the price effect. The price 
effect can be fiirther neutralised by combining the corresponding size portfolios across 
all price groups into one size portfolio. This will result into S size portfolios with the 
same number of constituents and very similar average prices. 
21 
1.3 Portfolio Formation Procedure 
Portfolios are formed at the beginning of the period under examination and are 
subsequently rebalanced when a time interval of fixed length has elapsed. Let's call the 
beginning of such a time interval, the rebalancing point. At each rebalancing point, N 
percentiles p^,p^,...,p^ are calculated for a specific security attribute (e.g. market 
capitalisation) and are ranked in ascending order of magnitude. The number of 
percentiles is fixed during the entire analysis period. These percentiles mark the 
boundaries of N+1 portfolios of securities. The value of the attribute for each of the 
securities in the first portfolio is less than or equal to/?,. For portfoUo i, i=l,...,N the 
value of the attribute for each portfolio constituent is greater than p•_^ and less than or 
equal to . Finally for portfolio N+1 the value of the attribute for each portfolio 
constituent is greater than p^. Securities with no available attribute or price 
information at the rebalancing point are excluded from the analysis for the duration of 
the given time interval. The value of the portfolios thus formed can be calculated as the 
weighted sum of the values of the constituent securities. Portfolios can be either 
equally or capitaUsation weighted. For equally weighted portfolios the weight of each 
security at the rebalancing point is 1 / where i = \,...,N + \ and K. is the number of 
securities in portfolio / . The weights for capitalisation weighted portfolios are 
calculated as mcj /'^mCj where mcj is the market capitalisation for security j and 
^ . 
2_,"^^j is the total market capitaUsation of the constituents of portfolio i . The return 
7 = 1 
for each portfolio over a given time interval is calculated as the weighted sum of the 
retums of the portfolio's constituents over the same period. This time interval can be 
the entire length of time between two consecutive rebalances. AUematively the period 
between consecutive rebalances can be divided into shorter sub-periods of equal 
length. Portfolio retums are then calculated for each of these sub-periods. For example 
the retums on portfolios formed on size and rebalanced semi-annually can be 
calculated on a semi-annual basis where the return is calculated for the entire period 
intervening between two consecutive rebalances. Altematively this period can be 
"divided into 6 one-month-long intervals and portfolio retums can be calculated for 
"each month. UTthe 'latter case the" weight assigrieB tcr a ipecific 'security"retum oh a 
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given sub-period has to be adjusted to reflect the change in the relative portfolio value 
represented by the security. The adjustment is calculated as follows: let w^  be the 
weight of security j at the beginning of a sub-period and rj , PR the return of the 
security and the portfolio respectively over the sub-period. The weight of the security 
at the end of the sub-period is calculated as [(1 + rj)* Wj ] / (1 + PR). A time series of 
monthly portfolio returns spanning the entire period of interest can be subsequently 
calculated for all the portfolios. 
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1.4 Analysis of unconditional percentile portfolios 
1.4.1 Equally weighted market capitalisation percentile portfolios 
Table 1 shows the average monthly returns and the annualised standard 
deviations for the equally weighted portfolios formed on Market Capitalisation. 
Statistics for the market portfolio are also displayed. The small company portfolio is 
denoted PIO and comprises the bottom 10% of the companies when ranked in 
ascending order of market capitalisation. PI00 is the portfolio consisting of the top 
10% of the companies. The annually rebalanced PIO portfolio has an average monthly 
return which is 34 basis points larger than that of the PI00 portfolio but PIO is clearly 
more risky than PI 00. A more informative measure of portfolio performance that takes 
into account both the risk and return measures is the risk/return trade-off as measured 
by the ratio of the average aimualised return over the annualised standard deviation of 
the return. The risk/return trade-off shows the return received by investors for each 
unit of risk undertaken. The risk/return ratio for portfolio PIO, PI00 and the market are 
0.44, 0.30 and 0.32 respectively. This may suggest that the Market portfolio is not on 
the efficient frontier and that company size is a market anomaly leading to higher 
returns without a commensurate increase in risk indicating the presence of the small 
size effect. 
Equalh / Weighted 
Table 1 
, Annually Rebalanced Unconditional Size Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.008 0.219 0.773 0.281 0.319 3.886 
P20 0.007 0.218 0.507 0.192 0.440 3.166 
P30 0.005 0.217 0.030 0.104 0.474 2.482 
P40 0.004 0.215 -0.128 0.090 0.584 3.468 
P50 0.004 0.222 -0.272 0.177 0.657 5.175 
P60 0.004 0.226 -0.222 0.120 0.655 4.517 
P70 0.004 0.217 -0.343 0.047 0.610 3.543 
P80 0.003 0.206 -0.730 -0.065 0.779 5.798 
P90 0.004 0.192 -0.661 0.061 0.979 9.036 
P100 0.005 0.186 0.076 0.660 4.259 
Market 0.006 0.204 0.108 0.675 4.665 
In order to test the hypothesis that average portfolio returns are significantly 
"different from the average returns of portfolio PlOO, the following regression was 
used: P7?:/ - juii+ ^^ i7>^  = 10,20,'...,90 where Pi?. i F the prerri^  
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premium is defined as Pi?,, -''loo, where ?; ,/',oo are the monthly returns for 
portfolios Pi, i=10,...,90 and PlOO respectively. T-statistics for //,. are displayed in the 
column headed 'Premium T-stats'. The null hypothesis of a zero average premium is 
not rejected for the PIO portfolio both at the 10% and 5% levels of significance. 
Therefore although the PIO return is almost twice as large as that of PlOO, the 
difference in the returns does not appear to be statistically significant suggesting the 
absence of the size effect in the Japanese stock market over the specific period under 
investigation. 
1.4.2 Equally weighted price percentile portfolios 
Table 2 displays average returns and their annualised standard deviations for 
portfolios formed by sorting firms into 10 groups according to their month-end price 
prior to portfolio formation. Therefore portfolios formed in February 1985 are done so 
using month-end prices for January 1985. The results reveal a very sti-ong small-price 
effect with small price firms (PIO) on average over-performing large-price firms 
(PlOO) by 118 basis points. The return/risk ratios for the PIO, PlOO and the market 
portfohos are 0.47, -0.0935 and 0.32 respectively. The small-price portfolio 
outperforms both the market and the large-price portfolios. Most of the premiums of 
portfolios PIO to P90 with respect to portfolio PlOO are statistically significant but 
declining suggesting the existence of a more linear structure in the small-price 
premium. This contrasts the behaviour of the small-size portfolio returns where none 
of the premiums is significant. Compared to the small-size premium, the small-price 
premium is almost three times larger and this can be mainly attributed to the 
significantly smaller average return for the PlOO price portfolio when compared with 
the corresponding size portfolio. The average difference between the two portfolio 
returns is 61 basis points with a t-statistic of 2.02 and a critical value of 1.65. It is 
therefore significantly different from zero. The PIO size and price portfolios do not 
appear to have significantly different average returns. Their average return difference 
is 23 basis points with a t-statistic of 1.3. Figure 1 presents a plot of the small-price 
premium and the small-size premium over time. It is evident that the price premium is 
-relatively stable over long periods of time and consistently positive with the only 
^exception being the period between May 96 and February„2000. „. 
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Table 2 
Equally Weighted, Unconditional Price Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.010 0.261 2.561 0.222 0.017 1.831 
P20 0.009 0.263 2.480 0.097 0.300 1.188 
P30 0.006 0.237 2.049 0.111 0.638 4.238 
P40 0.006 0.213 1.975 0.055 0.689 4.529 
P50 0.005 0.201 1.957 0.047 0.730 5.034 
P60 0.004 0.193 1.901 0.040 0.641 3.882 
P70 0.004 0.188 2.017 -0.016 0.756 5.323 
P80 0.002 0.184 1.551 0.087 0.882 7.508 
P90 0.000 0.181 0.867 0.021 0.621 3.595 
P100 -0.001 0.186 0.004 0.356 1.177 
Market 0.006 0.204 0.108 0.675 4.665 
Figure 1 
Cumulative price and size premiums 
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The cumulative small size premium in contrast is rather flat and is characterised by 
long periods of negative values. The flatness of the curve is due to relatively small 
premium values that oscillate around zero. The higher peaks and deeper troughs of the 
cumulative price premium curve reflect the higher volatility of the large price portfolio 
(PI00) compared to the large size portfolio. The existence of prolonged periods of 
negative values in both curves suggests that the effects may be cyclical in nature. It is 
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therefore interesting to look at the relationship between macroeconomic scenarios and 
the return patterns under investigation. 
1.4.3 Equally weighted market to book value percentile portfolios 
Finally all the companies in our investment universe are sorted in ascending 
order of their Market-to-Book-Value ratio (henceforth MTBV) in the month prior to 
portfolio formation'. The return statistics for the percentile portfolios thus formed are 
presented in Table 3. It is evident that the small MTBV portfolio outperforms its large 
ratio counterpart significantly. The average premium of portfolio PIO over portfolio 
PI00 is 108 basis points. This is very similar to the premium of the corresponding 
price portfolios and would imply that the two variables produce highly correlated 
rankings of the securities in our investment universe. In order to test whether this is 
true, the cross-sectional correlation coefficient of the rankings according to the two 
variables is calculated for each month. These coefficients are then averaged across all 
years thus ending up with 12 average ranking correlation coefficients. The values of 
these averages range from 18.76% to 23.48% indicating the absence of strong 
correlation in the rankings. In contrast the correlation coefficients of the rankings 
according to price and market capitalisation range fi-om 42.16% to 44.54%. 
Table 3 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Unconditional MTBV Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.009 0.224 3.306 0.201 0.311 2.395 
P20 0.008 0.220 3.249 0.144 0.706 5.400 
P30 0.007 0.214 3.038 0.092 0.483 2.486 
P40 0.007 0.212 2.982 0.114 0.672 4.680 
P50 0.006 0.208 2.971 0.030 0.646 3.914 
P60 0.004 0.199 2.301 0.052 0.629 3.777 
P70 0.004 0.200 2.437 -0.019 0.606 3.425 
P80 0.003 0.206 2.484 0.080 0.548 3.027 
P90 0.002 0.207 2.025 -0.008 0.530 2.617 
P100 -0.002 0.230 0.140 0.511 3.153 
Market 0.006 0.204 0.108 0.675 4.665 
' In Ime with Fama and French (1993, 1995) who demonstrate that size together with BE/ME can proxy 
for risk factors that capture strong common variation in stock returns, the thesis uses the Market-to-
Book-Value ratio as a robustness test of the findings this far. - ^ - = - ~ — — - -
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The return/risk ratios for the PIO, PlOO and the market portfolios are 0.47, -0.1 
and 0.32 respectively. The small-ratio portfolio outperforms both the market and the 
large-ratio portfolios. In a similar manner to the price portfolios, all of the premiums of 
portfolios PIO to P90 with respect to portfolio PlOO are statistically significant and 
declining in magnitude indicating the existence of a more linear structure in the small 
MTBV premium. Compared to market capitalization, sorting companies according to 
their MTBV ratio is more effective at picking out losers. Indeed the returns of the PIO 
size and MTBV portfolios are almost indistinguishable whereas the average returns of 
the corresponding PlOO portfolios are different by 66 basis points. The MTBV 
portfolios also differ markedly from their price and size portfolios is that they all 
exhibit more or less the same volatility. In fact the volatilities of portfolios PIO and 
PlOO are almost identical. This results in a very strongly significant premium for PIO. 
These results are strikingly similar to the results obtained by Fama and French (1992). 
The authors report that 'The more striking evidence ... is the strong positive relation 
between average return and book-to-market equity. Average returns rise from 0.30% 
for the lowest BE/ME portfolio to 1.83% for the highest, a difference of 1.53% per 
month. This spread is twice as large as the difference of 0.74% between the average 
monthly returns on the smallest and largest size portfolios in Table I I . Note also that 
the strong relation between book-to-market equity and average return is unlikely to be 
a beta effect in disguise; Table IV shows that post-ranking market betas vary little 
across portfoHos formed on ranked values of BE/ME.'. Bearing in mind that MTBV is 
the inverse of BE/ME, the above sentence describes perfectly the results obtained 
herein fi-om the Japanese data. Furthermore the fact that the total risk, as measured by 
the standard deviation of the returns, does not vary much between the different MTBV 
portfolios contradicts the Fama and French hypothesis that the effect is really a proxy 
for some underlying risk factor and gives credence to the assertion that it is an 
anomaly. 
So far the small price and MTBV portfolios appear to out-perform significantly 
their large value counterparts. The following section examines whether this superior 
performance persists when capitalisation weighted portfolios are formed and trading 
costs are accounted for. 
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1.4.3 The effect of capitalisation weights and trading costs 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present statistics for the capitalisation weighted returns of the 
market capitalisation, price and MTBV percentile portfolios. Portfolio weights are 
calculated at the end of the month prior to portfolio formation. A l l portfolios are 
balanced annually and returns are calculated at the end of each month. As is evident, 
the small size portfolio still has an average monthly return which is almost twice as 
large as that of the large size portfolio. However the small size portfolio return is also 
much more volatile than its large size counterpart thus resulting in the difference 
between the two portfolio returns not being statistically significant. None of the other 
size portfolios exhibits returns that are statistically distinguishable from the PI00 
portfolio return, which is in accordance with the equally weighted portfolio results. 
The small price portfolio, despite being much more volatile, still cormnands a sizeable 
and statistically significant premium over the large price portfolio. None of the other 
price portfohos has a statistically significant premium over the PI00 portfolio, 
although they all outperform PI00 in absolute return terms. It is noted that the PI00 
retum is now positive and much larger than its equally weighted counterpart, hi 
contrast almost all of the MTBV portfolios still outperform portfolio PI00 
significantly the only exception being portfolio P80. The portfolio volatilities are again 
very similar in magnitude and so their premiums over PI00 are statistically significant. 
hi order to study the effect of trading costs the equally weighted portfolio 
returns are calculated again by imposing a cost of 30 basis point for buying shares and 
70 basis point for selling shares. The selling cost is inclusive of taxes imposed on 
trading shares by the Japanese government during most of the period under 
investigation. Tables 7 and 8 present resuhs for the price and MTBV portfolios. The 
results for the size portfolios are inconsequential and therefore not presented. As 
expected the imposition of trading costs results in lower portfolio returns across the 
board. Since the effect of trading costs is symmetric, the portfolio premiums and 
volatilities are not affected much. Therefore the patterns of out-performance remain 
unchanged for both the price and the MTBV portfolios. 
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Table 4 
Capitalisation Weighted, Annuaily Rebalanced Unconditional Size 
Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.008 0.231 0.709 0.285 0.245 3.584 
P20 0.007 0.219 0.580 0.194 0.449 3.274 
P30 0.005 0.217 0.140 0.099 0.471 2.423 
P40 0.004 0.215 0.034 0.080 0.590 3.468 
P50 0.004 0.222 -0.117 0.170 0.661 5.134 
P60 0.004 0.226 -0.056 0.119 0.641 4.342 
P70 0.004 0.217 -0.044 0.050 0.612 3.567 
P80 0.003 0.205 -0.320 -0.064 0.797 6.056 
P90 0.004 0.191 -0.095 0.065 0.978 9.040 
P100 0.004 0.189 0.190 0.858 8.175 
Market 0.004 0.179 0.105 0.842 6.993 
Table 5 
Capitalisation Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Unconditional Price 
Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
PIG 0.013 0.283 2.104 0.131 0.210 1.046 
P20 0.008 0.261 1.493 0.044 0.147 0.273 
P30 0.007 0.238 1.304 0.008 0.463 1.997 
P40 0.006 0.214 1.043 0.095 0.341 1.412 
P50 0.005 0.200 1.033 0.076 0.597 3.527 
P60 0.007 0.203 1.622 0.244 0.514 4.663 
P70 0.005 0.203 1.219 0.056 0.658 4.143 
P80 0.004 0.190 0.985 0.192 0.691 5.810 
P90 0.004 0.186 1.415 0.020 1.177 12.888 
P100 0.001 0.186 0.039 0.489 2.276 
Market 0.004 0.179 0.105 0.842 6.993 
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Table 6 
Capitalisation Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Unconditional MTBV 
Portfolios 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.007 0.231 1.995 0.316 0.659 7.762 
P20 0.006 0.231 2.223 0.141 1.133 12.662 
P30 0.009 0.210 2.812 0.009 0.519 2.501 
P40 0.007 0.222 2.383 0.110 0.586 3.639 
P50 0.009 0.206 4.010 0.120 0.521 3.056 
P60 0.004 0.199 2.039 0.148 0.792 6.647 
P70 0.006 0.193 2.501 0.151 0.481 2.998 
P80 0.002 0.206 1.565 0.199 0.638 5.261 
P90 0.002 0.218 1.929 0.195 1.306 17.274 
P100 -0.002 0.234 0.140 0.384 2.105 
Market 0.004 0.179 0.105 0.842 6.993 
Equally Weighted, Annually 1 
Wil 
Table 7 
Rebalanced Unconditional Price Portfolios 
th Trading Costs 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.010 0.261 2.546 0.222 0.015 1.826 
P20 0.009 0.262 2.422 0.096 0.291 1.126 
P30 0.006 0.237 1.973 0.105 0.616 3.939 
P40 0.005 0.212 1.888 0.046 0.669 4.231 
P50 0.004 0.200 1.857 0.040 0.706 4.696 
P60 0.004 0.192 1.797 0.034 0.630 3.725 
P70 0.004 0.187 1.908 -0.025 0.735 5.041 
P80 0.002 0.183 1.440 0.084 0.872 7.329 
P90 -0.001 0.181 0.768 0.022 0.606 3.425 
P100 -0.002 0.186 0.007 0.349 1.131 
Market 0.006 0.204 0.108 0.675 4.665 
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Table 8 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalai 
Portfolios With Trad 
iced Unconditional MTBV 
Ing Costs 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P10 0.009 0.223 3.287 0.200 0.306 2.359 
P20 0.007 0.219 3.168 0.142 0.683 5.083 
P30 0.007 0.214 2.942 0.086 0.452 2.179 
P40 0.006 0.211 2.874 0.108 0.646 4.307 
P50 0.005 0.207 2.845 0.028 0.623 3.640 
P60 0.003 0.198 2.183 0.049 0.611 3.554 
P70 0.003 0.199 2.313 -0.030 0.572 3.074 
P80 0.003 0.206 2.354 0.075 0.528 2.795 
P90 0.002 0.206 1.927 -0.013 0.511 2.435 
P100 -0.002 0.230 0.140 0.505 3.099 
Market 0.006 0.204 0.108 0.675 4.665 
1.4.5 Summary 
In this section the stocks in the investment universe were ranked according to 
three attributes namely their price, their market capitalisation and their MTBV ratio. 
They were subsequently assigned to 10 equally weighted percentile portfolios which 
were rebalanced annually. By examining the returns of the extreme portfolios it 
emerged that the well documented size effect is not very strong in the Japanese stock 
market. However the small price and MTBV portfolios exhibit a sizeable and 
statistically significant premium over their larger value counterparts. In the case of the 
price portfolios, this premium is accompanied by a commensurate increase in risk as 
measured by the armualised standard deviation of the portfolio return. This is in stark 
contrast to the MTBV portfolios whose returns exhibit more or less the same volatility. 
It was also shown that the stock rankings produced by these two attributes are not 
highly correlated thus indicating that at first glance the two effects are independent of 
each other. The use of capitalisation rather than equal weights affects both the absolute 
as well as the relative portfolio returns. In the case of the price portfolios, the premium 
of PIO over PlOO still persists, but all other premiums are now statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, the premiums of the MTBV portfolios PIO to P90 over 
portfolio PlOO are all statistically significant and so the small MTBV premium is 
immune to the portfolio weighting scheme. Accounting for trading costs finally affects 
Fhe nominal but not the relative values of the returns thus leaving the portfolio 
premiums and their related statistics unaffected. 
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1.5 Analysis of conditional percentile portfolios 
Of the three variables tested so far, two, namely price and MTBV, seem to have 
a strong effect on the Japanese stock market. Both attributes generate small value 
percentile portfolios that out-perform significantly their large value counterparts. As 
menfioned in Section 4, both the price and MTBV PIO portfohos exhibit similar 
premiums over their corresponding PI00 portfolios. However a preliminary 
examination shows that there is very little correlation between the two variables. The 
average correlation between the stock rankings produced by the two variables is 21%. 
Another way to examine whether the two effects exist independent of each other is to 
use the two procedures for forming conditional portfolios described in the 
methodology section. These procedures wi l l be employed in this section to separate the 
MTBV and price effects. More particularly sub-section 1.5.1 examines the price 
portfolios when they are conditioned to have similar exposures to MTBV while sub-
section 1.5.2 examines the MTBV portfolios when they are conditioned to have similar 
exposures to price. 
1.5.1 Price conditioned on Market-to-Book-Value 
Return statistics for the conditioned price portfolios are presented in Table 9 for 
the first conditioning procedure and Table 10 for the second one. According to the first 
procedure followed by Fama & French (1995) the universe of stocks is separated into 
two groups by the median MTBV and into five groups by the price quintile points. The 
intersection of the two sets of groups results into ten price/MTBV portfolios. The 
second procedure again separates the universe into two groups by the median MTBV 
and then each group into 5 sub-groups by its respective price quintile points. The first 
procedure results in the number of holdings in each portfolio being quite different from 
its peers while the second procedure ensures that all portfolios have the same number 
of holdings and hence the same degree of diversification. Table 9 shows that only the 
small price P20 portfolios within both MTBV groups have average returns that are 
significantly different fi-om the average returns of their respective large price (PI00) 
portfolios. In accordance with the imconditioned portfolio results in Section 1.4, the 
small price portfolios are substantially riskier than their large price counterparts. 
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Table 9 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Conditional Price Portfolios 
With Procedure 1 
SMALL MTBV PORTFO LIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.012 0.270 2.310 0.192 0.140 1.557 
P40 0.007 0.224 1.302 0.074 0.666 4.327 
P60 0.006 0.202 0.791 0.149 0.647 4.712 
P80 0.006 0.192 1.117 0.129 1.089 11.647 
PICO 0.005 0.192 0.084 0.894 7.693 
LARGE MTBV PORTFO LIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.008 0.291 1.931 0.116 0.143 0.689 
P40 0.003 0.235 1.476 0.052 0.651 4.042 
P60 0.003 0.203 1.658 -0.020 0.726 4.906 
P80 0.002 0.185 1.489 0.044 0.515 2.535 
PICO -0.002 0.184 0.038 0.354 1.218 
Table 10 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Conditional Price Portfolios 
With Procedure 2 
SMALL MTBV PORTFO LIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.012 0.276 2.570 0.214 0.124 1.850 
P40 0.007 0.232 1.687 0.153 0.535 3.523 
P60 0.006 0.206 1.117 0.137 0.642 4.536 
P80 0.006 0.195 1.694 0.082 0.791 6.069 
P100 0.005 0.189 0.099 1.177 13.244 
LARGE MTBV PORTFO LIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.007 0.281 1.847 0.091 0.290 1.091 
P40 0.004 0.226 1.803 0.004 0.945 8.301 
P60 0.001 0.200 1.326 0.031 0.681 4.341 
P80 0.001 0.186 1.562 0.125 0.641 4.400 
P100 -0.003 0.193 0.036 0.280 0.777 
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Table 11 
Average Price and MTBV values for the Constituents of the Price 
Average Price Average MTBV 
P20SB P100SB P20LB P100LB P20SB P100SB P20LB P100LB 
1985 211 1212 221 1953 -243 159 413 668 
1986 266 1571 273 1904 -620 185 476 505 
1987 325 2198 318 2431 123 172 784 678 
1988 477 2446 463 21194 72 228 819 667 
1989 728 2964 717 16404 131 159 949 760 
1990 937 4255 924 13566 270 299 961 1134 
1991 479 3286 454 7351 110 169 596 483 
1992 467 3440 444 7276 112 169 442 432 
1993 332 2505 308 5326 87 122 475 296 
1994 400 2938 377 14677 -39 151 538 369 
1995 411 13636 394 13159 48 142 747 329 
1996 421 11826 428 14170 -10 143 441 552 
1997 327 9719 324 14874 2 116 343 358 
1998 191 14059 186 13937 19 22 547 240 
1999 141 10614 136 20697 -87 30 372 241 
2000 141 26561 135 104017 1 34 137 278 
2001 125 47854 124 60249 32 56 300 352 
2002 98 67433 103 84805 20 51 218 331 
2003 89 62323 93 68444 22 37 277 220 
Total 1 Avg 346 15307 338 25602 3 124 499 459 
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Table 12 
Average Price and MTBV values for the Constituents of the Price 
Average Price Average MTBV 
P20SB P100SB P20LB P100LB P20SB P100SB P20LB P100LB 
1985 194 967 252 2375 -364 159 395 601 
1986 265 1296 283 2242 -639 183 460 541 
1987 307 1694 355 2930 108 192 706 744 
1988 470 2116 479 28145 61 216 782 736 
1989 766 2964 754 19227 154 159 899 780 
1990 979 4015 929 14686 285 298 973 1180 
1991 478 2344 455 8705 111 106 598 504 
1992 458 2394 459 8147 108 165 443 436 
1993 324 1769 321 6569 85 121 453 313 
1994 403 2219 376 18404 -34 148 541 394 
1995 416 8443 368 15057 53 123 864 340 
1996 430 7351 408 17745 6 144 467 631 
1997 325 6032 310 18959 1 115 352 389 
1998 183 5105 209 22504 10 58 449 272 
1999 127 3024 167 34673 -126 52 299 290 
2000 126 3700 188 194918 13 31 127 429 
2001 106 8291 170 108729 32 60 330 488 
2002 78 11573 164 153070 16 55 228 365 
2003 69 15158 152 119807 20 51 218 244 
Total 
Avg 342 4761 358 41942 -4 123 486 505 
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Table 13 
Consolidated Price Portfolios Net of the MTB IV Effect 








SMALL 0.010 0.279 2.137 0.146 0.134 0.956 
LARGE 0.002 0.180 0.011 0.878 7.159 
PREMIUM 0.008 0.187 0.283 0.192 3.313 
Procedure 2 
SMALL 0.009 0.276 2.211 0.138 0.160 0.941 
LARGE 0.001 0.182 0.028 0.859 6.888 
PREMIUM 0.009 0.186 0.259 0.277 3.214 
Table 
Average Price and IVITBV for Con 




ents of Consolidated Price 
BV Effect 
Procedure 1 Procedure 2 
SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
1985 216 1582 85 414 223 1671 15 380 
1986 270 1738 -72 345 274 1769 -89 362 
1987 321 2315 454 425 331 2312 407 468 
1988 470 11820 445 448 474 15131 422 476 
1989 723 9684 540 459 760 11096 526 470 
1990 930 8911 616 716 954 9351 629 739 
1991 467 5318 353 326 467 5525 354 305 
1992 455 5358 277 300 458 5270 275 301 
1993 320 3915 281 209 322 4169 269 217 
1994 389 8807 250 260 389 10312 254 271 
1995 402 13398 397 236 392 11750 459 232 
1996 424 12998 216 347 419 12548 237 388 
1997 326 12297 172 237 317 12496 176 252 
1998 189 13998 283 131 196 13805 230 165 
1999 139 15656 142 135 147 18849 87 171 
2000 138 65289 69 156 157 99309 70 230 
2001 125 54051 166 204 138 58510 181 274 
2002 100 76119 119 191 121 82322 122 210 
2003 91 65383 150 128 111 67482 119 147 
Total 
Avg 342 20455 251 291 350 23351 241 314 
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The second conditioning procedure generates similar although slightly stronger 
results. Now both portfolios P20 and P40 out-perform portfolio PI00 for both MTBV 
groups. The price portfolios again become riskier as we move from PI00 to P20. 
Tables 11 and 12 show the average MTBV and average price of the constituents of the 
P20SB (P20 Small MTBV), PIOOSB, P20LB (P20, Large MTBV) and PIOOLB 
portfolios for both conditioning procedures. The average Market-to-Book-Value 
spread between the P20 and PI00 portfolios in the small MTBV group is clearly large 
enough to claim part of the return difference for both procedures. This is not true for 
the large MTBV price portfolios which have virtually the same exposure to MTBV. In 
order to mitigate the MTBV effect and assess the pure price effect we compare the 
returns of two new portfolios which are simply called SMALL PRICE and LARGE 
PRICE and their return statistics are displayed in Table 13 for both procedures. The 
SMALL PRICE portfolio is formed by taking the simple arithmetic average of the P20 
portfolios across the two MTBV groups. Equivalently the LARGE PRICE portfolio 
return series is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the two PI00 portfolios. Table 14 
contains the average Market-to-Book-Value and the average stock price of the 
portfolio constituents. Apparently the SMALL PRICE portfolio premiums are positive 
and significant for both procedures. The Fama & French procedure average premium 
is 84 basis points, almost identical to the premium resulting from the second procedure 
which is 86 basis points. The return differential can only be attributed to the larger 
average price spread between the LARGE PRICE and the SMALL PRICE portfolios. 
The two portfolios have a small Market-to-Book-Value spread for both procedures, 
compared to the spread in exposure of the unconditioned MTBV portfolios PIO and 
PI00 (40 and 73 versus 1116). It is therefore evident that the price effect persists even 
when exposure to Market-to-Book-Value is controlled for. 
1.5.2 Market-to-Book-Value conditioned on Price 
Results for the Market-to-Book-Value portfolios which are conditioned to have 
similar exposures to price are presented in Table 15 for the Fama-French procedure. 
Al l portfolios in both price groups outperform their respective PI00 portfolio the only 
exception being the large price group P80 portfolio. Furthermore the P20 premium 
over portfolio PI00 is almost exactly the same for both price groups (73 and 77 basis 
points respectively). At first glance this indicates thatlhe Market-to-Book-Value effect 
continues to be very strong and exists indepMdently' frtfih the" price" ^ ffeH. The"risk" 
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profiles of all portfolios within each group are very similar however the large price 
MTBV portfolios are less risky than the small price MTBV portfolios. This is due to 
the latter group's exposure to small prices and is in accordance with the unconditional 
price portfolio results where it was noted that the small price portfolios were much 
more volatile than their large price counterparts. The average price and Market-to-
Book-Value exposures for all portfolios are presented in Table 16. It is noted that the 
average price spread of the constituents of the P20 and PI 00 MTBV portfolios is much 
larger in the large price group than in the small price group leaving open the possibility 
that results for the former group may be driven by both price and Market-to-Book-
Value. However the price spread between the large price group P20 and PI00 MTBV 
portfolios pales in comparison even to that of the unconditional P90 and PI00 price 
portfolios (18,974 versus 53,725). It is therefore highly unlikely that exposure to price 
bears any effect to the performance differences of the large price group MTBV 
portfolios. 
Table 15 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Conditional MTBV Portfolios 
With Procedure 1 
SMALL PRICE PORT FOLIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.010 0.238 5.093 0.180 0.393 2.642 
P40 0.008 0.234 4.615 0.128 0.442 2.423 
P60 0.006 0.238 3.863 0.076 0.417 1.829 
P80 0.006 0.248 4.275 0.067 0.438 1.950 
PICO 0.002 0.267 0.090 0.490 2.537 
LARGE PRICE PORTFOLIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.006 0.198 2.446 0.130 1.036 10.606 
P40 0.005 0.193 2.366 0.041 0.962 8.661 
P60 0.003 0.181 2.248 0.074 0.975 9.034 
P80 0.001 0.183 1.464 0.028 0.492 2.278 
P100 -0.001 0.190 -0.024 0.171 0.294 
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Table 16 
Average Price and MTBV values for the Constituents of the MTBV 
Average Price Average MTBV 
P20SP P100SP P20LP P100LP P20SP P100SP P20LP P100LP 
1985 295 312 757 1571 -268 638 117 861 
1986 363 351 919 1644 -534 704 132 830 
1987 435 413 1067 2058 63 1120 114 846 
1988 609 606 1788 23903 26 1118 64 953 
1989 877 834 2015 17565 82 1091 103 1085 
1990 1134 1117 2713 3699 204 1524 235 1469 
1991 606 562 1667 2436 80 818 47 634 
1992 591 561 1557 2414 82 584 123 537 
1993 431 409 1158 2663 59 573 87 429 
1994 527 476 1548 13021 -29 1143 97 504 
1995 535 464 2926 14528 24 1148 77 433 
1996 559 515 2684 16503 -14 557 91 763 
1997 436 398 1916 15516 3 460 48 462 
1998 300 286 5600 14089 7 715 -13 302 
1999 231 217 1274 22678 -85 517 15 350 
2000 119 118 2556 59169 -11 817 9 661 
2001 220 221 10472 59208 0 669 35 420 
2002 185 207 16898 73203 11 446 31 392 
2003 168 199 16351 52855 11 554 19 287 
Total 
Avg 437 419 3921 22895 -15 800 75 643 
Table 17 presents the return statistics for the MTBV portfolios that are 
controlled to have the same exposure to price using the second procedure. Again this 
procedure produces remarkably similar results to the Fama-French method and 
reaffirms the results presented in the previous paragraph. Finally an attempt is made to 
mitigate the price effect fiirther by examining two new portfolios namely SMALL 
MTBV and LARGE MTBV. The SMALL MTBV (LARGE MTBV) portfolio returns 
are calculated by taking the simple arithmetic average of the returns of the two P20 
(PI00) BVALUE portfolios corresponding to the two price groups. This procedure 
reduces the price spread between the large and small MTBV portfolios even more thus 
minimising the impact that the price effect may have on the relative portfolio 
performances. Return statistics are presented in Table 19 for both procedures while 
Table 20 shows the average exposure of the two portfolios to the MTBV and price 
factors.-As is evident, the SMALL MTBV portfoho.out-performs the LARGE MTBV 
=portfolio»strongly. Notice how both portfohos have ahnost identical risk profiles now=^  
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that their difference in exposure to price has been mitigated. The evidence therefore 
suggests that the Market-to-Book-Value effect persists and is quite strong even when 
the percentile portfolios are forced to have similar exposures to price. 
Table17 
Equally Weighted, Annually Rebalanced Conditional MTBV Portfolios 
With Procedure 2 
SMALL PRICE PORTFOLIOS 




T^tat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.010 0.241 4.395 0.188 0.340 2.382 
P40 0.009 0.236 4.534 0.171 0.516 3.562 
P60 0.007 0.239 3.686 0.073 0.503 2.551 
P80 0.007 0.245 3.682 0.049 0.414 1.685 
PlOO 0.003 0.265 0.069 0.540 2.893 
LARGE PRICE PORTFOLIOS 




T-Stat Skewness Kurtosis 
Normality 
Test 
P20 0.006 0.195 2.390 0.082 0.995 9.461 
P40 0.005 0.188 2.617 0.077 0.850 6.933 
P60 0.002 0.177 1.486 0.006 0.725 4.891 
P80 0.001 0.186 1.789 0.047 0.406 1.616 
PlOO -0.002 0.195 0.019 0.063 0.051 
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Table 18 
Average Price and MTBV values for the Constituents of the IVITBV 
Average Price Average MTBV 
P20SP P100SP P20LP P100L P P20SP P100SP P20LP P100LP 
1985 285 308 748 1798 -417 522 129 1019 
1986 363 352 883 1739 -728 640 140 913 
1987 415 427 1048 2273 23 917 139 934 
1988 600 598 1681 26036 -8 1033 93 997 
1989 858 819 1957 16377 80 1119 104 1059 
1990 1126 1101 2704 3535 210 1596 232 1407 
1991 615 582 1718 2560 69 753 68 670 
1992 596 580 1660 2550 70 559 131 559 
1993 423 411 1208 1922 46 536 95 448 
1994 519 480 1566 13913 -67 1086 107 519 
1995 550 480 2878 14779 20 1126 82 429 
1996 568 530 2641 16558 -19 560 94 755 
1997 433 402 1820 16298 -18 448 60 475 
1998 275 277 3049 15866 -21 541 28 339 
1999 215 217 2617 24887 -167 350 38 420 
2000 109 119 1677 88538 -49 438 43 898 
2001 201 227 5735 70215 -27 377 48 539 
2002 154 214 6580 96460 -9 255 46 508 
2003 143 205 8325 62852 -5 326 40 354 
Total 
Avg 428 422 2609 28385 -54 694 90 697 
Table 19 
Consolidated MTBV Portfolios Net of the Price Effect 








SMALL 0.008 0.214 3.583 0.133 0.611 4.127 
L A R G E 0.001 0.218 0.037 0.506 2.426 
PREMIUM 0.007 0.090 -0.058 0.402 1.630 
Procedure 2 
SMALL 0.008 0.213 3.368 0.116 0.544 3.252 
L A R G E 0.001 0.219 0.043 0.503 2.423 
PREMIUM 0.007 0.092 -0.040 0.593 3.324 
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Table 20 
Average Price and MTBV for Constituents of Consolidated MTBV 
Portfolios Net of Price Effect 
Procedure 1 Procedure 2 
SMALL L A R G E SMALL L A R G E SMALL L A R G E SMALL L A R G E 
1985 -76 749 526 941 -144 770 516 1053 
1986 -201 767 641 997 -294 776 623 1045 
1987 88 983 751 1236 81 925 731 1350 
1988 45 1036 1199 12255 42 1015 1141 13317 
1989 93 1088 1446 9200 92 1089 1408 8598 
1990 220 1497 1923 2408 221 1502 1915 2318 
1991 63 726 1137 1499 68 711 1167 1571 
1992 102 561 1074 1487 101 559 1128 1565 
1993 73 501 794 1536 71 492 815 1167 
1994 34 823 1038 6749 20 802 1043 7196 
1995 50 791 1730 7496 51 777 1714 7630 
1996 38 660 1622 8509 37 658 1604 8544 
1997 25 461 1176 7957 21 461 1126 8350 
1998 -3 508 2950 7188 4 440 1662 8072 
1999 -35 433 753 11447 -64 385 1416 12552 
2000 -1 739 1338 29644 -3 668 893 44329 
2001 17 545 5346 29714 11 458 2968 35221 
2002 21 419 8542 36705 18 382 3367 48337 
2003 15 421 8260 26527 18 340 4234 31528 
Total 
Avg 30 721 2179 11657 18 695 1518 14404 
1.5.3 Summary 
Two different procedures were used to mitigate the Market-to-Book-Value 
differences among the price portfoHos and the price differences among the Market-to-
Book-Value portfoUos in order to disentangle the MTBV and the price effects. Both 
methods manage to mitigate these differences in exposure substantially although 
neither method eliminates them completely. This is because the two effects are weakly 
correlated. This obstacle is overcome, when necessary, by comparing the returns of the 
conditional portfolios with those of unconditional portfolios that have a similar 
exposure to the factor in question. The analysis of the returns of the conditional 
portfolios shows that both effects seem to exist independent of each other; however the 
evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the MTBV effect. The price effect appears 
"weakened when the average MTBV differences Of theprice pbftfoUos are reduced but 
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is still statistically significant. In contrast the MTBV effect still persists in the absence 
of large price differences in the constituents of the Market-to-Book-Value portfolios. 
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1.6 The effect of Macroeconomic scenarios on 
portfolio premiums 
Inherent in the previous analysis is that the return differential between the 
extreme percentile portfolios for both factors is stable over time. There is evidence 
presented in some studies though that the premium changes in magnitude and some 
times even in sign over time. A closer look at the way the difference in the monthly 
returns of the PIO and the PI00 portfolios, evolves over time is very revealing. Figure 
2 plots the cumulative return differences between PIO and PI00 over time, for both the 
MTBV and the price portfolios. It can be seen that the slope of both premiums is 
declining over certain periods of time meaning that the premiums are actually negative 
during these periods. This may suggest that the Market-to-Book-Value and the price 
premiums are cyclical in nature and are affected by the macro-economy. The 
relationship between the magnitude of the small Market-to-Book-Value and price 
premiums and certain macroeconomic variables (factors) is examined by analysing 
both premiums under four scenarios: 
• The macro-economic factor value in the highest quartile of it's distribution (high 
growth in the factor) 
• The macro-economic factor value in the lowest quartile of it's distribution (low 
growth in the factor) 
• The macro-economic factor value above the median of it's distribution 
• The macro-economic factor value below the median of it's distribution 
The factors used to create the different scenarios are: 
• Inflation defined as the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index 
• Changes in the level of consumer confidence 
• Percentage change in the Japanese YenAJS Dollar exchange rate 
• Changes in the short term interest rate 
• Changes in the long term interest rate 
• The growth rate of industrial production 
• The growth rate of the narrow money supply measure M l 
• The growth rate of the broad money supply measure M4 
Tables 21 and 22 contain results for the price and Market-to-Book-Value 
-portfolios respectively. The first six columns in each table display the means and 
standard deviations of the monthly returns for the PIO and PI00 portfolios as well as 
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for the premium when each scenario is true. The columns headed P(Prem>0), 
P(Prem>mean+std) and P(Prem<mean-std) display the empirical probability that the 
premium is larger than zero, larger than the average premium plus one standard 
deviation and smaller than the average premium minus one standard deviation 
respectively. The empirical probability for a given event is calculated as the percentage 
of the total number of observations for which the event is true. The interpretation of 
the probabilities is straightforward: i f the probability of the premium being greater 
(smaller) than zero is above 0.5, then portfolio PIO outperforms (underperforms) 
portfolio PI00 under that scenario. The probability of the premium being greater than 
the mean plus one standard deviation indicates the chances for significant over 
performance whilst the probability that the premium is less than the mean minus one 
standard deviation gives a measure of the chances for significant underperformance. 
Starting with the price portfolios, Table 21 shows that the average premium is larger 
and more likely to be positive when inflation is high. The average premium is higher 
by 120 basis points when inflation is either above its median value or at its highest 
quartile. However there is no indication that this is due to the premium attaining more 
extreme values during high inflation periods. The probability that the premium is 
further away than one standard deviation fi*om its mean is roughly the same for both 
high and low inflation periods. Consumer confidence seems to have a very strong 
effect on the observed small-price premium. The average premium during periods of 
high consumer confidence is almost nine times higher than when consumer confidence 
is low. Over 70% of the observed monthly premiums are positive when consumer 
confidence changes are in the highest quartile. The premium seems to be 
symmetrically distributed around it's mean as shown by the percentage of values 
greater or smaller than the mean plus or minus one standard deviation respectively. 
Therefore the difference cannot be attributed to the effect of one off shocks. The 
premium also appears to be larger and more evenly distributed when the Yen/US 
Dollar exchange rate is less volatile. Using similar reasoning it can be deduced that the 
premium remains relatively imaffected by changes in the long term interest rates, the 
corporate bond yield and both money supply measures. 
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Large changes in the short term interest rates seem to have an adverse effect on the 
small-price premium. This may be due to the fact that declining short term rates benefit 
small companies more since a larger proportion of their debt portfolio consists of short 
term liabilities as opposed to large companies that have easier access to long term 
capital. However, as the next few rows in Table 21 indicate, periods of low short term 
interest rate levels tend to be associated with a smaller average premiiun. This is due to 
the fact that when interest rates are already low they are more likely to go up than 
down. Extreme changes in industrial production (values in the top quartile) have a 
positive effect on the premium but that effect dissipates when looking at the two halves 
of the distribution (above and below median). The above analysis when applied to the 
Market-to-Book-Value percentile portfolios does not yield the same conclusions. The 
difference between the returns of small Market-to-Book-Value PIO portfolio and the 
large MTBV PI00 portfolio seems to be fairly stable and largely unaffected by the 
different macroeconomic scenarios. The only exceptions seem to be periods of large 
positive and large negative changes in consumer confidence and periods of high versus 
low corporate bond yields. High consumer confidence and high bond yields benefit the 
difference between the returns of the PIO and PI 00 MTBV portfolios. 
Overall, there seems to be evidence in the data that the small price premium is 
strongly affected by macroeconomic conditions. The premium of the small MTBV 
portfolio however remains relatively stable when different macroeconomic scenarios 
are applied. A related question that has drawn the attention of many researchers is 
whether portfolio returns and their related premiums exhibit any seasonal patterns. 
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1.7 Seasonalities in tlie portfolio premiums 
Table 23 displays average monthly returns for the price portfolios and their 
standard deviations for each month of the year. A l l the portfolio returns exhibit an 
interesting decaying pattern. They remain positive during the first half of the year 
(January to June) and achieve their highest value in May. Subsequently the portfolio 
returns become negative in July and stay so until December. The high value of all 
portfolio returns in May confirms the "January" effect documented in many similar 
studies whereby exceptionally high returns are observed in the month following the 
financial year end. However most Japanese companies have their financial year end in 
April and hence the large returns in May. A similar pattern is followed by the small 
price portfolio premium, although it assumes its largest value in July. The premium 
attains large positive values between February and July and subsequently it becomes 
small and oscillates around zero. It is interesting to note that the market return is also 
consistently negative between July and December which corroborates the evidence in 
the previous section that the small price premium is affected by the macro economy. 
The aforementioned seasonal patterns in the mean returns tend to be confirmed by the 
respective t-statistics which result from the regressions of the portfolio returns and the 
premium on 12 monthly dummy variables. The coefficients for the small price 
premium are positive and statistically significant between January and May. During 
the rest of the year they oscillate around zero and bear no statistical significance. 
The same seasonal pattern is exhibited by the Market-to-Book-Value 
portfolios. Table 24 shows the average portfolio returns and the regression results of 
the portfolio returns on the 12 monthly dummy variables. The portfolio returns are 
consistently negative during the second half of the year and positive during the first 
half The premium of portfolio PIO over PI00 is mostly positive and Hke the small 
price premium, attains its largest value in July. The only three negative average 
premium values occur in the second half of the year. 
To summarize therefore, both groups of portfolios exhibit the same seasonal 
pattern whereby returns are negative between July and December and positive during 
the rest of the year. Interestingly the same pattern is identified in the market return. 
This suggests that the observed seasonalities are pervasive and not specific to either 
=group of portfolio returns. In a similar mamief the pfeniium of portfolio PIO over PIOO 
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does not persist across all months of the year but is strongest during the first half, for 
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The existence of the so called size effect in stock returns is investigated for the 
Japanese stock market. I f the size effect is present, stocks of small companies should 
command a premium, that is earn a higher return than the stock of large companies. 
This is known as the small cap premium. The stocks comprising the investment 
universe are sorted in ascending order of their market capitalisation and are 
subsequently allocated into ten percentile portfolios whose returns are examined to 
establish the existence of the small cap premium. Likewise two other attributes namely 
price and Market-to-Book-Value, are also used to form percentile portfolios and 
examine the existence of other related potential sources of pricing anomalies. Analysis 
of the returns of these portfolios lends very weak support to the hypothesis that the size 
effect is present in the Japanese market, hi contrast the small price and Market-to-
Book-Value portfolios appear to outperform their large value counterparts 
significantly. Since there is little evidence in support of the size effect in Japan, the 
subsequent analysis concentrates on the price and Market-to-Book-Value portfolios. 
Both the Market-to-Book-Value and price premiums as well as most of the portfolio 
returns show a seasonal pattern in that they tend to be positive during the first half of 
the year (more so in April and May) and negative thereafter. This phenomenon is 
termed the "January" effect and has been identified by a multitude of studies in the US 
and European markets where most companies have their financial year end in 
December. In the case of Japan most companies report year end results in March and 
April and so the effect is observed in April/May. 
When conditioned on macroeconomic variables, it is clear that the price 
premium and to a lesser extent the Market-to-Book-Value premium are associated with 
the state of the underlying economy. Scenarios that are representative of upswings in 
the business cycle such as high inflation, strong currency relative to the US Dollar, 
strong consumer confidence, monetary and fiscal stability are linked with positive 
premiums. 
The existence of moderate correlation between price and Market-to-Book-
Value implies that the respective portfolio returns are also correlated. An attempt to 
disentangle the two effects is made by examining the returns of Market-to-Book-Value 
and price portfolios that are price and Market-to-Book-Value neutral respectively. Jhe.^ 
price effect appears weaker but still statistically significant in the absence of large 
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differences in the average Market-to-Book-Value value between the price portfolios, hi 
contrast the premium of the small Market-to-Book-Value appears unaffected by the 
elimination of large price differences in the constituents of the Market-to-Book-Value 
portfoUos. 
The debate surrounding market anomalies has recently focused on the validity 
of the CAPM as an asset pricing model. The argument is that observed market 
anomalies are due to the influence of risk factors unaccounted for by the simple 
structure of the CAPM. The higher observed returns for small-size or price portfolios 
are therefore due to the higher exposure of these portfolios to certain risk factors. An 
insight into verity of this hypothesis can be gained by looking at a measure of total risk 
for the portfolios analysed in this chapter. The measure of risk used is the annualised 
standard deviation of the returns. At first glance the small price and small market 
capitalisation portfolios appear to be much riskier than their 'large' value counterparts. 
Since all portfolios have the same number of constituent securities, it is fair to assume 
that the differences in total risk tend to reflect differences in systematic rather than 
residual risk. However, according to modem portfolio theory the efficient investment 
frontier is concave when drawn in the risk/return space. This implies that the slope of 
the curve is diminishing as we move towards larger risk numbers, implying that each 
additional unit of risk undertaken is rewarded with an ever decreasing return. 
Therefore the return/risk ratio of securities becomes smaller as both risk and return 
increase. As shown in the tables displaying statistics for the portfolio returns, the 
'small' portfolios have a larger rather than smaller return/risk ratio than the 'large' 
ones or the market. This implies that either the market portfolio in not on the efficient 
frontier or that the total risk of the small portfolios cannot account for the whole of the 
return and that part of the return must be due to pricing errors captured by size and/or 
price. This analysis is irrelevant for the Market-to-Book-Value portfolios, where the 
PI00 portfolio not only has a negative return on average but also appears to be slightly 
riskier than the PIO portfolio thereby negating the claim that return differences are 
accounted for by risk differences. 
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CHAPTER 2 




The negative serial correlation exhibited by stock returns has been a well-
documented phenomenon since the 1960's (Fama, (1965)). This observation casts 
doubt on the validity of the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Moreover, a 
multitude of studies over the last 20 years, indicate that this phenomenon can be 
exploited economically (e.g. De Bondt & Thaler (1987), Lakonishok et al (1994), 
Bacmann & Dubois (1998)). Empirical estimates suggest that contrarian strategies can 
consistently yield substantial profits with serious implications about the weak form of 
the efficient market hypothesis. A contrarian strategy calls for action that is contrary to 
that followed by 'naive' investors. Examples of 'naive' investment behaviour range 
from assuming a trend in stock prices to extrapolating past earnings growth too far into 
the fiiture, to overreacting to good or bad news or to equating a good investment with a 
well-run company irrespective of price. 
Confrarian strategies can be grouped in two categories according to their 
investment horizon (the length of the period for which an investment is held before it is 
liquidated): short-term and long-term strategies. Typical short-term strategies hold 
investment for up to a month. Long-term sfrategies hold investments for a year or 
longer. There is a large body of evidence showing that both long and short term 
contrarian sfrategies are significantly profitable (e.g. De Bondt & Thaler (1985, 1987), 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1995)). However, empirical studies of both types of contrarian 
strategy are susceptible to methodological pitfalls which are explained in the literature 
review. The academic community developed two competing explanations for 
contrarian profits. The first argues that contrarian sfrategies bear higher fiindamental 
risk than naive sfrategies and so are rewarded by higher returns (e.g. Chan (1988), Ball 
& Kothari (1989)) An alternative explanafion (e.g. De Bondt & Thaler (1985, 1987), 
Lakonishok et al (1994), Daniel et al (1998)) is that investors become overly 
enthusiastic about stocks that performed well in the past and buy them up. The result is 
that these stocks become overpriced, hi a similar manner, they overreact to stocks that 
had a poor performance in the past and these stocks become under-priced. Contrarian 
mvestors bet against this behaviour by selling the 'overpriced' stocks and buying the 
under-priced ones. More recent articles (e.g. Jegadeesh & Titman (1995)) suggest that 
return reversals may not be the only source of confrarian profits. Such profits can also 
arise when some firms react faster to information than others. 
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Much of the criticism directed to the contrarian literature stems fi-om problems 
with the applied methodology that may lead to spurious results. For example portfolio 
retums are commonly susceptible to bid-ask bias and other measurement errors and so 
over-estimate contrarian retums (Ball et al (1995)). This study contributes to the debate 
by seeking to address these issues and extend the analysis as follows: 
a) The Japanese stock market is tested for the existence of contrarian profits. The 
academic community has relatively neglected this market and most of the 
research is concentrated on US data. 
b) Unlike previous studies we examine optimal investment portfolios that have 
maximum expected return and zero (or near zero) systematic risk. 
c) Different implementations of the contrarian strategies resuU fi-om alternative 
ways of identifying over and under-priced stocks. It is shown that contrarian 
profits are very dependent on the asset-pricing model used to estimate the 
magnitude of stock miss pricing and the co-variability of the investment 
universe 
d) Liquidity is found to be another major factor affecting the magnitude of 
contrarian profits. The extent to which stock prices are determined by market 
considerations or firm specific attributes is also closely related to this factor. 
e) Trading costs are introduced when calculating portfolio retums and are found 
to significantly affect their performance. Trading costs have largely been 
ignored by the literature although the strategies examined exhibit very high 
tumover (and hence substantial transaction costs). 
f) The conventional literature calculates portfolio retums using closing stock 
prices which are largely unattainable. This study also examines portfolio 
retums which are calculated using two different types of prices: Open prices 
and volume-weighted average prices (VWAP). Both prices are readily and 
cheaply delivered by Japanese stock brokers therefore portfolio retums that are 
thus calculated are more realistic and feasible. 
g) A l l the empirical studies so far examine a contrarian portfolio which is formed 
in period t-1 and whose performance is measured in period t. The retums of 
both periods use the closing price of period t-1, therefore the portfolio retums 
suffer from in-sample bias due to the way they are calculated. This bias results 
in substantially over-estimated contrarian profits as wil l be shown later. Use of 
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closing prices in the formation period and open or VWAP prices in the test 
period avoids this pitfall. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: 
Section 2.1 reviews the existing literature on contrarian profits. Section 2.2 presents 
the data and the methodology used. Section 2.3 replicates the Jegadeesh & Titman 
(1995) analysis. Section 2.4 extends the contrarian sfrategy of Section 2.3 by requiring 
that the investment portfolio is always chosen to be the maximum Sharpe Ratio 
portfolio. Three models are used to generate the trading signals: a simple market 
model, a model that uses the market retum and its first order lag as factors and finally a 
multifactor model that uses 20 statistical factors extracted with factor analysis 
techniques. Section 2.5 examines market microstructure issues and proposes remedies. 
The profitability of this sfrategy is reassessed when all the biases are controlled for. 
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2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Since the advent of asset pricing models, a plethora of studies have attempted 
to either give support or disprove the efficient market hypothesis: the notion that all 
past information has been impacted in current prices and therefore it is impossible to 
predict future price movements and exploit them profitably. Researchers have looked 
for 'irregularities' or 'anomalies' in the behaviour of capital markets. The presence of 
empirical anomalies in asset returns suggests that empirical forms of asset pricing 
models are miss-specified and/or that capital markets are not efficient. The procedure, 
most commonly used by event studies to analyse such anomalies, is the ranking of the 
assets comprising the investment universe according to some attribute such as market 
capitalisation, accounting ratios, past asset returns etc. Assets are subsequently 
grouped into portfolios of 'high' and 'low' attribute values and their returns are 
compared. Alternatively, researchers simulate a contrarian strategy that assumes a long 
position in one portfolio and a short position in the other and the profit or loss 
generated undergoes rigorous analysis, hiitially, the observed anomalous returns were 
attributed to miss-specification of the empirical asset pricing model employed to 
estimate them due to some omitted risk factor (e.g. Zarowin, 1989). It was claimed that 
the attribute by which stocks are ranked acts as a proxy for this factor which when 
included in the correct valuation model would eliminate the anomaly. However this 
missing factor has proved elusive and irregular returns have survived several empirical 
versions of asset pricing models. This explanation implies that the market is efficient 
and that the detected irregularities are the illusory consequence of spurious 
methodology. An alternative explanation was sought in the theory behavioural finance. 
Using the PE ratio as an example of an attribute, firms with a low (high) PE value are 
perceived to be 'undervalued' ('overvalued') because investors have become overly 
pessimistic (optimistic) and overreact after a series of bad (good) earnings 
announcements. Once future earnings turn out to be better (worse) than the imduly 
glum (buoyant) forecasts, the price adjusts. This is what Basu (1977) called the 'price-
ratio' hypothesis. An important tacit admission of this interpretation is that agents do 
not behave rationally and therefore the market does not value assets efficiently in the 
short term. Such inefficiencies should be arbitraged out in the medium to long term by 
means of contrarian investments. 
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Most of the event studies employ long-horizon investment strategies to 
examine anomalous retum pattems. These studies are reviewed in section 2.1.2 and are 
broadly categorised in two groups, one that seeks a behavioural rationalisation of the 
results and one that offers a risk-based explanation. Studies that subsequently sparked 
a substantial amoimt of debate as well as those that help the reader gain a clear 
understanding of the issues involved, are reviewed in greater detail than the rest. The 
few short-horizon confrarian studies in existence are the main focus of this chapter and 
so are reviewed separately in sub-section 2.1.3. Sub-section 2.1.4 reviews related 
methodological issues and finally sub-section 2.1.5 concludes. 
2.1.2 Long-Horizon studies 
Long horizon studies examine investment portfolios which are typically 
characterised by holding periods that range from a few months to a few years. The 
most influential such study is that of DeBondt & Thaler (1985) which formalised the 
overreaction hypothesis and generated a lot of controversy. 
2.1.2.1 Behavioural Rationalisation 
The notion that investors may overreact is not new. For example De Bondt and 
Thaler quote Keynes (1936) who noted that '...day-to-day fluctuations in the profits 
of existing investments, which are obviously of an ephemeral and non-significant 
nature, tend to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the 
market'. It is due to De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) that interest in this area was 
renewed and the current debate was sparked. The study of De Bondt and Thaler was 
triggered by the work of Kahneman and Trevsky (1982) and Arrow (1982) who argue 
that when revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and 
underweight prior data. Individuals do not respond to new information according to 
Bayes' mle but rather tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic events. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) tested the overreaction hypothesis using monthly data for the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the period between January 1926 and December 
1982 obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. They 
looked for evidence in support of overreaction, by testing two hypotheses: 
(a) Extreme stock price movements in one direction wil l be followed by 
subsequent price movements in the opposite direction and 
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(b) The more extreme the price movements the greater the subsequent 
adjustments. 
Only stocks that traded for at least 85 consecutive months were used. Three types of 
residual returns were tested (market adjusted excess returns, market model residuals, 
and excess returns derived from the Sharp-Linter version of the CAPM) in order to 
assess how different valuation models affect conclusions about market efficiency. 
However since all three methods are based on single index models the authors admit 
that their results are still susceptible to misspecification problems. De Bondt and 
Thaler found that whichever of the three types of residuals they used their results did 
not change much so they only reported results based on market-adjusted excess 
returns. Their particular strategy consists of 3 basic steps: 
(a) Starting on January 1930 the monthly cumulative abnormal return for every 
stock j is calculated, over an initial portfolio formation period of 3-years, as 
CAR,=f^{Rj,-R„,) 
Where: 
Rjt is the return of stock j at time t, 
Rmt is the equally weighted market return (constant). 
This step is repeated for all subsequent non-overlapping 3-year periods starting 
on January 1930, January 1933... January 1975. At the end of each portfolio 
formation period, firms are ranked according to their CAR. The extreme high 
and low performers are then allocated to a wirmer and a loser portfolio (of 35, 
50 or 10 stocks) respectively. 
(b) Using the equation in (a), the CARs of the winner and loser constituents are 
then calculated for up to 36 months during the three year period following each 
portfolio formation period. This period is termed the 'performance evaluation 
period' or test period. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return over a period 
of length k months for the winner and loser portfolios is then calculated as: 
ACAR^(k) = ^'^CAR,ik) 
Where CAR , {k) = ^ {R, - / ? „ , ) , k=l,...,36, p = W, L and Np is the 
number of securities in portfolio p. 
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The difference between the ACARs is then defined as: 
DACAR(k) = ACARL(k) - ACARw(k), k=l,...,36. 
(c) The final step is to test whether 
(1) the loser portfolio outperforms the market: ACARL(k) > 0, 
(2) the winner portfolio underperforms the market: ACARw(k) < 0 and 
most importantly 
(3) the arbifrage portfolio defined as loser-winner earns positive returns: 
DACAR(k) > 0. 
To carry out the tests, the ACARp(k)'s are averaged across all non-overlapping 
test periods for each k. . 
De Bondt and Thaler found that the loser portfolio outperformed the market by 19.6% 
on average, three years post portfolio formation i.e. for k=36. During the same period, 
the winner portfolio underperformed the market by 5.0% on average. Thus the 
arbitrage portfolio earned 24.6% (DACAR(36) = 24.6%). hi fact DAKAR was 
consistently greater than zero and its magnitude was increasing systematically with k. 
The overreaction effect was observed mostly during the second and third year of the 
test period and was found to be asymmetric: much larger for losers than for winners. 
For formation periods of one-year, price reversals were not observed. It was also noted 
that larger loses (gains) in the formation period are followed by larger gains (loses) in 
the test period. Consistent with previous work on the January effect, De Bondt and 
Thaler found that most of the excess returns were realized in January but that effect 
alone could not adequately explain the magnitude of the contrarian profits. The risks of 
the two portfolios, as measured by the average CAPM betas of the portfolio 
constituents, were also examined. CAPM betas were calculated by estimating the 
market model over a period of 60 months prior to portfolio formation. The average 
winner portfolio beta was found to be consistently and significantly larger than the 
loser portfolio beta. Therefore the loser portfolio not only outperforms the winner 
portfolio but is also less risky. This led the authors to believe that their chosen 
procediu-e probably underestimates the true magnitude of the overreaction effect. 
In response to criticism of their original study by Vermaelen and Verstringe 
(1986) and Chan (1988) among others, De Bondt & Thaler (1987) reappraised thefr 
earlier results and also addressed unresolved issues such as: 
(a) The sfrong seasonality in the confrarian returns, 
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(b) The asymmetric performance of the winner and loser portfolios, 
(c) The exposure of the extreme portfolios to attributes such as size. The winner-
loser effect may be yet another instance of the well documented size anomaly, 
and finally, 
(d) the contention that the overreaction effect they observed is in effect a response 
to changing risk 
To examine the seasonality and the risk of the winner and loser portfolio retums, the 
authors used the same CRSP monthly data as in their previous study. Using a 5-year 
formation and test period they now constmct 50-stock portfolios for each of the 10-
year periods starting in January of each year from 1926 to 1973. It was found that 
during the test period excess retums occur primarily in January for both winners and 
losers (more so for losers than for winners). January excess retums for both losers and 
winners are found to be driven mainly by reverse performance over the immediately 
preceding months. This is consistent with tax-loss selling for losers and a capital gains 
tax lock in effect for wiimers. A statistically significant link was also found between 
January retums and prior long-term performance. For losers, this negates the tax-loss 
selling hypothesis as an explanation of the January effect. For winners the effect is 
positive which contradicts the overreaction hypothesis altogether. 
To test whether the contrarian excess retums can be attributed to risk 
differences between losers and winners, De Bondt & Thaler stack all the test period 
data together and estimate the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM betas of the arbitrage, wiimer and 
loser portfolios. In confrast to the 1985 results, losers are found to be riskier than 
winners but only slightly. Furthermore, the estimated abnormal retum for the arbitrage 
portfolio is significantly positive and its magnitude implies that the estimated beta is 
insufficient to explain the portfolio's retum. De Bondt & Thaler argue therefore that 
the risk change hypothesis fails to explain the winner-loser effect. However their 
results may suffer from the methodological pitfall explained by Chan (1988): Since 
betas change over time, De Bondt & Thaler's estimate of the abnormal retum is a 
positively biased estimate of the tmea^_^. This is because time varying betas are 
likely to be positively correlated with the market risk premium and this covariance is 
included in the a^_^ estimate obtained by De Bondt & Thaler. Compustat data from 
1966 until 1985 were used to examine whether the winner-loser effect is different from 
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the size effect. The original (stocks ranked by CAR) winner and loser portfolios were 
constructed using a 4-year formation period. Portfolios were also formed by ranking 
stocks according to their market capitalisation (MV), book value to market (BV/MV) 
and asset value (AV) at the last formation period year. Significantly positive excess 
returns for the arbitrage portfolio were re-confirmed by replicating the original wirmer-
loser strategy. It was found that the difference in market value between the winner and 
loser portfolios was less pronounced than that of the extreme MV and AV portfolios. 
The loser portfolio is smaller than the wirmer portfolio but 30 times larger than the 
smallest MV portfolio. Therefore the authors conclude that the wiimer-loser effect 
cannot be the same as the size effect. In contrast they notice that the portfolios which 
are ranked by (formation period) CAR, are coincidentally ranked by MV/BV as well 
and vice versa. It therefore seems more natural to characterise the winner-loser effect 
as an overvalued-undervalued effect. The authors also notice that the earnings of the 
winner and loser firms show reversal patterns that are consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis. Therefore extreme price movements are predictive of subsequent earnings 
reversals. 
Poterba & Summers (1988) assert that the observed mean reversion in stock 
returns is consistent with the hypothesis that stock prices are temporarily driven out of 
equilibrium (due to overreaction amid other things) and subsequent speculation drives 
them back to their fundamental values. Verity of this hypothesis would imply negative 
serial correlation in stock returns, and therefore contrarian profits. They examined 
monthly CRSP returns of both value and equally weighted NYSE indices between 
1926 and 1985 and found evidence of positive serial correlation in the first year and 
negative autocorrelation for larger time periods. The results persist when infrequent 
trading is confrolled for and when they switch to S&P data. There is therefore a time 
lag of at least one year before contrarian strategies become profitable. Similar 
autocorrelation patterns were observed for Canada, the UK and most of the fifteen 
other countries they examined. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) provide further evidence in favour of 
the overreaction hypothesis by showing that value stocks (hitherto known as losers) 
consistently outperform 'glamour' stocks (hitherto known as winners). They attribute 
this out-performance to the sub-optimal behaviour of the typical investor rather than to 
risk differences. The authors argue that 'naive' investors tend to extrapolate recent 
stock performance too far into the future thus over-valuing glamour stocks and under-
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valuing out-of-favour or value stocks. Rational traders can realise substantial arbifrage 
profits by betting against this behaviour. However Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
that there is a limit in the effectiveness of arbifrage. Rational arbitrageurs assume the 
short-term risk that the miss-pricing may be expanded fiirther or last longer due to the 
persistence of noise fraders. Furthermore, noise traders may make it impossible to find 
a rationally traded stock to hedge the arbitraged security. Therefore the risk involved in 
arbitrage may outweigh the return. Lakonishok, Shleifer «& Vishny use data 
NYSE/AMEX stock data from 1968 until 1990 and examine the long horizon returns 
(of up to 5 years) of several sets of decile portfolios based on sorting firms by various 
measures of past and expected performance. Sales growth, earnings and cash flow are 
used to measure the former while price multiples of current earnings and cash flow are 
used to measure the latter. Portfolios are rebalanced annually thus minimising the 
impact of transaction costs and various market microstructure issues. The authors 
found that value stocks consistently outperformed glamour stocks both when simple 
one-dimensional and two-dimensional sorting schemes (based on combinations of past 
and future growth measures) were used. The superior performance persisted when the 
analysis was restricted to the largest 50%> of stocks so it could not be attributed to the 
size effect. 
By examining traditional risk measures (beta, standard deviations of portfolio 
returns) as well as comparing the performance of value versus glamour portfolios in 
different states of the economy, they found very little support for the view that value 
stocks are fiindamentally riskier. Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny suggest that their 
results are due to investors consistently over-estimating the fiiture growth prospects of 
glamour relative to value stocks. By comparing sales, earnings and cash flow rates of 
growth they found that glamour stocks have historically grown faster than value 
stocks. Investors expect this superior growth to continue for many years. However, 
evidence suggests that after a couple of years both groups of stocks had essentially the 
same growth rates. By tying their forecasts to past growth rates, investors become 
overly optimistic (pessimistic) about the growth prospects of glamour (value) stocks. 
Contrarian sfrategies that bet against these expectations produce significant profits. 
Finally, the authors question why have value stocks outperformed for so long despite 
not being fiindamentally riskier? Such return differentials should vanish sooner rather 
-than later in an efficient market. The authors think that this is because of both 
individual and institutional investors' preference for glamour stocks. 
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Dissanaike (1997) examined a sample of UK hsted companies for evidence on 
the overreaction hypothesis. He restricted his analysis to about 1000 of the largest and 
better known companies whose shares are more frequently fraded. By doing so, 
Dissanaike reduces both the effect of microstmcture related biases (bid-ask spread, 
infrequent trading) and the possibility that his results are driven by smaller companies. 
Strong evidence of overreaction was found with the loser portfolio outperforming the 
winner portfolio by almost 100% four years after portfolio formation. Similar to the 
DeBondt and Thaler study, the performance of the winner and loser portfolios was 
found to be asymmetric. Moreover the loser portfolio displayed a strong seasonal 
pattern and most of its retum was realised around January. This is somewhat puzzling 
since most UK firms have an April financial year end. The author offered as a possible 
explanation the participation of many US investors in the UK market who respond to 
their own tax regime. Using a procedure similar to Chan's (1988) to control for risk 
changes over time, he found that in fact the winner portfolio had a larger beta than the 
loser portfolio with the equity risk premium being positive. This mled out differences 
in the risk of the two portfolios as a potential explanation of the results. 
Having studied the evidence on retum reversals, Daniel, Hirshleifer & 
Subrahmanyam (1998), attempt to explain why investors behave in a manner that 
induces such miss-pricing. They suggest that investors are overconfident, 
underestimating their forecast error, by believing that they have better forecast ability 
than they really do. Their confidence increases when public information agrees with 
their forecasts. As a result they tend to overreact to their private information and 
underreact to public signals. As time passes and their predictions are proven wrong 
they gradually adapt their behaviour and prices are corrected to equilibrium levels. 
Public events could lead to fiirther overreaction ( i f confirming investor's beliefs), 
inducing short term momentum, and longer term price reversion as more and more 
public information arrives. So underreaction is possible but not necessary for a post 
announcement drift. They simulated two models assuming both static and changing 
confidence levels respectively. Their results confirmed that when positive public news 
agreed with investors' beliefs, there was an initial price increase followed by 
progressive downward correction thus implying positive short-term and negative long-
term autocorrelation. Considering accounting information as noisy public information, 
a positive short-mn and negative long-mn relationship was observed between 
73 
accounting ratios and price. This finding appears to be consistent with the abihty of 
prise based measures (B/M, E/P , dividends, market value etc) to describe returns. 
Finally, Gunaratne & Yosenawa (1997) studied return reversals in Japan using 
data for companies listed in the first section of the Tokyo stock exchange between 
1955 and 1990. The authors simulated a contrarian strategy with a holding period of 
four years and found that past losers outperformed past winners by about 11% per 
annum over the holding period. By employing a simple C A P M regression, they 
attribute only part of the observed over-performance to risk differences and conclude 
that the overreaction effect is statistically and economically significant. They found 
seasonal patterns in the winner and loser portfolios separately but not in the reversal 
effect concluding that the overreaction effect is fundamentally different fi-om the 
monthly seasonal pattern of stock returns. 
hi summary, the studies reviewed in this section attribute contrarian profits to 
irrational investor behaviour. It is argued that naive investors tend to overreact to both 
good and bad news thus driving prices out of equilibrium. The overreaction hypothesis 
was alluded to by Keynes as early as 1936 but was given formal content by De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985). A number of subsequent studies, most notably Daniel et al (1998) 
and Lakonishok et al (1994), gave support to this hypothesis thus raising serious 
doubts about stock market efficiency. 
2.1.2.2 Risk-Based Interpretations 
A considerable number of researchers reacted to the overreaction hypothesis 
with plenty of scepticism. Fama and French (1986) compared the returns of winner and 
loser portfolios with those of size-sorted portfolios and claim that part of the return 
reversal effect is explained by the size effect. In a subsequent article (Fama & French 
(1988)) they examine in more detail the autocorrelation patterns induced by retmn 
reversals. They observed weak negative autocorrelation in short horizon stock returns 
(daily, weekly) which becomes stronger for horizons of a year or more. They 
suggested two possible explanations: either the market is inefficient and stock prices 
are temporarily driven out of equilibrium (overreaction and subsequent reversal) or the 
required rate of return varies with time within an efficient market framework. They 
examined CRSP data for all N Y S E stocks between 1-926 and 1985 by grouping them 
first into 10 equally-weighted portfolios based on size and later into 17 industry 
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portfolios. The portfolio returns were then decomposed into a random-walk and a 
stationary component. The larger and more consistent the stationary component is, the 
larger the observed return reversals. Fama and French found that return reversals are 
very large for horizons between two and five years but dissipate for longer horizons. 
They suggested that the negative autocorrelations were due to mean reverting factor 
risk premiums rather than to firm-specific factors. 
Zarowin argues that subsequent return differences between prior losers and 
winners can be explained entirely by differences in their market capitalisation. 
Previous research by the author (1989) suggested that firms that experienced very poor 
earnings recently outperformed the best earners by a statistically significant amount 
over the following 36 months. The poorest earners were also found to be significantly 
smaller than the highest earners during the portfolio formation period. Motivated by 
these findings and not entirely convinced by DeBondt and Thaler's (1985, 1987) claim 
that 'the winner-loser effect is not primarily a size effect', Zarowin (1990) re-examines 
the relation between size and the overreaction hypothesis, controlling for size 
differences between winners and losers. He starts by replicating the DeBondt and 
Thaler methodology and concludes that neither risk nor seasonality alone can account 
for the results. Interestingly, when he applies Chan's procedure to account for 
changing risk, the resuhs contradict Chan's findings and losers still outperform 
winners significantly. To control for size differences, Zarowin sorts all firms at the 
beginning of the test period first according to size and then according to their prior 3-
year performance. The two sorts are independent of each other and each company is 
assigned a pair of rankings (i, j ) which denote the prior performance and size quintiles 
respectively, to which the firm belongs. For example, the rankings (1, 1) and (5, 1) 
indicate the smallest losers and the smallest winners respectively. He then applies 
Jensen performance tests on the five winner-loser portfolios that result fi"om the double 
ranking (one for each size quintile). Zarowin finds that losers outperform winners only 
in January. Zarowin uses also a June 30"^  rather than December 31*' ranking cycle to 
see whether the results are driven by the January effect or by overreaction in the first 
month of the test period. He finds that losers still outperform winners in January but 
not in July. Periods when losers are smaller than winners were also examined 
separately from periods when the opposite is true. When winners are smaller they 
outperform losers. This contradicts the overreaction hypothesis and is consistent with 
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the size effect. Therefore, concludes Zarowin, the loser's out-performance is due to 
size differences rather than investor overreaction. 
The articles presented so far attribute the contrarian profits to size differences 
between loser and winner stocks. If size is a good proxy for risk, as advocated by the 
size-effect literature, the winner and loser portfolios are fairly priced and the contrarian 
strategy returns are justified by their accompanying systematic risk, hi accordance, the 
studies reviewed in the rest of this section, argue that performance differentials 
between winners and losers are explained by risk differences as measured by the 
C A P M beta. Using data on the Belgian stock market, Vermaelen and Verstringe 
(1986) replicated the DeBondt & Thaler study and also found evidence of an 
overreaction effect but argue that this effect is a rational response to risk changes. 
Chan (1988) argues that the risk of winners and losers changes over time and therefore 
the results of De Bondt and Thaler are very sensitive to the methods used. The 
contrarian profits seem to be very small when risk changes are controlled for. Chan 
observed that the market value of the winner (loser) stocks increases (decreases) 
dramatically, on average, over the portfolio formation or ranking period. If size is a 
good proxy for risk as suggested by the size-effect literature then losers become riskier 
than winners by the end of the formation period. A change in the market capitalisation 
of a firm affects the market value of its equity more than the market value of its 
liabilities. As the stock price falls, the debt to equity ratio increases ceteris paribus thus 
increasing the risk of the stock and vice versa. Therefore beta estimates over the 
formation period underestimate the loser portfolio beta over the test period, since the 
loser portfolio risk increases. The opposite holds for the wiimer portfolio. To test his 
hypothesis Chan employed the same methodology and CRSP data as De Bondt and 
Thaler, to construct wirmer and loser portfolios. However he tested the strategy over a 
slightly longer period (1926-1985). Formation and test period betas and abnormal 
returns are estimated simultaneously by estimating the parameters of the following 
equation: 
rit-rft=aii(l-Dt)+ a 2iDt+pi(rnit-rft)+ PiD(rnirrft)Dt+eit 
Where: 
t = 1 to 72 
i = loser portfoUo, wirmer portfolio, arbitrage portfolio (loser-winner) 
Trnt is the equally weighted CRSP index. 
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Fft is the risk-free rate of return, 
Dt is a dummy variable with Dt=0 in the formation period (t<=36) and Dt=l in 
the test period (t>36), 
P i and (Pi - ) are the rank and test period betas estimates respectively, 
a,, and a^j are the average estimated abnormal returns of the rank and test 
period respectively. 
The estimates of the regression parameters are averages of the parameters in individual 
formation and test periods. The results showed that during the formation periods, 
losers (winners) have large negative (positive) abnormal returns on average. Over the 
same periods, the arbitrage portfolio loses on average 4.56% per month. During the 
test periods, the contrarian strategy yields small and, after controlling for transaction 
costs, economically insignificant abnormal returns: 0.095%, -0.228% and 0.133% on 
average per month for the loser, winner and arbitrage portfolios. The aggregate t 
statistic for the arbitrage portfolio return is 0.88. As expected the estimated rank period 
betas are smaller for losers than for winners. The reverse is true for test period betas, 
which appears to be consistent with the change in risk explanation of contrarian 
profits. This conclusion contradicts De Bondt and Thaler (1985) who compared 
formation period betas to determine whether contrarian profits can be attributed to risk 
differences. Therefore the abnormal returns are very sensitive to the model and 
methods used to estimate them. Chan admits that the arbitrage portfolio beta (measured 
as the difference between the average wiimer and loser portfolio betas) cannot 
adequately explain its average monthly return during the test period. He explains the 
combined observation of a small abnormal return (a^ ,^ =0.133%), a small beta 
(A-ff =0.107) and a large return (r^,^ = 0.586%) by the positive correlation 
between time-varying betas and the market risk premium. It is estimated that the 
C A P M explains 77% of the arbitrage portfolio return of which 55% is explained by the 
covariance between the beta and the market premium and 22% is explained by the 
average beta. It is not therefore correct to compare average returns and average betas 
estimated over a very long period of time because the changing betas may be 
correlated to the market risk premium. 
Ball & Kothari (1989) tested whether the negative serial correlation in market-
adjusted returns, observed by Poterba & Summers (1988), and Fama & French (1989) 
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among others, was due to risk differences over time. Negative autocorrelation can be 
consistent with both changing expected returns and market miss-pricing (due to 
overreaction). Monthly CRSP data from 1926 to 1986 were analysed. Twenty ventile 
portfolios were formed at the beginning of each year for each of the following two 
stock rankings: their previous 5-year total retmn and their size. Similar to Bondt & 
Thaler (1985, 1987), the authors use 5-year formation and test periods and calculate 
buy and hold returns for each year in both periods. Market model abnormal returns and 
betas were also estimated for all portfolios. Significantly negative serial correlation 
was observed between formation and test period returns which could be a 
manifestation of risk changes over time. Indeed, the authors observed that extreme 
losers become riskier (beta increases by 78%) while extreme winners become less 
risky (beta reduction of 57%), as we move from the formation to the test period. The 
DeBondt & Thaler contrarian sfrategy abnormal returns were drastically reduced when 
betas were allowed to change and so the winner-loser effect disappears when risk 
changes are accounted for. Similar results were found for the size-sorted portfolios. 
The studies reviewed in this section argued against the overreaction hypothesis. 
Instead some studies (Fama & French (1986), Zarrowin (1989)) attributed contrarian 
profits to size differences between the winner and loser portfolios. I f size is a proxy for 
some underlying risk factor then contrarian returns are justified by their commensurate 
exposure to risk. Others (Chan (1988), Ball & Kothari (1989)) argued that the 
differential performance of winner and loser portfolios is explained by changes in the 
risk of these portfolios over time. They showed that contrarian profits became 
insignificant when risk changes were accounted for. 
2.1.3 Short- Horizon Studies 
In contrast to long horizon studies, short horizon studies examine portfolios 
which are characterised by holding periods that range from a few days to a few weeks. 
Because of the shorter holding period, some of the criticism directed to confrarian 
profits is no longer apphcable. For example Chan's critique (1988) that contrarian 
profits are attributed to risk changes over time is not valid since performance is 
measured over time intervals which are very short for such changes to occur and affect 
it. The most influential such studies are those of Lo & MacKinlay (1990) and 
"Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) both of which devise a framework for analysingIhe^ 
sources of cbhtrMan p 
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Lo & MacKinlay (1990) argue that in addition to the overreaction effect, 
delayed reaction to information (underreaction) may also contribute to contrarian 
profits. I f the price of stock B changes following a price change in stock A, a profit can 
be made fi"om buying B subsequent to a price increase in A and vice versa. By making 
certain distributional assumptions on stock returns and choosing portfoho weights 
which are inversely proportional to each stock's performance relative to a market 
index, the authors are able to decompose the contrarian profits into three parts: one due 
to the dispersion of expected returns, another due to the serial covariance of returns 
and a final part due to their cross-serial covariance. The cross-serial covariance 
component measures the effect of delayed reaction to information on profits. By 
examining size-sorted portfolios, Lo & MacKinlay found that there was a definite lead-
lag pattern observing large positive covariances between the returns of small stocks 
and the lagged returns of large stocks but not vice versa. They estimate that less than 
50% of the contrarian profit is attributed to overreaction. 
.Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) examine the profitability of short horizon 
contrarian strategies and examine the contribution of stock price overreaction and 
delayed reaction to such profits. They use the work of Lo and MacKinlay as a starting 
point, who comment that the observed profitability of contrarian strategies carmot lead 
to inferences about how prices react to information. The authors develop a generalised 
fi-amework for identifying the different sources of contrarian profits based on how 
prices respond to information. They assume that stock returns are determined 
according to the following muhifactor model: 
K 
nj = + E (Ki,Jt.k + Ki.kf>-i.k)+ 
This model facilitates the separate examination of price reactions to common 
factors , lagged realisations of common factors /,_,^ and firm specific 
information e, ,, where denotes the unexpected factor realisation. It is reasonably 
assumed that the factors are orthogonal and unrelated to their lagged values and that 
cov( e.,, )=0 for all i It then follows that: 
K 
' f k 
The model therefore relates the observed lead-lag structure of stock returns to delayed 
reaction to common factors. It also allows for asymmetric cross-correlations as 
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observed in the Lo & MacKinley study where large stock returns were found to lead 
small stock returns but not vice-versa. Jegadeesh and Titman examine the same 
strategy as Lo & MacKinley where the portfolio weight for stock i at time t is: 
where is the equally weighted index return and N is the number of stocks. The 
contrarian profit is then given by: 
E{K,) = -E 
where 
J N 2 
•"V ,-=1 
Q = — Z c o v ( e . , - e . , _ , ) and 
1=1 
jy ,=1 
The expected contrarian profit is therefore decomposed into three components: 
(a) A part due to the cross-serial covariance of expected returns, - cr^. 
(b) A part due to the average serial covariance of the residual returns, - Q and 
(c) A part due to delayed reaction to factor realisations, (5 .^ 
If prices overreact initially to firm specific news and subsequently adjust to 
equilibrium levels, Q will be negative and will have a positive contribution to 
contrarian profits. The term measures the cross-sectional covariance of 
contemporaneous and delayed factor sensitivities and may be either positive or 
negative. Therefore, while overreaction to firm-specific information contributes to 
contrarian profits, overreaction to common factors can either increase or reduce them. 
The authors point out that the Lo & MacKinley decomposition measures the delayed 
reaction effect twice thus leading to incorrect inferences. They test their decomposition 
on N Y S E and A M E X data from 1963 to 1990 assuming a single factor model (value 
weighted market return and its one period lag). The estimated contrarian profit TT is 
found to be significantly positive and the resuhs suggest that stock prices react to the 
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market with a one week lag. This effect is more pronounced for smaller firms. 5 is 
found to be negative both for the whole sample and for all size quintiles therefore the 
lead lag structure has a positive contribution to profits. However, this contribution is 
found to be trivial (less than 1% of total profits). Virtually all profit is attributed to the 
large negative auto-covariance of the error terms implying strong overreaction to firm-
specific news (for lack of a better explanation). Similar results are obtained when the 
betas are allowed to change over time. Return reversals can therefore result to 
substantial contrarian profits and their primary cause is the reversal of the firm specific 
component of returns. 
Lehmarm (1990) tested a short horizon contrarian strategy using weekly C R S P 
data on A M E X and N Y S E stocks from July 1962 and December 1986. He used 
formation periods which ranged from 4 days to 52 weeks. Stocks were assigned 
portfolio weights proportional to the deviation of their formation period return from 
that of an equally weighted index comprising all eligible stocks. Lehmaim found that 
substantial profits could be made even after accounting for substantial fransaction 
costs. The arbitrage portfolio gained profits in 85-94% of the weeks depending on the 
investment horizon Most of the loser portfolio profits occurred in the week 
immediately following the formation period and dissipated thereafter. The winner 
portfolio had losses in the first week and profits in the following four weeks. The lack 
of persistence in the reversal effect could be due to the market being efficient in the 
long run. The author believes that price reversals are due to lack of short-term market 
liquidity, caused by the inability of market makers to meet demand from impatient 
traders. Supply pressures are alleviated in the long run and prices return to their 
fimdamental values. Risk changes cannot explain the profits of the short horizon 
contrarian strategy because systematic short run changes in fundamental values should 
be insignificant in an efficient market. A potential caveat of strategy is that it may 
suffer from bid-ask spread, lagged reaction and price pressure effects. 
Chang, McLeavey & Rhee (1995) examined the existence of short term 
contrarian profits in Japan using data between 1975 and 1991 on companies listed in 
both sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They also considered how these profits 
are affected by firm size and seasonal patterns. In order to examine the persistence of 
contrarian profits, they tested holding periods of one up to six months. They found that 
profits were significant and persisted after differences'in systematic risk and size were 
accounted for. However profits dissipated quickly after the third month and' becaiiie 
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negative in the fifth and sixth months. Like Gunarante & Yonesawa (1997), they found 
that contrarian profits did not exhibit strong seasonal patterns and they derived more or 
less equally from both the winner and loser portfolios. 
To summarize, the studies reviewed in this section showed that there exist 
significant short term contrarian profits. However, in addition to the overreaction 
hypothesis, these profits are also consistent with delayed reaction to factor realizations. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) extended the work of Lo & MacKinlay (1990) and 
provided a framework for examining the sources of such profits. In contrast to Lo & 
MacKinlay, they showed that, almost all the profit is attributed to overreaction to firm 
specific events and only a negligible proportion is due to delayed factor reaction. 
2.1.4 Methodological Issues 
This section reviews a number of studies that focus their criticism on the 
procedure followed to evaluate the performance of contrarian strategies. These studies 
argue that contrarian returns are susceptible to a number of microstructure biases and 
so are not reliable. They identify a number of methodological issues that need to be 
addressed in order to draw valid inferences about the profitability of contrarian 
strategies. Estimates of stock and by extension portfolio returns are most commonly 
affected by bid-ask bias. This issue is explored in Conrad & Kaul (1993). They build 
on a paper by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) who show that single period returns are 
positively biased. Researchers usually observe a closing price which may be a bid or 
an ask price. The observed price may be written as: 
where OP is the observed price, P is the true price, E ( .9,.,) = 0, i9„ is independent of 
and Pii^ for all k. The observed return is then given by: 
o/?, = - ^ - i = i i ^ ( i + i ? , ) - i 
where i?,., is the true return. Therefore: 
EiOR,) = £ { ( l + 5 , ) / ( l + ^,_,)}[l + ^ ( i ? , ) ] - l 
According to Jensen's inequality i?{(l + i9,.J/(l + .9,.,_,)}>l and using a Taylor series 
approximation: E{ORf,)=E{R.,) + <y^{&.^_^). So single period observed returns are 
positively biased estimates of true returns. By cumulating single period returns over a 
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long period of time, long-term contrarian strategies cumulate also the bid-ask bias. 
This bias increases linearly with the measurement interval and is substantially greater 
for low rather than high priced stocks. If loser firms are on average priced lower than 
winner firms, the long horizon arbitrage portfolio return will be substantially over-
estimated. A large part of the perceived long-term abnormal contrarian return will 
therefore be spurious. The procedure for cumulating single period returns over long 
periods of time (i.e. computing CARs) is also conceptually flawed because it implicitly 
rebalances portfolios to equal weights each period (e.g. month) thus generating 
substantial transaction costs which are not taken into account. The authors suggest that 
a more appropriate measure of portfolio performance over long intervals is the holding 
period return (i.e. the buy and hold return measured over the entire interval). This 
measure minimises the bid-ask spread bias as well as the implicit transaction costs. 
Using data on N Y S E stocks between 1926 and 1988 and applying the DeBondt & 
Thaler procedure, Conrad & Kaul found that the average price for losers is $11.48, 
substantially lower than the average price of $38,576 for winners. After confirming the 
DeBondt & Thaler results, they used buy and hold returns and found that the arbitrage 
portfolio earns negative returns in the non-January months. The all-month returns are 
consistently lower, compared to the DeBondt & Thaler procedure, but still positive. 
Therefore the January effect accounts entirely for the portfolio's positive performance, 
contrary to the overreaction hypothesis. 
Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) examine the possibility that the observed serial 
correlation in stock returns may be due to measurement errors rather than investor 
overreaction. They evaluated the performance of three portfolios of small, medium and 
large firms respectively using three measures: conventional close price-to-close price 
returns R j , bid price-to-bid price returns R B and their difference R D = R T - R B which 
measures the bid-ask spread effect. They found that R j exhibit sti-ong negative 
autocorrelation in the short term which becomes positive in the long term. The same 
autocorrelation pattern, only much weaker and only for small firms, occurs when R B is 
used. The authors show that the short term negative autocorrelation is due to weekday 
returns being less volatile than weekend returns. Therefore, the authors conclude, 
return reversals are more likely due to bid-ask spread rather than investor overreaction. 
Bid-ask errors were actually found to explain over 50% (23%) of the small (large) firm 
variance. 
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Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) build on the work of Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) and highlight a number of problems in measuring both raw and risk adjusted 
returns in the context of the DeBondt and Thaler methodology. They first show that 
losers are on average priced very low hence their returns are very sensitive to 
measurement errors and other microstructure effects (bid-ask spread, liquidity and 
transaction costs). A $1/8 increase in the purchase price reduces the average 5-year 
buy and hold return by 25%. As is shown in other confrarian studies as well, most of 
the strategy's profitability is due to loser stocks. Therefore confrarian returns are very 
susceptible to the same biases as loser returns and so very unreliable. Furthermore, the 
distribution of loser stock returns is highly skewed to the right and so their mean is 
considerably larger than their median. Comparisons of average loser and winner 
returns should therefore be done with caution. By simply changing the formation 
period to June rather than December and even ignoring transaction costs, both raw and 
abnormal loser returns are drastically reduced implying that the DeBondt and Thaler 
estimates of contrarian performance are not robust. In fact the risk adjusted 
performance of the June-end portfolio becomes negative, regardless of the C A P M 
version used. December-end confrarian returns derive mainly from the winner portfolio 
and cannot therefore be explained by year-end tax-loss selling. Finally, the authors 
examine the confrarian portfolio beta at different states of the market and, in agreement 
with DeBondt and Thaler, find that it is higher in up-market than down-market states. 
They notice however that, although attractive, the higher up-market beta is 
accompanied by a not so desirable negative alpha. Ball, Kothari, and Shanken 
conclude that measurement errors are present in both raw and risk adjusted returns. 
These errors are more acute for contrarian portfolios because they tend to invest in 
extremely low priced stocks. 
Studies, which provide evidence that stock prices over- or underreact to certain 
events, argue against market efficiency, since prices do not reflect all available 
information. Fama (1998) (who introduced event studies) refutes this claim because: 
(a) The observed frequencies of both over- and underreaction are the same. 
Therefore they both have an equally random chance of occurring, which is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
(b) Long-run anomalies are very sensitive to the different methods and models 
used to estimate expected returns. Most anomalies disappear when different 
approaches are used so they can be thought of as chance events . 
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(c) Finally, for a model to be considered as an alternative to the E M H , it must 
describe reality better than the E M H . 
The models used in such studies do not describe reality perfectly so they generate 
biased results. In contrast to Conrad & Kaul (1993), Fama argues that buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns accentuate the biases introduced by averages of monthly abnormal 
returns or cumulative abnormal returns and suggests the use of value- rather than 
equally-weighted portfolios. He shows that, with the exception of small firms whose 
returns are in any way not described well by available models, anomalous returns can 
disappear when either the sample period or the portfolio-weighting scheme or the 
valuation model is changed. Therefore, the author concludes, the results of most event 
studies are not reliable because they are sensitive to the methods used. Anomalous 
returns are most probably observed because of specific samples, the use of wrong 
methods and valuation models that don't explain reality properly. 
2.1.5 Summary 
The existence of negative serial correlation patterns in stock returns has cast 
doubt on the efficient market hypothesis. Such patterns can make future returns 
predictable and may result in risk-less arbitrage profit by means of a contrarian 
strategy. The question whether this profit is economically or statistically significant 
has sparked an intense debate. Two schools of thought have emerged. The first one 
argues that return reversals are economically exploitable and are the result of irrational 
investor behaviour. Based on survey data, Kahneman and Trevsky (1982) and Arrow 
(1982) argued that individuals are not rational, Baysian decision makers but rather tend 
to overreact to unexpected and dramatic events. DeBondt and Thaler were the first to 
launch an empirical investigation into this claim and found evidence in support of the 
overreaction hypothesis. A plethora of both empirical (e.g. Fama & French (1988), 
Poterba & Summers (1988), Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994), Lo & MacKinlay 
(1990), Lehmann (1990), Jegadeesh and Tihnan (1995)) and theoretical (e.g. Daniel, 
Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) studies followed 
providing support to the same hypothesis. 
Non-converts to the overreaction hypothesis (e.g. Vermaelen and Verstringe 
(1986), Chan (1988), Ball & Kothari (1989)) argue that the observed contrarian retiims 
are accompanied by commensurate risk as measured by the C A P M beta. Alternatively 
the superior performance of loser stocks is attributed to their smaner'market 
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capitahsation (e.g. Zarowin (1989, 1990), Fama and French (1986)). As long as size is 
a good proxy for risk, contrarian returns are consistent with efficiently fiinctioning 
stock markets. Finally a group of non-partisan studies (e.g. Fama (1998), Ball, Kothari, 
and Shanken (1995), Kaul & Nimalendran (1990), Conrad & Kaul (1993), Blume and 
Stambaugh (1983)) point out several procedural errors common in event studies that 
argue in favour or against market efficiency. They show that the measured stock and 
portfolio returns are plagued by market microstructure induced biases. Furthermore the 
results of the aforementioned event studies are sensitive to the different methods and 
models used to estimate expected returns. Therefore the evidence, presented by both 
the efficient market hypothesis and the overreaction hypothesis advocates, is 
debatable. 
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2.2 Methodology and Data 
As it has emerged fi^om the previous section, there are three main thrusts to the 
criticism of the advocates of the overreaction hypothesis. It was argued that contrarian 
profits: 
(a) are explained by differences in the market capitalisation of the 
winner and loser portfolios 
(b) are explained by the changing risk of these portfolios over time 
(c) are spurious in nature because of bid/ask and other microstructure 
biases in measured portfolio returns. 
This section describes in detail how this study attempts to address each of these issues 
and how the methodology for assessing the profitability of contrarian strategies can be 
improved. 
By concentrating our analysis on a short-term strategy the problems associated 
with long-horizon strategies are alleviated. For example, time-varying risk can no 
longer explain the performance of the arbitrage portfolio since the risk of the long and 
short portfolios does not change very much firom one week to the next. As mentioned 
above, measured returns may suffer fi*om infi-equent trading and bid-ask biases. With 
regard to the former, the entire sample is broken into two sub-samples, consisting of 
liquid and illiquid shares respectively and the results are compared. Liquid shares are 
characterised by relatively large daily trading volumes as a proportion of the total 
number of outstanding shares. The procedure used to assign companies to either of the 
two samples consists of two steps: The median of the traded volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for each company over the entire sample period is 
calculated first. The cut-off point of the two samples is then defined as the median of 
these medians. Companies with a median less (greater) than the cut-off point are 
assigned to the illiquid (liquid) sub-sample respectively. 
Use of buy and hold weekly returns reduces the bid-ask bias but does not 
eliminate it. Furthermore, the closing price at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is 
defined as the last traded price for the day and is unattainable by any simulated 
strategy. This renders the simulation results unrealistic. To make the performance of 
the simulated strategy more plausible we use open or volume weighted average prices 
(VWAP) to measure portfolio returns. Open prices at the (TSE) are determined by an 
open auction whereby individual buy and sell orders are aggregated and then the price 
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that equates supply with demand is calculated. As such, open prices are not susceptible 
to bid/ask bias. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large proportion of the average 
daily volume is fraded at the open price. Provided that the extra volume generated by 
our simulated sfrategy is not very large relative to the average daily traded volume, it 
should in principle be absorbed by the market at the open auction without having a 
major effect on the price. Alternatively, portfolio returns may be measured using 
volume weighted average prices. As the name suggests, a V W A P for a given stock is 
defined as the volume weighted average of all the prices at which trades for that stock 
occurred in a given day. Such prices are available from 1996 onwards from 
Bloomberg'. Many stock brokers guarantee execution of their clients' orders at V W A P 
for a slightly higher fee compared to other types of orders because the broker assumes 
part of the execution risk. For example, a market open order fee is around 10 basis 
points whereas the fee for a V W A P order ranges from 12.5 to 15 basis points. Both 
VWAP and open prices therefore eliminate the bid-ask bias in measured portfolio 
returns. 
All the empirical studies so far examine an arbitrage portfolio which is formed 
at the end of period t-1 using all available information including the closing price at t-
1. Its performance in period t is subsequentiy measured as the ratio of the closing price 
at t and the closing price at t-1. In real life though the portfolio positions are not 
established until the open of the market in period t, therefore the portfolio return 
suffers from in-sample bias. This bias is more severe for short rather than long-horizon 
strategies and results in substantially over-estimated contrarian profits as will be shown 
later. This pitfall is avoided by measuring portfolio returns between the beginning of 
period t (using the open price at t) and either the end of period t (using the close price 
at t), or the beginning of period t+1 (using the open price at t+1). 
Another common argument against the overreaction hypothesis is that 
contrarian profits are due to differences in the market capitalisation or the risk of the 
wirmer and loser portfolios. However, the portfolio weights in the event studies 
reviewed herein were not chosen to simultaneously maximize expected return and 
minimize risk. In short the portfolios examined in the extant literature are not on the 
efficient frontier and as such they are not efficient. Inferences about market efficiency 
drawn from evidence based on non-efficient investment portfolios cannot therefore be 
reliable. In order to counteract this argument, we examine an alternative contrarian 
' Bloomberg Inc is a commercial provider of real time and historical market data 
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strategy, which results from maximizing the expected Sharpe Ratio of the investment 
portfolio. By maximising the Sharpe ratio, we choose arbitrage portfolios that are 
characterised by minimum risk for any given expected return. By definition, the risk of 
the arbitrage portfolio is equal to the tracking error between the long and short 
portfolios. Therefore maximum Sharpe ratio arbitrage portfolios are characterised by 
minimum risk differences between their long and short sides. The Sharpe Ratio is 
defined as the average weekly portfolio return divided by its standard deviation and 
measures the return received for each unit of risk borne by the portfolio 
SR = ^ 
The portfolio standard deviation is equal to the square root of its variance, which is 
given by: w'Vw, where w is a Nx l vector of portfoho weights and V is the NxN 
variance-covariance matrix of all stocks considered in the optimisation problem. 





V = BVfB'+Q. 
Where is the unconditional expected return, e,., is the residual or firm specific 
component, is the k'*' factor realisation and 6,.^  is the sensitivity of stock i to the k* 
factor, is a K x K variance-covariance matrix of factor returns, 5 is a N x K matrix 
of factor sensitivities and Q is a NxN diagonal matrix with the stock specific 
variances along the diagonal. Furthermore, by adding appropriate constraints to the 
objective function we can maximise the expected Sharpe ratio of the arbitrage portfolio 
while at the same time minimising its sensitivity to specific factors. The portfolio 
sensitivity to factor k is given by^Wj-ft,.^. Assuming that the factor sensitivities at time 
/• 
t are good forecasts of factor sensitivities at time t+1, the portfolio sensitivity to factor 
k at time t+1 can be minimized by imposing the following constraint to the 
optimisation problem: ^ = 0. The same constraint can be used to minimise the 
arbitrage pbrtfdlid's exposui-e to any given atfribtte, like size Tor example. Ah 
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additional constraint sets the sum of the weights to 0 thus ensuring that we have a zero 
net investment. 
Therefore optimal portfolio weights are derived by solving the following 
constrained optimisation problem: 
Max SR = ^ 
dp 
Subject to^iv,.^,.^ = 0, k=l, 2...and 
X w , . = 0 
By setting the portfolio sensitivity to factor k equal to zero at time t does not 
necessarily imply zero sensitivity at time t+1. The optimisation problem is conditional 
on information available at time t. If factor sensitivities are time varying, it is 
impossible to completely avoid exposure to any given factor unless we have perfect 
foresight of future factor sensitivities. Notice that when portfolio weights are 
multiplied by a non-zero constant c the Sharpe Ratio remains unchanged since 
y cw,.i?,. c Y w^R 
y' = = SR and so the optimisation problem remains unchanged. If, as 
in Grinold & Kahn (1995), c is chosen so that c=l/^H',.i? then the numerator in the 
objective function is always 1 and the maximization problem becomes equivalent to 
the following: 
Optimisation Problem 2.2.1 
Min f^cTp=h'Vh^ h'{BVfB'+Q)h 
Subject to ^i^ik = 0. k=l, 2... 
i 
and YJ^.R =1 
Hence we minimize the denominator of SR subject to ^h-R =\, where h. = cw., in 
addition to the old constraints. The market model can be regarded as a special case of 
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2.2.1 with K = 1. The 1st order conditions for the optimisation problem 2.2.1 are then 
given by: 
Vh-A^b-A^r-A^h = 0 
h'r = l 
h'b^O 
h'I = 0, 
Where: A^,A,2,A,^ are the Lagrange multipliers, r i s a N x l vector of expected 
returns,6is a Nx l vector of factor sensitivities and lis a N x l vector of ones. The 
above can be solved for h,A^,A2,Aj to give: 
Closed Form Solution 2.2.1 
. _ AB(CF-DE + ABF(l-\/C)) 
A, 
A, = 
(AB-C')(AD' -ECD +E'B-ABF) 
AB(E^ - AF) + EC{AD - EC) 
' {AB - C^)(AD^ - ECD + E^B - ABF) 
^ ^ AD-EC 
'~ AD^ - 2ECD + E^B - ABF + C^F 
Where A = b'V-'b, B = r'V-'r, C = r'V-'b, D = rT'^I, A = bT'^I and 
F = rV'^I are all scalars 
The weights resulting from the closed form solution 2.2.1, sum to 0 but neither the 
long nor the short side weights add up to 1 necessarily, implying that both portfolios 
have a positive (under-invested) or negative (over-invested) cash component at each 
period. In order to have fiiUy invested portfolios we divide all weights by the sum of 
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the long side weights. The new long and short portfolio weights will thus add up to 1 
and -1 respectively. As explained before, this transformation leaves the Sharpe Ratio 
unaffected. In order to assess how different valuation models affect conclusions about 
market efficiency, we use both a single index model and a commercially available, 
multifactor APT type model to generate the inputs to the optimisation process. To the 
best of our knowledge, such work has not been carried out before in the context of 
contrarian literature. 
The available data consists of 2069 daily observations from January 1994 until 
May 2002, on the open and closing prices and traded volume spanning a universe of 
2359 Japanese companies downloaded from DataSfream. The sample comprises 1500 
and 576 companies listed in the 1^ ' and 2"*^  section of the Tokyo stock exchange 
respectively as well as 314 dead companies. The dead companies sample also includes 
companies listed in regional exchanges, since DataSfream does not provide Stock 
Exchange information for dead companies. Included in this sample were also 
subsidiaries of non-Japanese multinational companies, which were manually weeded 
out from the sample. Weekly returns are calculated by taking every 5'^  closing price 
for all stocks in the sample starting from observation 1. The reason for doing so is that 
each 'weekly' return thus calculated carries 5 frading days worth of information. It is 
assumed that during 'market' holidays (i.e. when the Stock market is closed) there are 
no corporate or other news releases that can significantly affect stock prices. There are 
5 non-overlapping weekly return series that can be generated starting from 
observations 1 to 5 respectively. The 1*' such series is used to derive all the results 
presented in this chapter. Results for the remaining 4 series are characterised by slight 
quantitative differences which are of no consequence to the conclusions drawn herein. 
The formula used to calculate returns is R , = P,/P,_, -1. Al l the sfrategies tested require 
the estimation of a simple market or a multifactor model. Factor exposure estimates for 
the later are provided by Advanced Portfolio Technologies^, a company that provides 
such information commercially to financial institutions. Al l strategies are simulated 
from 24-Jul-1995 until 21-May-2002 and use the same sample of companies so that the 
^ APT use internationally recognized codes to identify individual companies such as SEDOLS, ISIN numbers and 
local exchange codes. DataStream on the other hand use their own proprietary code but also provide SEDOLS as 
"part of the'data for each company in their database. TTiese SEDOLS^ere u s a tolfiatch DataSti^anvwtlTSPT^atar 
There are 31 companies in total for which the data cannot be matched. This is because either their SEDOL code is 
not available or APT does not provide coverage: . - . . -
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results of the simulations are comparable. At each period t, the companies included in 
the analysis must: 
(a) Have more than 30 non-missing weekly returns in the last 78 weeks so as to 
minimise biases induced by infrequently traded or less-established firms. 
(b) Have a non-missing return for period t. 
(c) Be part of the APT sample 
When the last restriction is relaxed the results do not change substantially with signs 
and orders of magnitude still the same and only slight numerical differences (3'^ '' or 4"^  
decimal place). Not all companies meet these criteria at all times. Their number varies 
with a minimum of 1514, a maximum of 1935 and a median of 1767 companies used 
at different times. The min, max and median number of companies available at 
different times for the series of weekly returns which are calculated starting from 
observations 2 to 5 are [1555, 1941, 1781.5], [1549, 1926, 1782], [1488, 1933, 1783] 
and [1589, 1939, 1787] respectively. Prices with an associated traded volume of zero 
are set to missing since they are artificial. Finally, estimation of C A P M betas requires 
the subtraction of a risk free rate of return from the market and the stock returns, hi the 
U S this is usually the T-Bill rate, hi Japan there is no equivalent rate. Researchers have 
previously used the call money rate and the 30-day Gensaki (repo) rate. However 
interest rates in Japan have been very close or equal to zero throughout our sample 
period, therefore using raw instead of excess returns should make no difference to our 
results. For example annual interest rates on Certificates of Deposit^ with terms of less 
than 30 days from Jan 1995 until May 2002 averaged 0.44%, that's 44 basis points. 
Since we use weekly data, the equivalent weekly rate should be used as the risk fi-ee 
rate. That is equal to 0.44/52 = 0.0086% which is 0.86 basis points. The Japan hiter-
bank 1 Month offered rate over the same period, averaged 47 basis points annually i.e. 
0.9 basis points weekly. This represents 0.4% of the average weekly movement of the 
equally weighted market index over the same period which is equal to 215 basis points. 
To summarise therefore this study attempts to rectify several methodological 
problems identified in the literature review. We simulate a strategy with a holding 
period of one week which is too short a time for substantial changes in the risk profiles 
of the winner and loser portfolios to occur. Unlike previous studies we examine 
optimal investment portfolios that have maximum expected return and zero exposure 
to systematic risk and/or size thus countering the argument that results are driven by 
^ Source: Bank of Japan website, data is available from January 1995 until present 
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risk differences in the wiimer and loser portfolios. In order to mitigate the impact of 
microstructure biases we use auction determined open prices and volume weighted 
average prices to estimate portfolio performance. We also split the sample in two 
halves and examine illiquid companies separately from liquid ones. Portfolio returns 
are calculated net of trading costs which have largely been ignored by the literature 
although confrarian returns are very sensitive to them due to the high turnover of the 
strategy. Unlike previous studies our strategy is simulated entirely out of sample and 
so portfolio returns do not suffer from in-sample bias. This bias results in substantially 
over-estimated contrarian profits as will be shown later. 
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2.3 The Jegadeesh^Titman Decomposition 
2.3.1 Ex-Ante Return Decomposition 
Table 25 displays the average coefficient values when equation (2.2.1)'* is 
estimated over the entire sample using the market return and its 1'' lag as regressors. 
As in Jegadeesh-Titman (JT) (1995), the market returns used to estimate (2.2.1) are 
value weighted but those used to calculate the portfolio weights are equally weighted. 
The portfolio weight assigned to stock i at time t isw, =—^(•/?,,_, - R „ , - i ) , where 
N 
the subscript'm' indicates the market. Simulated portfolio returns are calculated from 
24-Jul-1995 until 21-May-2002. Delta is an estimate of the quantity given by 
Jy 1=1 
, which is the expected value of the covariance 
between contemporaneous and lagged factor sensitivities. Delta is used to estimate the 
component of the contrarian profit attributed to delayed reaction to factor realisations. 
The coefficient of the market lag is positive but the average T-statistic is very 
small and so it does not seem to be significant on average. A closer examination 
reveals that about 32% of the stocks have a statistically significant positive lagged 
market coefficient value. About 64% of the sample has insignificant lagged-market 
sensitivity and the rest has significantly negative sensitivity. Therefore over one third 
of the sample has a statistically significant response to past market returns. The Delta 
estimate is positive suggesting that delayed reaction to factor realizations will have a 
negative contribution to the expected contrarian profit. Table 26 shows the components 
of the estimated contrarian profits for the whole, liquid and illiquid samples. The 
component, -o^xlO' , measures the part of the return attributed to the cross-sectional 
variation of stock returns. Stocks with higher than average expected returns tend to 
have higher than average realized returns and therefore reduce contrarian profits. The 
term - Q x l O ' measures the part of the return due to overreaction to firm specific 
information. Finally, the component -Scr^^xlO^ is the contribution of delayed 
reaction of stock prices to common factor realizations. 
^Equation (2.2.1) is: / ? , = + £ b,., f , + e . 
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Table 25 
Jegadesh & Titman Decomposition, Sensitivities to contemporaneous 
and lagged value weighted market returns 
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Jegadesh & Titman Decomposition of Contrarian Profits 
- C T > 1 0 ' - Q x l O ' - ^ c r ^ ^ x l O ' Total 
Whole 
Sample 
Value -0.0439 0.3464 -0.0234 0.033% 
Proportion -0.1334 1.0515 -0.0710 
Liquid 
Sample 
Value -0.0229 0.1935 -0.0192 0.023% 
Proportion -0.1008 0.8527 -0.0846 
Illiquid 
Sample 
Value -0.0650 0.5020 -0.0308 0.047% 
Proportion -0.1376 1.0620 -0.0652 
As expected the contribution of the delayed reaction to common factors is 
negative and most of the return comes fi"om overreaction to the firm-specific 
component of returns. An important observation is that the average overreaction return 
for the illiquid sub-sample is more than twice as large as that of the liquid sub-sample 
suggesting that most of the strategy return comes fi-om the less liquid stocks in the 
sffiiple. Table 27 provides estimates of the relative coritributioh of the different sources 
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of contrarian profits allowing for time varying factor sensitivities. According to 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1995) this is done by estimating the parameters of the following 
equation: 
1 ^ 
Where n is the contrarian return and^, = —Y^ef, . Estimates of confrarian profits due 
to delayed reaction to the common factors and to overreaction are given by a , ( T ^ „ 
and Y 
1 ^ ^ 
—^,9,_, respectively. An estimate of .9 is obtained using the residuals from 
equation. (2.2.1). These results reinforce the results in table 26. It is worth noting that 
the largest part of the return is due to overreaction, for all three samples. The delayed 
reaction to common factors contributes negatively to the sfrategy profits for all 
samples but this contribution is much larger for the liquid sample than for the illiquid 
sample. This result in itself would lead us to believe that the prices of illiquid stocks 
react more promptly and fiilly to the market, which seems counterintuitive. Table 25 
though shows that the coefficient of the lag of the market return is on average very 
small and insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient of the market return is on average 
almost equal to 1 for the companies in the liquid sample but significantly less than 1 
for the companies in the illiquid sample. This may be so because the market return is 
constructed as a value weighted index and is therefore more correlated with the larger 
companies in the sample, which also happen to be the most liquid. An alternative 
explanation is that the returns of illiquid companies are driven more by company 
specific factors rather than market considerations. To gain some insight into which 
interpretation may be true, we re-produce the results of Tables 25 and 27 in tables 25a 
and 27a respectively, using the returns of an equally weighted market index. The 
results are remarkably similar when equally weighted returns are used. The average 
market return coefficient for liquid stocks is still considerably larger than for illiquid 
stocks. Delayed reaction to factors seems to contribute very little to the profits of the 
illiquid sample. This, in conjunction with the lower average correlation of these stocks 




Jegadesh & Titman Contrarian Profits Conditional on Lagged Factor 
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2.3.2 Ex-Post Return Attribution 
The return decomposition proposed by Jegadeesh & Titman breaks down the 
expected portfolio return into different components. An alternative method of return 
attribution, which is widely used by investment professionals and also appears in 
Bachmann-Dubois (1998) (BD), decomposes the realised portfolio return into different 
components. This method treats weights as constants rather than random variables 
"since they are calculated as a function of realizedTetums. According to BD, if (2.2.1) 
descnbes stock returns then the strategy return at time ti^ 
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(=1 1=1 i=l 
\ N 
J 1=1 
So the strategy return can be broken into 3 parts: an idiosyncratic part consisting of the 
weighted sum of the idiosyncratic stock returns, a systematic part attributed to the 
influence of common factors including lagged factors and a residual part attributed to 
over and underreaction to firm specific news. 
Table 28 
Ex-Post Return attribution: Simple market model with market lag 




















































































































































































T-Stat,HO: X = 0 11.949 -10.914 2.5922 1.4717 12.0852 
Table 28 presents the results of this decomposition. Estimates of the factor sensitivities 
of stock returns are obtained from equation (2.2.1) which is estimated for each period t 
using the most recent 78 weekly returns. This allows for time variability in the factor 
sensitivities. Stocks with fewer than 30 returns at time t (i.e. in the last 78 weeks) are 
excluded fi"om all calculations for that period, thus avoiding biases induced by 
infrequently traded or less-established firms. T-statistics are corrected for serial 
correlation of order up to 5. The 1st value in this row is the T-statistic of the average 
weekly strategy return, which rejects the null that the mean return is 0 for all samples. 
The average weekly return for the whole sample is 0.032% and the annualized Sharpe 
Ratio is 3.51. It is evident from Table 28 that, for all samples, the largest proportion of 
the contrarian profit is attributed to the residual return which is associated with 
overreaction. The contribution of the lagged factor value is negative for the whole and 
Uquid samples and positive but very small for the illiquid sample, which is in keeping 
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with the results in Table 26. The average return for the illiquid sample is more than 
twice as large as that of the liquid sample. This result is again in keeping with the 
results in Tables 26 and 27. Table 26 shows that the expected contrarian profit for the 
ilhquid sample is 0.4062 compared with 0.1514 for the hquid sample. Table 27 shows 
that the estimates of confrarian profits due to delayed reaction to the common factors 
and to overreaction for the Uquid and iUiquid samples are [-0.0847, 0.2981] and [-
0.0061, 0.5053] respectively. The fact that most of the strategy profits come from the 
illiquid part of the sample implies that the sfrategy's performance in real life would be 
much poorer than on paper. IlUquid stocks are traded infrequently and in small 
amounts, therefore a large part of the sfrategy's profit would not be readily realizable. 
Furthermore, even small fraded nominal values would have a relatively large impact on 
the price of such shares thus dissipating the potential profit before it is realized. 
Table 30 
Jegadeesh & Titman Portfolio Ex-Post Return attribution: Simple market 
model 
Total a bo Residual 
Whole 
Sample 
Proportion 1 -0.1102 0.0517 1.0584 
Mean*10^ 0.3294 -0.0363 0.0170 0.3487 
T-Stat,HO: X = 0 9.4916 -7.8408 0.9397 12.3316 
2.3.3 Market Risk of Contrarian Returns 
A stock-portfolio is a collection of securities and as such is a synthetic stock 
itself The tools used to analyse stock returns should therefore be used to assess the 
properties of portfolio returns as well. One such tool is the multifactor model used to 
estimate stock betas with respect to a number of factors. When a given portfolio's 
returns are influenced by common factors, the effect can be measured by regressing the 
portfoho returns on the factor reahzations, as in equation (2.3.3.1): 
+ Y^bJu + e , , f , : Factori (2.3.3.1) 
i 
Two factors of interest in this study are the market index and its lag and equation 
(2.3.3.1) in this case becomes: 
K, = a+b,Ry^^^, +b,Ry^„,_, +e, (2.3.3.2) 
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This regression estimates the market beta of the portfolio return. The portfolio beta is 
by definition equal to the covariance between the portfolio and the market return 
divided by the variance of the market return. The beta of the market return is equal to 
one while a risk fi-ee asset has a Beta equal to zero. A very small beta therefore would 
imply a small covariance between the portfolio and the market return i.e. a relatively 
low risk asset. Alternatively, the estimated beta is by definition equal to the difference 
between the betas of the long and short sides of the portfolio. The intercept term a is 
the familiar Jensen performance index. Table 29 presents estimates of regression 
(2.3.3.2). 
Regressions of Co 
weighted mar 
Table 29 
ntrarian Returns on a volume 
ket index and its first lag 
a bo 















The coefficients of the market and the lagged market return are both very small in 
magnitude indicating very small correlation between the portfolio and the market 
returns. The T-statistic of the market beta is statistically significant so the beta, 
although very small, is not zero. The constant term is also statistically significant 
implying that the mean portfolio return is greater than zero. The regression results in 
Table 29 then show that the contrarian strategy return is on average larger than zero 
and bears very small correlation with the market return. It can therefore be assumed 
that although a very small part of the average portfolio return can be attributed to the 
assumption of market risk, the market does not play a dominant role in determining 
such returns. The contrarian portfolio return is in large part free of systematic risk as is 
also confirmed by the return attribution results in Table 28. The coefficient of the 
lagged value of the market index is negative, so the strategy returns are negatively 
correlated with the previous period's market index value. This is in agreement with the 
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results in Tables 25 and 27, which indicate that delayed reaction to common factors 
contributes negatively to the strategy profits. 
2.3.4 The Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition Using Time-Varying 
Betas 
Results so far have been derived by estimating the 2-factor version of equation 
2.2.1 over the entire sample. Therefore the factor sensitivities are constant over time. 
Alternatively 2.2.1 can be estimated by using a rolling window regression, as above, 
thus allowing betas to vary over time. Estimates of the JT return components are 
obtained for each period and then averaged and their means tested as in Bachmann-
Dubois (1998). Results are presented in Table 31. Again, most of the return is 
attributed to overreaction to firm specific information. The component that measures 
the contribution of delayed reaction to factor realizations is statistically insignificant 
for all samples. A noticeable difference with the results in Table 26 is the size of the 
contribution of the cross-sectional variation of expected returns, which now appears to 
be much larger and significant. 
Table 31 
Jegadeesh & Titman Decomposition of Contrarian Returns using time 
varying betas 
Portfolio - o - J x l O ' - Q x l O ^ -c5c7^„x l0^ 
Whole 
Sample 
Proportion -0.6953 1.1497 -0.0690 




T-Stat,HO: X = 0 -3.5584 24.8627 -0.9867 
Liquid 
Sample 
Proportion -0.5678 1.3754 -0.0824 
p IViean*10^ -0.1289 0.3121 -0.0187 
0) o 
« a. 





Proportion -0.8097 1.0692 -0.0778 
IMeanMO^ -0.3828 0.5054 -0.0368 
T-Stat,HO: X = 0 -2.5466 22.7762 0.6828 
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2.3.5 Summary 
The results of the Jegadeesh-Titman analysis are dependent on the portfolio 
weights attributed to each stock in each period, which are proportional to a simple 
market residual. Therefore the results should in principle not hold when the chosen 
weights are not simple linear fiinctions of each stock's performance relative to the 
market index. Furthermore, these weights are thought to maximise the expected 
confrarian return because larger deviations imply larger reversals. However, large 
deviations may simply reflect a stock's larger volatility or a larger standard error for 
the stock's estimated factor sensitivities. The authors provide a convenient and fast 
way to estimate the magnitude of the expected profit from a specific contrarian 
sfrategy, as well as, to what extent this profit bears systematic risk. I f the analysis 
suggests that the estimated profit is significantly larger than zero and only a small part 
comes from delayed reaction to common factors then one should attempt to fiirther 
refine the strategy and maximize the expected profit. If on the other hand, the 
estimated profit is not significantly positive, this should not be interpreted as lack of 
potential for confrarian profits in the given market. The tested sfrategy is by no means 
the sfrategy with the best risk/reward potential. The desirability of the portfolio tested 
is questionable since the weights chosen do not maximize expected return nor do they 
minimize the portfolio's expected exposure to common factor risk. 
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2.4 Maximum Sharpe Ratio Portfolios 
This section presents results for our particular version of the contrarian strategy 
which involves the use of portfohos which are optimal with respect to their expected 
Sharpe ratio. As mentioned in the methodology section both a single index model and 
a multifactor APT type model were used to generate the inputs to the optimisation 
process. Sub-section 2.4.1 presents results for the single factor asset pricing model 
while sub-section 2.4.2 presents results for the multifactor model. Finally sub-section 
2.4.3 examines the portfolio returns for seasonal patterns 
2.4.1 Optimal Portfolios with a Single Factor Asset Pricing Model 
The closed form solution to the portfolio optimisation problem requires 
estimates of the expected returns and variance-covariance matrix of the stocks that 
comprise the investment universe. These estimates may be derived using a single or a 
multifactor approach to modelling stock returns. This section will examine optimal 
portfolios based on the single factor approach. 
2.4.1.1 Portfolio Formation 
The results in section 2.3 indicate that delayed reaction to factor realisations 
contributes very little to contrarian profits. The sensitivity to the first lag of the market 
return is very small on average; however it is statistically significant for 36% of the 
stocks. Therefore, equation 2.2.1 will be estimated using the market return and its first 
lag in order to produce the inputs for the closed form solution (2.2.1). Normality tests 
and portfolio performance results are presented in Tables 32 and 33 respectively. 
Return attribution results are included in tables 34 and 35. Both tables were derived by 
using the ex-post return attribution procedure described in Section 2.3. The only 
difference is that Table 34 presents t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the various 
return components are equal to zero. In contrast Table 35 presents one tailed tests for 
two separate null hypotheses: 
(a) That the various return components account for 3% or less of the total portfolio 
return and 
(b) That the various return components account for -3% or less of the total 
portfolio return. 
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If (a) is accepted and (b) is rejected, the return component accounts for less than 3% in 
absolute value of the total portfolio return. The scheme used by Lo & MacKinley and 
Jegadeesh & Titman to allocate portfolio weights to individual securities does not 
guarantee that these weights add up to 1. This implies that at any time either of the 
long or short portfolios is over or under invested thus making return comparisons over 
time spurious. In order to make the JT strategy comparable with the optimised 
portfolio strategy, both the short and the long portfolio weights are transformed so that 
they sum up to -1 and 1 respectively. This new portfolio is called the 'JT Portfolio'. 
As it has emerged fi-om the literature review, many of the sceptics attribute the 
contrarian strategy returns to differences in either the average market capitalisation or 
in the systematic risk between the long and short portfolios. This compelled us to 
impose two sets of restrictions on the optimal portfolio weights. The first set requires 
that: 
(a) The portfolio sensitivity to the market is zero and 
(b) The portfolio sensitivity to the market lag is zero 
The vector of historical betas is used as a forecast of period t+1 betas. The exposure of 
the resulting portfolio to the market index depends on the quality of this forecast. This 
portfolio is called 'Zero Risk'. The second set of restrictions requires that: 
(a) The portfolio sensitivity to the market is zero and 
(b) The average size of the long portfolio equals that of the short portfolio 
For each stock, size is calculated every 52 weeks as the average market capitalisation 
over the last 200 trading days (i.e. roughly one calendar year). This portfolio is called 
'Zero Size'. Using equation 2.2.1, the residual return for each stock j is calculated as: 
Where Rj is the stock j return, is the market return and Uj is the constant of the 
regression or the stock j abnormal return. The opposite of this residual is taken to be 
the expected stock return for time t+1. Using the closed form solution (2.2.1) we then 
get a vector of weights for period t+1, given all the information up to time t. The 
portfolio return for t+1 is calculated as R ^ = h ', + , |^ , ^ , + i » where R is an Nxl 
vector of period t+1 returns and N is the number of stocks in the investment universe. 
The variance-covariance matrix is estimated by: V - B'V^B + Q., where 5 is a Nx2 
matrix of market and market lag betas, is the covariance matrix of the market 
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return and its lag and Q is an NxN diagonal matrix with the variances of the residual 
stock returns along the diagonal. 
2.4.1.2 Performance Comparisons 
Table 33 shows that the Sharpe Ratio of the 'Zero Risk' and 'Zero Size' 
portfolios is 7.81 and 7.99 respectively. In comparison, the JT portfolio has a Sharpe 
Ratio of 4.68. Thus, by simply changing the way in which portfolio weights are 
allocated, we managed to improve the strategy's performance significantly in terms of 
the reward-to-risk ratio. The average weekly return of the JT strategy is both larger and 
more volatile than that of the optimal portfolio (1.48% vs. 1.27% and 1.29%) and 
therefore less certain. This is also reflected in the associated t-statistic which is larger 
for the optimised portfolio returns due to their much smaller standard deviation. The t-
statistic values reject the null hypothesis that the average weekly portfolio return is less 
than or equal to 0.5% for all three portfolios. All the portfolio return series have a few 
observations that are more than three standard deviations away from their mean. These 
observations will certainly bias the portfolio beta estimates and will also affect the 
Sharpe-Ratio estimates. A closer examination of the returns, showed that the average 
value of all the outlying observations is positive, suggesting that there are more 
positive than negative outliers. One way of dealing with such observations is 
truncation, i.e. observations larger (smaller) than the mean plus (minus) three standard 
deviations are set equal to the mean plus (minus) three standard deviations This will 
result in both a smaller mean return and associated standard deviation. Table 32 only 
reports the Berra-Jarque statistic for the truncated portfolio returns. Sharpe ratio values 
for the raw portfolio returns are reported in brackets in Table 33. The raw return 
Sharpe Ratio value is always smaller than that corresponding to the truncated returns. 
This is because although truncation reduces the mean portfolio return, it reduces the 
standard deviation even more thus resulting in a larger Sharpe Ratio. 
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Table 32 
Normality Statistics of Optimal Portfolios with a Single Factor Asset 
Pricing Model 
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By examining the abnormal returns of the portfolios that are formed over the entire 
sample of companies (Table 33), it emerges that they are fairly symmetric with the 
long and short sides contributing more or less equally to the arbitrage profits. This is 
not true when the total portfolio returns are compared; the long side of the arbitrage 
portfolio seems to contribute slightly more than the short side (roughly 55% and 45% 
respectively). When the liquid sample is examined, the long portfolio contributes 
substantially more than the short portfolio for all strategies. In contrast, by examining 
the ilhquid sample, the optimised portfolios are symmetric while the short side 
contributes relatively more for the JT strategy. The illiquid sample portfolio returns are 
substantially higher than their liquid sample coimterparts for all strategies. Taking the 
'Zero Size' strategy as an example, the illiquid sample portfolio outperforms 
significantly the liquid sample portfolio both in terms of average return and Sharpe 
Ratio. The average difference of the two return series is 0.46% and its associated t-
statistic of 6.55 suggests it is significantly different fi-om zero at the 5% level. 
Furthermore, the market betas for the illiquid sample's long and short portfolios are 
lower than their liquid sample counterparts. This implies that the illiquid portfolio 
returns are rather driven by factors other than the market, such as reaction to firm 
specific events and microstructiu-e effects. Conrad & Raul (1993) and Ball, Kothari & 
Shanken (1995) among others have argued that small capitalisation stock retiuns are 
more susceptible to measurement errors such as the bid-ask bias. Illiquid stocks tend to 
be also small in size. The average market capitalization in the sample under 
investigation is 129,767.8 and 296,166.2 million yen for the illiquid and liquid stocks 
respectively. The market impact of any given transaction will be relatively larger for 
illiquid stocks, thus resulting in larger price movements. This makes it more likely that 
prices of illiquid stocks overreact to firm specific news, which in turn induces higher 
correlation between current residual and fiiture total returns. Therefore higher returns 
and lower market betas are symptomatic of measurement errors and lack of liquidity. 
2.4.1.3 Return Attribution and Risk Analysis 
Table 33 reports the sensitivity of the various portfolio returns to the market 
index and its first lag over the entire sample period. The market return coefficient is 
very small in magnitude but statistically significant despite choosing the portfolio 
weights so that the formation period portfolio beta is alw a^ys zero. This is partly 
because the variance-cdVanance matrix, the stoek"betas"and the stdckflfeisiduarretuiS^^^ 
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are all estimated with error. This makes it very difficult to calculate weights that 
eliminate systematic risk completely. Another reason is that when time varying betas 
are assimied, historical betas are not very good forecasts of fiiture betas. An interesting 
result is obtained when the variance-covariance matrix, the stock betas and the stock 
residual returns are all estimated using all available time points (i.e. betas are assumed 
to be constant over time). Portfolio weights are again calculated using equations (2.2.1) 
but now the vector of Betas and the Variance-Covariance matrix are the same in each 
period t. The only thing that changes is the vector of expected returns for t+1. All of 
the average portfolio return in this case is attributed to the residual stock returns by 
construction as is evident in the table that follows. Nevertheless, the portfolio return 
has a statistically significant regression coefficient for the market retiim. 
a K 6> Residual 
Proportion 0.0001 -0.00% 0.00% 99.99% 
Mean Value 0.000149% -0.000045% 0.000054% 1.41% 
Regression Value 0.0136 0.1219 0.0076 
T-Statistic 23.12 5.87 0.36 
This result highlights the difficulties in disentangling portfolio returns. Caution 
should be applied when interpreting results. Although the portfolio beta above is zero 
by construction, the regression of the portfolio return on the market return rejects the 
hypothesis that the portfolio beta is zero. It should be borne in mind that betas are 
estimated with error. Therefore, despite one's best efforts, the optimal portfolio will 
most likely have a true beta that is not exactly equal to zero. The best that can be done 
is to construct a portfolio with a very low beta so that the impact of the market on the 
portfolio return is so small that can be ignored. It can then be argued that stock betas 
do not really affect portfolio returns. The importance of statistically significant betas 
should not be over-stated. The explanatory power of the regression is very weak as 
shown by the R-Square value. The R-Square is an estimate of the proportion of the 
total variance of the portfolio return explained by the market return and its lag. In this 
case, the proportion is about 9% as it is also indicated by the small beta values. In 
agreement with the JT analysis in Section 2.3, the market lag coefficient is 
insignificant across all portfolios indicating the absence of wide-spread delayed 
reaction to factor realisations. 
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All portfolios have positive and statistically significant abnormal returns. This 
raises questions regarding short-term market efficiency and lends support to the 
overreaction hypothesis. The abnormal portfolio returns should be zero in an efficient 
market. In contrast, as is obvious from Table 34, the abnormal stock return 
a contributes negatively to all arbitrage portfolio profits. This contribution is much 
larger in magnitude and more significant for the JT portfolio. A possible explanation is 
that this strategy uses market adjusted returns as trading signals, hi the context of a 
CAPM type valuation model, this return consists of the abnormal return a, the residual 
return and a part equal to (bj^, -'i)*Rywm,f Therefore the strategy will tend to short 
high a stocks and buy low a stocks with the arbitrage portfolio having a negative net 
exposure to a. For the same reason the JT portfolio seems to have a larger proportion 
of its return attributed to the market beta although the associated t-statistic indicates 
that it is not significant. However, as mentioned before, the large portfolio-return 
volatility accounts for the low t-statistic value. 
Less than 2% of the average return of the optimised portfolios is attributed to 
the market index. The rather large associated t-statistics indicate that this proportion is 
not zero. Once again, the large t-statistic values are a consequence of the low portfolio 
volatility. It has therefore emerged that high t-statistics are associated with low 
portfolio volatility and vice versa. This may suggest that the tested null hypothesis 
should be changed. Comparison of individual return components to zero may be 
unproductive since a contribution value of 2% is just as insignificant. Table 35 
compares return contributions to 3% and -3% of the average portfolio return. 
Evidently, the substantial negative contribution of the abnormal return is significantly 
larger (in absolute value) than 3% for the JT strategy. Both the market index 
component and the lag market component account for less than 3% of the average 
return for all portfolios. The largest proportion of the return is by far attributed to the 
residual stock performance, which is associated with overreaction to firm specific 
news, thus providing overwhelming support to the overreaction hypothesis. T-statistics 
for thea,6o,6, and Residual columns are compared against a critical value of 1.9671 
and - 1.9671 for the right and left tail test respectively (2.5% confidence level). 
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Table 34 
Return Attribution for Optimal Portfolios with a Single Factor Asset 
Pricing Model 








































































































































































































































































































































T-Statistic 21.79 -1.86 5.66 6.60 22.87 
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2.4.2 Optimal Portfolios with a Multi-Factor Asset Pricing Model 
2.4.2.1 Model Description 
A company called APT (Advanced Portfolio Technologies) estimate a multi-
factor model using weekly return data on about 1800 companies. The sample of 
companies is selected based on length of trading history, market capitalisation and 
liquidity criteria. Using factor analysis they extract 20 factors and provide quarterly 
updates of the set of factor loadings (sensitivities) for all stocks in the investment 
universe. Robust regression techniques are used to estimate factor loadings for assets 
outside the sample. The factor returns are linear combinations of stock returns that best 
explain their historical variance-covariance matrix. The chosen number of 20 factors is 
coincidental; when the model was developed, FORTRAN did not support dynamic 
allocation of arrays so the number of 20 factors was settled on since most markets 
could be modelled adequately with about 15 factors and 20 was a cautious estimate. 
The 20 factor model has the same form as equation 2.2.1, the only difference being 
that the term ,. is now replaced by Vj-, the risk free rate of return. All factor 
returns have an expected value of 0 and are orthogonal by construction. These 
properties afford us with computational ease of quantities such as the systematic 
variance-covariance matrix of stock returns which is given by: B*B', where B is the 
NxK matrix of factor loadings, N is the number of stocks and K the number of factors. 
Each row of B contains the factor loadings for each stock in the investment universe. 
So the inner product of row j of B provides an estimate of the systematic variance for 
stock j . Factor returns are not provided so they have to be estimated from the supplied 
sets of factor loadings and our sample of stock returns. Residual returns may then be 
estimated using (2.2.1) The process for estimating factor returns is as follows: 
Equation (2.2.1) may be rewritten as: 
R, = BF, + e, 
Where: 
R is the Nxl vector of stock returns, B is the NxK matrix of factor sensitivities, F is 
the Kxl vector of factor returns and e is the Nxl vector of residual returns. 
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The variance-covariance matrix of residual returns is given by, Q an NxN diagonal 
matrix with residual variances along the diagonal. If the risk-free rate is not known, the 
term can be absorbed in the equation, so that we can write: 
R, = XZ , + e,. 
Where now X = [B I] , I is a Nxl vector of ones and Z = [F Vj-] 
The weighted least-squares solution to this problem is: 
~Z = {rQ.-'xyrQ.-'R (2.4.1) 
Using (2.4.1), we can generate estimates of the time series of factor returns and the risk 
free rate for each period t and subsequently the residual stock returns can be calculated. 
The next sub-section examines two maximum Sharpe Ratio portfolios, when 
the inputs to the optimisation problem, namely estimates of the expected returns and 
the variance-covariance matrix of the stocks in the optimisation universe, are 
calculated using the 20-factor model described above. The first portfolio results from 
solving the Optimisation Problem (2.2.1) without imposing any constraints on the 
exposure of the portfolio to various factors or attributes. This portfolio will be called 
'APT Unconstrained'. The second portfolio is consfrained to have zero exposure to 
size as in section 2.4.1 and will be called 'APT Zero Size'. Results are presented in 
Tables 36 to 40. 
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Table 36 
Normality Statistics for Optimal Portfolios with a Multi-Factor Asset 
Pricing Model 
Portfolio Berra-Jarque Skewness Kurtosis 
Whole 
Sample 
Arbitrage 0.2736 -0.0101 0.1384 
Long 16.9724 0.0738 1.0911 











Arbitrage 7.6495 -0.0688 0.7263 
c o 
i\ 










Arbitrage 2.2635 0.1221 -0.3194 
Long 30.3619 0.2672 1.3723 
Short 18.7161 -0.2193 1.0698 
Whole 
Sample 
Arbitrage 0.0698 0.0123 0.0662 
Long 16.8553 0.0755 1.0868 






















Arbitrage 2.3578 0.1262 -0.3236 
Long 30.4695 0.2672 1.3751 
Short 18.5842 -0.2177 1.0667 
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Return attribution for the APT Unconstrained portfolio using tlie 20 
factor model 
Whole Sample Liquid Sample Illiquid Sample 
Source Proportion T-Stat Proportion T-Stat Proportion T-Stat 
Total 1.0000 19.45 1.0000 21.29 1.0000 14.81 
Factor 1 0.0003 0.92 -0.0002 -0.61 -0.0009 -0.78 
Factor 2 -0.0007 -1.42 -0.0001 -0.14 -0.0013 -1.36 
Factor 3 -0.0005 -1.74 0.0002 0.51 -0.0030 -4.21 
Factor 4 -0.0001 -0.47 0.0000 -0.05 -0.0004 -1.01 
Factor 5 0.0001 0.93 0.0002 0.98 -0.0003 -0.83 
Factor 6 0.0004 1.67 0.0003 1.46 0.0011 1.90 
Factor 7 -0.0002 -1.53 -0.0002 -1.17 -0.0001 -0.12 
Factor 8 -0.0001 -0.47 0.0001 0.57 -0.0004 -0.82 
Factor 9 -0.0002 -1.56 -0.0005 -2.33 -0.0004 -1.01 
Factor 10 0.0000 0.02 0.0000 -0.25 0.0000 0.09 
Factor 11 0.0000 -0.06 -0.0005 -2.24 0.0004 1.00 
Factor 12 0.0000 0.02 -0.0001 -0.58 0.0003 1.30 
Factor 13 0.0002 0.78 0.0000 -0.01 0.0003 1.28 
Factor 14 -0.0002 -0.85 -0.0002 -0.90 -0.0002 -0.63 
Factor 15 -0.0002 -1.70 0.0001 0.34 -0.0003 -0.81 
Factor 16 -0.0001 -0.43 0.0001 0.46 -0.0004 -1.09 
Factor 17 -0.0002 -1.73 0.0002 1.55 -0.0001 -0.42 
Factor 18 0.0000 -0.17 0.0001 0.90 -0.0006 -1.95 
Factor 19 -0.0001 -0.70 0.0000 -0.12 -0.0004 -1.49 
Factor 20 -0.0001 -0.38 0.0002 1.27 0.0000 -0.17 
RF-Rate 0.0000 0.46 0.0000 0.65 0.0001 1.48 
Residual 1.0017 19.11 1.0003 20.98 1.0065 14.75 
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Table 39 
Return attribution for the APT Zero Size portfolio using the 20 factor 
model 
Whole Sample Liquid Sample Illiquid Sample 
Source Proportion T-Stat Proportion T-Stat Proportion T-Stat 
Total 1.0000 19.48 1.0000 14.81 1.0000 21.23 
Factor 1 0.0003 1.11 -0.0009 -0.76 -0.0005 -1.24 
Factor 2 -0.0004 -0.70 -0.0012 -1.35 0.0000 -0.07 
Factor 3 -0.0007 -1.91 -0.0030 -4.22 -0.0001 -0.26 
Factor 4 0.0000 -0.05 -0.0004 -0.99 -0.0003 -0.86 
Factor 5 0.0003 1.87 -0.0003 -0.78 0.0002 0.70 
Factor 6 0.0005 1.97 0.0011 1.95 0.0006 2.37 
Factor 7 -0.0001 -1.09 -0.0001 -0.15 -0.0006 -1.99 
Factor 8 -0.0001 -0.36 -0.0004 -0.80 0.0001 0.60 
Factor 9 -0.0002 -1.51 -0.0004 -0.95 -0.0006 -2.30 
Factor 10 0.0000 0.22 0.0000 0.08 -0.0003 -1.20 
Factor 11 0.0000 -0.28 0.0004 0.94 -0.0002 -1.01 
Factor 12 0.0000 -0.32 0.0003 1.41 -0.0001 -0.32 
Factor 13 0.0001 0.62 0.0003 1.16 -0.0001 -0.23 
Factor 14 -0.0001 -0.55 -0.0002 -0.63 0.0000 -0.17 
Factor 15 -0.0002 -1.80 -0.0003 -0.82 0.0000 -0.05 
Factor 16 0.0000 -0.19 -0.0003 -1.05 0.0001 0.25 
Factor 17 -0.0002 -1.50 -0.0001 -0.39 0.0001 0.81 
Factor 18 0.0000 -0.01 -0.0006 -1.94 0.0001 0.87 
Factor 19 -0.0001 -0.72 -0.0004 -1.52 -0.0001 -0.29 
Factor 20 -0.0001 -0.38 -0.0001 -0.21 0.0001 0.83 
RF-Rate 0.0000 -0.60 0.0001 1.46 0.0000 1.07 
Residual 1.0011 19.16 1.0064 14.76 1.0015 21.26 
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Table 40 
Return Attribution for Optimal Portfolios with a Multi-Factor Asset 
Pricing Model Using the Market Model 
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HO: X>=-0.03*PR -10.25 6.20 5.29 23.53 
2.4.2.2 Performance Evaluation 
Restricting the portfolio exposure to size to be zero does not alter its 
performance significantly i f at all (Table 37). Size does not seem to influence the 
returns of any of the portfolios examined. Nevertheless, size is very closely related to 
liquidity. When the universe is split into liquid and illiquid stocks and the strategy is 
implemented separately on each sub-sample the resulting portfolios are drastically 
different. It seems therefore that when the entire sample is used, the optimisation 
process yields portfolios, which are fairly neutral with respect to their exposure to size 
and to the factors used to calculate the inputs of the optimisation problem. The 
average size difference between the long and the short side of the unconstrained 
portfolio is 490 million yen (4.1 million USD) compared with an average size of 221 
billion for the entire sample. Both the 'APT Unconstrained' and 'APT Zero Size' 
portfolios have a higher Sharpe Ratio and average weekly return compared to the 
portfolios in Section 2.4.1. The weekly return o f the 'APT'Unconstrained' portfolio is 
on average 0.28% (7.24) larger than the return of the 'Zero Risk' portfoho and the 
124 
return difference is statistically significant as shown by the T-statistic value in 
brackets. The weekly return of the 'APT Zero Size' portfolio is on average 0.27% 
(7.12) greater than that of its market model counterpart ('Zero Size') and 0.08% (0.94) 
larger than the average return of the 'JT Portfolio'. Although the average portfolio 
return is only slightly higher than that of the JT portfoho, the Sharpe Ratio is ahnost 
twice as large. So when the objective is to maximise the Sharpe Ratio, the same 
average weekly return can be obtained but with only half the volatility associated with 
it. This shows that the portfoho examined by JT is not on the efficient frontier and 
hence rather undesirable since investors can attain the same return for less risk. 
Drawing conclusions about market efficiency on the basis of such a portfolio can be 
specious. Both the 'APT Zero Size' and 'Zero Size' portfolios are formed using the 
same procedure to calculate portfolio weights and the same investment universe. The 
only difference is that different models are used to provide estimates of the variance-
covariance matrix and the expected stock returns. So the differences in the portfolio 
performance can only be attributed to differences in the quality of the inputs to the 
portfolio formation procedure. It seems that the 20-factor model is more precise in 
estimating the systematic component of the return, thus leading to more accurate 
estimates of the part of the return closely related to over- or underreaction to firm 
specific events. Furthermore, better estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
investment universe, lead to the formation of more efficient portfolios. 
The regression (2.3.3.2) results for the APT portfohos are very similar to the 
results for the portfohos in section 2.4.1. The portfolio beta is again very close to zero 
and the r-square of the regression is still low indicating that only a very small part of 
the total variance of the portfolio return is explained by the market. The return 
attribution tables 38 and 39, constructed using the 20 factor model, show that 100% of 
the return is attributed to stock residual returns with the average return attributed to all 
the other factors being neghgible. In contrast the market model decomposition in Table 
40 shows that both APT portfolios have a significant negative contribution from the 
stock abnormal return, a. Return proportions attributed to the market are less than 3%, 
similar to the portfolios examined in section 2.4.1. The portfoho, which is formed 
using the illiquid part of the sample, outperforms significantly its liquid sample 
counterpart. Therefore most of the portfolio performance is attributed to the less liquid 
"Stocks in the sample. This may be a cause for concern regarding the feasibility of the" 
sfrategy. I f scale is the main concern, the liquid sample results indicate that a healthy 
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Sharpe Ratio can be achieved by simply concentrating on the more liquid stocks. The 
strategy can then be implemented by investing nominal amounts that range from very 
small to very large since a liquid market should be able to absorb such amounts 
without any serious adverse price movements. I f on the other hand, scale is not very 
important, the strategy can be implemented in its original form. 
2.4.3 Seasonal Patterns in Portfolio Returns 
Table 41 breaks down the returns off all the portfolios examined so far, into the 
parts attained in each month of the year. Associated t-statistics are in brackets. A l l 
months yield a positive return on average for all portfolios so there is no serious 
concentration of performance on any given month. April returns are the highest for the 
first three portfolios and the second highest for the APT portfolios. Most Japanese 
companies have a March financial year end so at first glance it would appear that there 
is a tax-loss selling effect. However the Japanese tax code does not share the same 
peculiarities with the US one. There are three other potential explanations for the 
higher April returns. 
(a) Many Japanese banks have been facing insolvency for a number of years. One 
very significant asset in their books is large blocks of other firm's shares. There 
is a concerted effort around the end of each financial year to prop up the value 
of such shares and therefore allow many banks to meet the solvency criteria. 
(b) There is a fundamental shift towards value shares towards the financial year 
end. Most firms go ex-dividend in March and companies whose share value has 
been depressed during the year present a good value investment because of 
their higher dividend yield. Shares of these companies are sold again after their 
ex-dividend date elapses. 
(c) There is anecdotal evidence that the government sometimes intervenes directly 
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2.5 Feasibility of contrarian returns. 
All the portfolios examined so far yield substantial returns with little exposure 
to systematic risk. It is paradoxical that although this has been public knowledge for 
many years, these strategies still continue to yield large returns on paper. One would 
assume that investors would welcome the opportunity to make some relatively low risk 
profits until the opportunity disappeared. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that limits 
to the effectiveness of arbifrage explain the persistence of contrarian profits over time. 
Another reason may be that when implemented, such stiategies yield substantially 
different results than on paper. This section wil l show that the contrarian strategies, as 
perceived and analysed in the extant academic literature, have a strong positive bias 
and are highly unrealistic. 
The returns used to calculate the strategy's performance are usually calculated 
as the ratio of the difference between two closing prices. This is fine when unrealised 
returns are calculated and as long as the particular investment is not cashed 
(liquidated). However, these prices are not feasible. The composition of the portfolio 
for period t+1 is determined after the closing price at time t becomes known. This price 
is therefore unattainable during the holding period. The starting value of the portfolio 
wi l l be determined in the frading day immediately following period t. (the length of 
each period could be 5, 25, etc days, depending on the periodicity of the returns we 
analyze) and wil l depend on the prices at which the portfolio holdings are obtained. A 
more realistic candidate for the book price of the portfolio holdings would be the open 
price of the trading day following period t. This is particularly true for the Japanese 
stock market where most of the day's traded volume is transacted at the open auction. 
This price wi l l generally be quite different from the closing price of the formation 
period and as wil l be shown next, measuring portfolio returns between closing prices 
overstates portfolio performance. The type of confrarian sfrategy under investigation 
assumes that investors overreact to firm specific events therefore driving the stock 
price too high or too low from what is otherwise justified by the firm's fimdamental 
value. This anomaly wil l eventually be corrected as contrarian investors step in and 
take opposite positions. It is reasonable to assume that as more and more investors start 
to think that a certain price movement is overdone and pluck up the courage to build 
opposite positions, the price wil l revert instantly to a new level when the market re-
opens and it wi l l start accelerating towards its fair value. This effect wi l l erode the 
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potential contrarian profit. It wil l also induce high negative correlation between the 
residual return in period t and the return between the closing price of period t and the 
opening price of period t+1. The correlation should increase as we move towards the 
end of period t+1. This is demonstrated in the table that follows: 
CO CC 5D 
Avg. Corr.x 100 -9.43 -9.97 -11.34 
T-Statistic -37.82 -36.28 -46.53 
The CO column shows the average correlation coefficient between the residual 
return in period t and the return calculated between the close price of period t and the 
open price of period t+1. Column CC shows the correlation coefficient between the 
residual return in period t and the return calculated between the closing price of period 
t and the closing price of the 1 '^ day of period t+1. Finally, column 5D shows the 
average correlation coefficient between the residual return in period t and the return 
calculated between the close price of period t and the close price of period t+1 (i.e. the 
closing price of day 5 in period t+1). Evidently, the average correlation coefficient 
increases as we move fi-om CC to 5D but the CO coefficient is 83% of the 5D 
coefficient. Therefore a large part of the return reversal occurs before the market even 
opens for trading. The above result is reinforced by breaking down daily stock returns 
into a component measured by the difference between the log of the opening price of 
day t+1 and the log of the closing price of day t, and a component measured by the 
difference between the log of the closing price of day t+1 and the log of the opening 
price of day t+1. The former part is unattainable. Averages over the entire sample are 
then examined. 
Average Proportion of Daily return attributed to time between: 
Close(t)-0pen(t+1) Open(t+1)-Close(t+1) 
11.85% 88.15% 
As can be seen more than 10% of the average daily return occurs while the 
market is closed implying that, when measured fi-om closing price to closing price, the 
portfolio performance is overstated by at least 10%. The price at the end of the holding 
period may be available but it is still not realizable. The closing price in the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange is defined as the last traded price so the simulated trade price (i.e. 
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closing price at t+1) wi l l be quite different from the realised price. Return calculations 
based on this type of price are also very susceptible to the well documented bid-ask 
bias. Furthermore, the added volume from the portfolio frade wil l have an adverse 
impact on the closing price itself, especially when liquidity is low, thus making the 
reported prices unattainable. The open price on the other hand is formed using an open 
auction and so there is no bid-ask spread. Quite a substantial proportion of the daily 
volume is fraded at this price so the portfolio frade wil l be readily feasible and its 
market impact will be relatively smaller. Open prices therefore are better candidates 
for assessing the simulated portfolio performance. Volume weighted average prices 
(VWAP) are also good candidates for simulating the confrarian strategy. As the name 
suggests, VWAPs are calculated as the volume weighted average of all the traded 
prices during a given trading day. Many stock brokers guarantee delivery of such 
prices for a small fee (the author has traded using VWAPs at a cost of around 12 basis 
points in Japan). Volume weighted average prices are therefore highly feasible, 
immune to bid-ask biases and not very susceptible to market impact (as long as the 
additional traded volume from the strategy remains a small proportion of the total 
volume). 
Trading costs have been largely ignored thus leading to grossly overstated 
portfolio returns. A l l the portfolios so far are subject to 100% tiunover over each 
holding period implying very high trading costs that could seriously hamper the 
portfolios' performance. Furthermore, a position is taken in all the stocks in the 
investment universe even for those with very small residual returns (noise trading) thus 
assuming contrarian positions on stocks that seem to be fairly priced. This wil l also 
have an adverse effect on portfolio performance. 
The effects on contrarian profits of the all the issues mentioned before are 
fiirther analysed by re-examining the 'APT Unconstrained' portfolio with a few 
modifications. A frading cost of 20 basis points per frade is assumed for both when the 
position is established and when it is liquidated. Given that the average cost of trading 
in Japan ranges from 7bp to 15bp depending on the type of order, the cost assumed 
here is intentionally higher to account for the probable market impact of the trade. 
During portfolio formation, the investment universe is sorted by the size of the residual 
return and it is split into 10 deciles. The eight deciles in the middle are then excluded 
from the portfolio formation process so that only stocks with a reasonably high 
residual in absolute value are considered. Both volume weighted and open price based 
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returns are used to evaluate portfolio performance. The tables that follow present 
performance and risk statistics for sfrategy returns calculated using the two types of 
price mentioned before. 









Open Price 9.6419 0.2191 0.7048 3.48 (3.37) 1.00% 8.65 
VWAP 7.1957 0.2456 0.5222 2.92 (2.83) 0.76% 7.29 
APT Unconstrained Portfolio: Beta Estimates, Entire Sample 
Return 
Type a K R-Square 
Open Price 0.0096 (9.11) 0.1982 (5.29) 0.0141 (0.37) 0.0777 
VWAP 0.0075 (7.60) 0.1708 (4.91) 0.0043 (0.12) 0.0676 
APT Unconstrained Portfolio Performance 





Liquid-Open 8.4317 -0.0743 0.7617 1.92 (1.85) 
0.60% 4.99 
Iliiquid-Open 21.6100 0.3561 1.0180 4.47 (4.14) 
1.55% 10.26 
Liquid-VWAP 11.0728 0.0224 0.8882 1.72 (1.64) 
0.49% 4.24 
liliquid-VWAP 20.1627 0.0160 1.1997 3.53 (3.41) 
1.16% 8.42 
As expected, there is a drastic drop in the aimualised Sharpe Ratio values for 
both return measures. The average weekly portfolio return, net of trading costs, is still 
significantly larger than 0.5% but much lower than before. Therefore portfolio 
performance is grossly overstated when measured using close price returns and 
ignoring frading costs. When trading costs are taken into account and Open Price 
returns are used to measure its performance, the original 'APT Unconstrained' 
portfolio yields 1.004%) (compared to 1.55% before) on average per week with a 
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Sharpe Ratio of 3.48. Omission of trading costs and use of close price returns 
overstates the portfolio performance by 0.55%. However, by reducing turnover, 
contrarian profits still remain significant when more realistic assumptions are made in 
measuring portfolio performance. When the strategy is simulated over the sub-sample 
of illiquid stocks, it outperforms significantly its liquid sample counterpart. This is true 
for both open and VWAP price returns, therefore there is more than just measurement 
error driving the superior performance of the illiquid sub-sample. Illiquid stocks seem 
to overreact more intensely to firm specific news. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the existence and significance of 
contrarian profits in the Japanese stock market. The analysis started with the 
implementation of the analytical fi-amework provided by JT on data for the Tokyo 
stock exchange constituent companies fi-om January 1995 until May 2002. The results 
suggested that a strategy like the one examined by JT can lead to significant contrarian 
profits. The main source of these profits is overreaction to firm specific events rather 
than delayed reaction to factor realisations. However the strategy simulated by JT 
examined a portfolio that was not optimal with respect to its expected return/risk trade-
off. The analysis was then extended by examining portfolios on the efficient firontier. 
The objective was to maximise the expected Sharpe Ratio of a contrarian portfolio. 
This was equivalent to maximising the portfolio's expected return while at the same 
time minimizing its volatility. Initially, a simple market model was used to generate 
estimates of the inputs to the optimisation process. The single index optimal portfolio 
had a much higher Sharpe ratio than the original JT portfolio. As the complexity of the 
model increased by adding more factors, so did the Sharpe Ratio reflecting the better 
quality of the inputs to the optimisation process. When a 20-factor APT type model 
was used, the Sharpe ratio of the investment portfolio became almost twice as large as 
that of the JT portfolio. 
Al l the portfolios tested, appeared immune to lagged factor realisations, so the 
main source of the contrarian profits was overreaction to firm specific events. This was 
also supported by the return attribution tables which showed that more than 98% of the 
portfolio return was related to residual stock returns. When the investment universe 
was split into liquid and illiquid stocks and the contrarian strategy was implemented 
separately on each sub-sample, the hquid sample portfolio consistently 
underperformed the illiquid sample portfolio ahnost by half Illiquid stocks were found 
to be more prone to overreaction since their prices are more responsive to demand 
surges or supply squeezes. The average market Beta was smaller for illiquid than for 
liquid stocks. This is because illiquid stock prices are driven mainly by firm specific 
events rather than the market. 
Both the Jegadeesh & Titamn (1995) paper and the present study provide a 
fi-amework for examining a specific class of contrarian strategies, namely strategies 
that are based on estimates of residual stock performance. Any inference drawn by this 
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analysis cannot be universally applied to all contrarian strategies. Even i f the type of 
strategy tested in this paper proved to be unprofitable or infeasible, this does not mean 
that the Japanese stock market is efficient and arbitrage opportunities are non-existent 
altogether. Nevertheless, the strategy tested seems to generate significant profits with 
the likely assumption of very little systematic risk. The profits are still significant 
when trading costs are imposed and more realistic assumptions are made regarding the 
prices at which the portfolio is traded. This raises questions regarding the short-term 
efficiency of the Japanese stock market. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Pairs Trading in Japan 
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Introduction 
Since its introduction in 1970 by Fama, a vast volume of modem finance 
literature has been dedicated to the examination of the efficient market hypothesis. 
According to the sfrong version of the efficient market hypothesis, all available 
information is impounded in stock prices and as a consequence efficient markets are 
characterised by the absence of arbifrage opportunities. A corollary of the efficient 
market hypothesis is the law of one price: equivalent fiiture payoffs with identical risk 
profiles should carry the same price. I f the prices are different then a riskless profit can 
be made by selling the expensive and buying the cheap of the two otherwise equivalent 
payoffs. Practitioners have been engaging in trading pairs of highly correlated 
securities whose relative prices appear to diverge from their perceived equilibrium 
level in the belief that the law of one price wi l l eventually drive the two prices back to 
a level justified by their risk profiles. The sources of the correlation between securities 
can vary from the purely fimdament to the purely statistical. There are relatively very 
few studies that examine the behaviour of the relative prices of securities linked by a 
fiondamental relationship. For example some papers examine the price differential 
between voting and non-voting shares of the same company (e.g. Dittman, 2001) while 
others examine the behaviour of shares of the same company which are traded on 
different exchanges (e.g. Froot & Dabora, 1999). Besides these fiindamentally linked 
securities though, there are a large number of companies that have similar exposures to 
a set of common factors that are believed to describe the market adequately. The shares 
of such companies wil l exhibit high systematic correlation because of their similar risk 
profiles. For example competing companies that belong to the same industry group are 
faced with similar risks and their shares wil l very likely be highly correlated (e.g. 
Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi). The aim of this chapter is to (a) develop a framework for 
identifying and analysing pairs of highly correlated stocks (whatever the reason) and 
(b) to examine whether deviations of relative stock prices from their equilibrium level 
can be profitably exploited by using a simple pairs trading rule on Japanese stock 
market data. An attempt is also made to examine the sources of such profits by 
drawing analogies between the pairs trading strategy and the contrarian strategy 
examined by Jegadeesh & Titman (1995) in their very influential article. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 reviews the relevant literature on 
the behaviour of fiindamentally linked securities; Section 3.2 develops the 
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methodology, describes the trading rule and presents the data used to derive the 
empirical results and finally Section 3.3 presents the results. 
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3.1 Overview and relevant literature 
The concept of market efficiency, introduced by Fama (1970), is of crucial 
importance as it constitutes a measure of the ability of financial markets to fulfil their 
economic role of resource allocation. The strong version of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH, hereafter) asserts that all available information is reflected in stock 
prices (Fama 1991). A more testable form of the E M H is the weak form and is defined 
as the lack of arbitrage opportunities (Ross, 1987) or the non-existence of trading 
profits net of costs (Jensen, 1978). Over the last 3 decades, research on market 
efficiency and asset pricing models across different markets has been overwhelming. 
However studies suggest that apparent arbitrage opportunities may be illusory due to 
market imperfections, such as liquidity risk or pitfalls in the methodology employed 
(e.g. Ball, Kothari & Shanken, 1995). 
Pairs trading is a trading strategy widely used by practitioners (Singh, 2002) to 
exploit perceived pricing anomalies between pairs of highly correlated securities but 
has nevertheless received little attention fi-om the academic community. The existence 
of statistically significant profits fi-om the strategy violates the 'no-arbitrage' definition 
of the efficient market hypothesis and so has very serious implications for the 
efficiency of relative asset pricing in particular and for market efficiency in general. As 
the name suggests, the strategy aims to identify pairs of securities whose returns are 
highly correlated; the implication being that the price of either stock relative to the 
other will be moving around a mean value over time. The high correlation of the 
returns will ensure that observed relative price deviations from their mean will 
eventually be corrected and relative prices will revert to their expected values. I f the 
deviation is large enough (to cover trading costs) and the correction is not 
instantaneous then it can be economically exploited by selling short and buying equal 
nominal amounts of the over-performing and under-performing stocks respectively. 
The sources of the correlation can be manifold. For example companies within 
the same industry group that face similar conditions both in terms of demand for their 
product and supply for primary resources used to produce it will most likely 
experience relatively high correlation in their returns. This correlation stems fi-om the 
fact that these companies face similar risks, for example Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the 
US. The same can be true for companies from different industries. In both cases the 
underlying relationship between the companies is of a statistical rather than physical 
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nature so such pairings of stocks are commonly referred to as 'statistical'. Different 
classes of shares of the same company (e.g. voting/non voting, common/preference) 
will also exhibit very high correlation due to the fact that they all represent shares of 
equity on the same underlying assets. So will shares of the same company traded on 
different exchanges (commonly known as 'dual listings') and shares of companies 
with large cross-ownership interests (e.g. companies with a parent/child relationship). 
In the first two cases there is a complete overlap in the underlying assets of the 
correlated shares. In the last case the overlap is partial but in all three cases it 
represents a more fundamental relationship between the paired shares so such pairs are 
usually referred to in the professional jargon as 'fiindamental pairs'. One major source 
of risk for the strategy stems from the possibility that what is perceived as a deviation 
from the expected relationship may transpire to be a permanent shift or even 
breakdown of the relationship. In this case the expected reversal will never materialise 
and substantial loses may occur if the relative price of the two stocks moves fiirther 
away from its perceived equilibrium value. Fimdamental pairs are less risky in that 
respect since the underlying relationship is stronger and therefore more stable over 
time. 
There are no studies that examine the behaviour of the relative price of statistical 
pairs of securities and only few published papers examine the relationship between the 
prices of fiindamentally linked securities. The majority of these papers focus on the 
behaviour of the voting premium which is defined as the price differential between 
voting and non-voting shares of the same company. It will however be instructive to 
present a few of these papers since there are obvious similarities between the two types 
of pairs. In a recent study, Dittman (2001) analyses the relationship between voting 
and non-voting shares of 10 German companies. His study is motivated by a finding 
common in many previous empirical studies (e.g. Kunz & Angel (1996), Lease, 
McConnell & Mikkelson (1983), Rydqvist (1996), Zingales (1994)) namely that the 
voting premium is stationary around a mean value determined by the stock's 
characteristics. Assuming that log prices behave like random walks, as standard theory 
and empirical work suggests (Fama, 1970), stationarity of the voting premium implies 
that the log prices of the voting and the non-voting shares are cointegrated. As the 
cointegration hypothesis between voting and non-voting shares had not been tested 
rigorously before, Dittman does so using daily data on ten such pairs of shares traded 
at the Frankfiirt stock exchange. More specifically he tests for the existence of' 
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fractional cointegration as opposed to classical cointegration. A linear combination of 
two series is fractionally or classically cointegrated if it is a long or short memory 
process respectively. Deviations from the equilibrium value of a long memory process 
die out eventually (Cheung & Lai, 1993) but tend to last much longer than a short 
memory process. Therefore adjustment to equilibrium values is faster for classically 
than fractionally cointegrated series, classical cointegration being a special case of 
fractional cointegration. It is showed that seven out of the ten pairs examined are 
indeed cointegrated and that the cointegrating relationship residuals are long memory 
processes. Dittman argues that the presence of cointegration between securities raises 
questions about efficiency since, as has been argued before, cointegration is 
incompatible with efficient markets. 
An intense debate about using cointegration analysis to test the efficient market 
hypothesis was sparked since the advent of this technique. Granger (1986) stated that 
assets cannot be cointegrated in an efficient market since otherwise one price could be 
used to forecast the other using the error correction model (ECM) derived from the 
cointegrating system. If for example the price of the voting shares relative to the non-
voting shares is larger than the equilibrium price suggested by the cointegrating 
equation, then the voting (non-voting) share price must decrease (increase) relative to 
the non-voting (voting) share price for equilibrium to be restored. It would therefore 
seem that cointegration is incompatible with market efficiency since according to the 
strong form of the E M H efficient markets compound all past information into present 
prices. However some studies like Sephton & Larsen (1991) point out that 
cointegration test results depend critically on the assumed model or the period 
analysed. Cointegration tests tend to accept the null of no cointegration more 
frequently as we increase the number of lagged differences included in the 
cointegrating regression for residual based tests or the V A R order of the model used to 
conduct the Johansen test. Others like Hakkio & Rush (1989) note that the E M H is a 
joint hypothesis that (a) investors are risk neutral and (b) they make rational use of all 
available information so that speculators have a zero expected return. Violation of 
either hypothesis will lead to rejection of the joint hypothesis but does not mean that 
the market is inefficient. Furthermore, as Fama (1991) noted, the necessity to rely on a 
particular asset-pricing model in many empirical tests of the E M H adds yet another 
facet to the joint hypothesis. Fama argues that stock prices can be predictable in an" 
efficient market. The sfrong form of the E M H therefore does not have much economic 
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content and has no connection to the existence of arbitrage profits. A weaker but 
economically more sensitive version of the E M H is that of Jensen (1978): market 
efficiency implies that economic profits fi-om trading are zero, where economic profits 
are risk-adjusted returns net of all costs. Fama (1991) suggests that 'event studies are 
the cleanest evidence we have on efficiency (the least cumbered by the joint hypothesis 
problem)'. Event studies, pioneered by Fama et al (1969), enable us to test the 
hypothesis that new information is rapidly incorporated into asset prices, and that the 
information currently available cannot be used to derive future abnormal retums. 
Dwyer & Wallace (1992) argue that with market efficiency defined as the lack of 
arbitrage opportimities, the existence of cointegrated assets is not equivalent to market 
inefficiency, hi a more recent study Ferre & Hall (2002) built on the work of Dwyer & 
Wallace and by analysing the relationship between efficiency and cointegration in the 
foreign exchange market they conclude that cointegrated exchange rates do not 
necessarily result fi^om an inefficient market. In contrast they provide a theoretical 
example where lack of cointegration among the exchange rates resulted in violation of 
the no-arbitrage condition and thus market inefficiency. Ferre & Hall illustrate that the 
error correction model (ECM) is an expression that can be obtained fi-om any 
cointegrated system under both efficient and inefficient market conditions. Therefore it 
is the precise form of the E C M rather than its mere existence that may convey some 
information about efficiency. More importantly the authors show that since empirical 
work only deals with partial systems given the intractability of the whole economy, 
examining efficiency using cointegration can lead to wrong conclusions because of the 
serious effect of the omitted variables on the results of the analysis. 
Froot & Dabora (1999) analyse pairs of large 'Siamese-twin' multinational 
companies where the distribution of cash flows between them is fixed in their charter. 
More specifically they examine the shares of Royal Dutch Petroleum versus Shell 
P L C , Unilever N.V versus Unilever P L C and SmithKline Beecham class A ordinary 
shares traded in London versus Class E shares traded in New York. All these twins 
pool their cash flows and their shares represent claims on a fixed proportion of each 
pooled cash flow. Therefore their share prices should move together at a ratio equal to 
the proportion of the cash flows. Froot & Dabora find that the relative prices of the 
twin stocks they examined do not actually behave in that manner but in contrast they 
are highly correlated with the value of their respective stock market indices. Their 
evidence suggests that the price differentials of the twin stocks contain unit roots and 
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they are cointegrated with their stock market indices. This means that the price 
differences are not mean reverting and tend to move together with stock index 
differences. The authors argue that since all the shares under investigation are among 
the largest and most liquid in the world, additional costs and informational advantages 
usually associated with cross-border trading cannot explain the results. The location 
where each share trades seems to be the overriding factor determining its price. They 
suggest three possible sources for this market segmentation namely tax-induced 
investor heterogeneity, noise from irrational traders that tends to affect domestic stocks 
more than foreign traded stocks and institutional inefficiencies. As the authors admit 
though, none of these explanations is complete. 
In summary, despite its popularity with practitioners, pairs trading has attracted 
little attention from the academic community. The term 'pair' refers to securities which 
are highly correlated because they have either some fiindamental underlying 
relationship or similar exposures to market-wide risk factors. In either case there is a 
compelling reason for the prices of the two securities to move together over time. This 
co-movement lends it self nicely to analysis by cointegration techniques. The existence 
of cointegrated assets is identified by some authors (e.g. Granger, 1986) with 
inefficient markets. This is disputed by others (e.g. Sephton & Larsen 1991, Dwyer & 
Wallace 1992, Ferre & Hall, 2002) who point out the weaknesses of using 
cointegration as a market efficiency test. A cleaner way to examine market efficiency 
pioneered by Fama (1969) is the use of event studies. 
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3.2. Methodology and data 
3.2.1 Introduction 
hi this section an event study will be simulated in order to examine the efficiency 
of the pricing of highly correlated securities. The centrepiece of the study is a pairs 
trading strategy which comprises three basic steps: 
(a) The parsimonious calculation of correlations between all securities 
in the investment universe. 
(b) The statistical analysis of the prices of pairs of securities that appear 
to be strongly correlated, and finally 
(c) Based on the results from step (b), the implementation of a trading 
rule that sells the overvalued and buys the undervalued asset. 
The strategy is tested using the same data on Tokyo Stock Exchange traded shares as 
in Chapter 2. One specific asset pricing model is used, namely the multifactor model 
provided by Advance Portfolio Technologies and described in detail in Chapter 2. 
3.2.2 The Data 
The available data consists of 2069 daily observations from January 1994 until 
May 2002, on the open and closing prices and traded volume spanning a universe of 
2359 Japanese companies downloaded from DataSfream. The sample comprises 1500 
and 576 companies listed in the 1^ ' and 2"** section of the Tokyo stock exchange 
respectively as well as 314 dead companies. The dead companies sample also includes 
companies listed in regional exchanges, since DataStream does not provide Stock 
Exchange information for dead companies. Licluded in this sample were also 
subsidiaries of non-Japanese multinational companies, which were manually weeded 
out from the sample. The strategy tested makes also use of the stocks' factor exposure 
estimates obtained from a multifactor model provided by Advanced Portfolio 
Technologies (APT), a company that provides such information commercially to 
financial institutions. APT provides coverage for a wide range of listed companies in 
Japan and other developed markets. The DataStream and A P T datasets were merged 
barring 31 companies in total which could not be matched. Prices with an associated 
traded volume of zero are set to missing since they are not real. 
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All strategies are simulated from 6-Feb-1996 until 24-May-2002 and use the same 
sample of companies so that the results of the simulations are comparable. In order to 
minimise biases induced by infrequently traded or less-established firms, at each 
period t: 
(a) The companies included in the analysis must have more than 260 non-missing 
daily closing prices in the 520 days prior to the pairs formation date 
(b) The price ratio of a pair of securities must have a non-missing value for period 
t. 
(c) The price ratio of a pair of securities must have at least 260 non-missing 
observations in the 520 days prior to period t. 
3.2.3 Asset Pricing models and relative prices 
Market efficiency and the law of one price command that cash flows with 
similar values and risk profiles should have similar prices. As was seen in section 3.1 
there is some evidence suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the relative price of highly 
correlated securities tends to move around a mean value. In this section it will be 
shown that the co-movement of the prices of highly correlated shares is compatible 
with a general form of asset pricing model. 
The price of a share and its rate of change are determined by the value of the cash 
flow and its risk characteristics of the company respectively. Shares represent claims 
on risky cash flows so cash flows with very similar risk profiles should imply share 
prices that move almost in lockstep. Let's assume that a K-factor asset pricing model 
provides an adequate description of stock returns. The returns of all N stocks in the 
investment universe can then be written: 
R = X*f+u 
Where R is an N vector of continuously compounded stock returns, X is an N by K 
matrix of stock factor exposures, f is a K vector of factor returns and u is an N vector 
of specific returns with zero expected value that cannot be explained by the K factors. 
Then the continuously compounded returns of stocks i and j are given by: 
and 
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respectively, where is the n* row of X . Applying the expectation operator on both 
sides of the above equations yields: 
and 
E[Rj,] = X,E[f,] 
Let's assume that stocks i and j have very similar risk characteristics, 
p 
therefore X ^. « X . Also R„ , = log( — ^ ) , n = i , j h y definition. The 
difference of the expected returns of i and j then becomes: 
E[R„ ] - E[R., ] = ( X , - X^j )E[f, ] « 0 ^ 
E[R,,]«E[Rj,]^ 
E[\og{-^)]« ^ [ l o g ( - ^ ) ] 
£ [ l o g ( - ^ ) - l o g ( - ^ ) ] « 0 : 
E[log{^^)]« 0 
^ [ l o g ( ^ ) + l o g ( ^ ) ] « 0 : 
E[\0g{^)] » - ^ [ 1 0 g ( ^ ) ] : 
^ [ l o g ( | ^ ) ] « ^ [ l o g ( ^ ) ] 
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The above relationship implies that the expected log-ratio of the prices of two 
securities with similar factor exposures will remain more or less constant over time. 
Therefore exfreme deviations from the expected price-ratio should at face value 
present arbitrage opportunities because they are not sustainable: the price-ratio should 
in time revert to its mean value. 
Two standard assumptions for asset pricing models are that the specific returns 
u are uncorrelated with the factor returns f and that cov (ui, uj) = 0 for i The N by N 
covariance matrix V of stock returns is then given by: 
V = X F X ' + « , 
where is the N by N diagonal matrix of residual variance. When the model is well 
defined and has good explanatory power, the diagonal terms of O are very small 
compared to those of V, i.e. the largest part of the stock variance is explained by the 
factor model. The covariance between stocks i and j is then given by: 
V { i , j ) - X^,*F* X'., 
where F is the covariance matrix of factor returns. The correlation between i and j is 
given by: 
Corr{i,j) = 
^Vii,i) + Qii,i),]VUJ) + nUJ)' 
while the systematic correlation i.e. the part of the total correlation induced by 
exposure to the common factors is given by: 
CorrjiJ)^ , ^(^'/> 
In the extreme case where i and j have identical factor exposures, = X^j, we have 
that V(ij)=^V(i,i)=V(jJ). Furthermore if the variances of i and j are adequately 
explained by the factor model, Q ( / , 0 and 0 ( 7 , 7 ) are neghgible and Corr{i,j) 
approaches 1. Therefore stocks that have similar factor exposures have also high 
systematic correlation. Their total correlation will also be high only if the factor model 
describes their returns adequately. Thus high systematic correlation does not imply 
high correlation in general. If the specific component dominates the stock returns of 
any given pair of stocks, their price paths will most likely be divergent. Although such-
a pair of stocks will become a candidate for trading on the basis of their similar factor 
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exposures, their relative price may not exhibit the desirable mean reverting behaviour. 
Cointegration analysis will aid in identifying such pairs and therefore exclude them 
from the investment universe. 
3.2.4 Calculation of correlations 
Calculating the covariance matrix of all the stocks in our investment universe 
can be very complicated and computationally expensive. Factor models provide a 
parsimonious way for calculating the covariance matrix since all that is needed is the 
covariance matrix of the factor retums and each stock's residual variance, thus 
drastically reducing the number of necessary computations. Furthermore, structural 
multifactor risk models allow for the convenient breakdown of a stock's risk structure 
into two distinct parts: one attributed to the stock's exposure to a set of common risk 
factors and the other attributed to the stock's idiosyncratic behaviour. 
As mentioned before, estimates of the multifactor model are provided by 
Advanced Portfolio Technologies (APT). The model is estimated using weekly retums 
on about 1800 companies listed on the Tokyo stock exchange. The sample of 
companies is selected based of length of trading history, market capitalisation and 
liquidity criteria. Using factor analysis they extract 20 factors and provide quarterly 
updates of the set of factor exposures (sensitivities) for all stocks in the investment 
universe. Robust regression techniques are used to estimate factor loadings for assets 
outside the sample. The factor returns are linear combinations of stock retums that best 
explain their historical variance-covariance matrix. The chosen number of 20 factors is 
coincidental; A P T observed that most markets could be modelled adequately with 
about 15 factors so 20 is a cautious estimate. All factor retums have an expected value 
of 0 and are orthogonal by construction so F = L Each row of X contains the factor 
loadings for each stock in the investment universe, so the inner product of row j of X 
provides an estimate of the systematic variance for stock j . These properties afford us 
with computational ease of quantities such as the systematic covariance matrix of stock 
retums. The correlation coefficient between stocks i and j is now equivalent to: 
Corr{i,j) 
V{iJ) XriFKj X , K j 
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The factor model is estimated quarterly so correlations also change quarterly. After 
calculating the systematic correlation matrix, all its elements above the main diagonal 
are sorted in descending order and the pairs of stocks that correspond to the largest 5% 
of the correlations are formed into a list of candidate pairs for trading. 
3.2.5 Statistical analysis of relative prices 
It has been shown so far that stocks with comparable risk profiles exhibit high 
systematic correlation as well as high total correlation provided that the systematic 
component dominates their returns. Equivalence of the risk profiles also translates into 
relative stock prices that oscillate around a constant expected value. The expected 
value of the relative price will remain stable for a long time as long as the overall risk 
exposures of the pair also remain similar over this period. However companies are 
living entities thus changing all the time. Each share represents a claim on a series of 
cash flows resulting from a collection of projects undertaken by the company. The 
period intervening between inception and implementation of a project is normally 
measured in years rather than months. Each project carries its own risks that affect the 
overall company risk. As new projects come to fruition the company risk profile 
changes accordingly. Unless two companies are faced with the same opportunity set, 
these changes will not be similar. It is not therefore likely that the systematic 
correlation between a particular pair of stocks will be stable over time. This is even 
more true for statistical than for fundamental pairs and is reflected in the correlation 
matrix which is gradually changing from one period to the next. Therefore the prices of 
a pair of highly correlated stocks may eventually start diverging so it becomes 
imperative that before assuming a trading position the stability of the relative price is 
examined. This should be done over a period of time of some specified length, prior to 
the trading decision. Testing for the stability of the relative price of the pair is 
equivalent to testing for the presence of unit roots. The testing procedure chosen for 
this study is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test' (henceforth ADF) . The time series on 
which the test is applied is calculated as the log of the ratio of the two stock prices that 
P P . 
make up the pair. In 3.2.3 it was shown that E[\og{—)]«iE:[log(-^)]. It then 
follows that the price ratio of a pair can be modelled as: 
The Phillips-Perron test was also used and the results were qualitatively the same 
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y, =a + S-t + py,_,+e,, 
where y, = \og{P, IP,) = \og{P.,) - log(P,) . 
The regression estimated for the augmented test is: 
y, =iAy,-x+^2^y,-2 + ^ p-Ay,-p*x +a + d-t + py,_^+e, 
The time trend is included because unless the two stocks are identical, their factor 
exposures and consequently their expected returns will be slightly different thus 
resulting in slightly different growth rates for the two prices. The price ratio will trend 
upwards (downwards) when the numerator grows faster (slower) than the denominator 
and in the case of a stable pair it will be trend stationary. The number of the lagged 
differences in the augmented regression is determined using the Schwarz criterion 
(Hubrich, Lutkepohl & Saikkonen, 2001, pp 29). The Schwarz criterion is one of few 
commonly used criteria for choosing the order of the autoregressive model above and 
has the desirable property that it chooses the correct model with probability as the 
number of observations goes to infinity. Al l the pairs whose price ratio accepts the null 
hypothesis of a unit root are eliminated from the list of candidate pairs. The remaining 
pairs are actually used to simulate the trading rule described in the next section. 
Since y, = log(/^,) - log(P„) , testing the log ratio for stationarity is equivalent 
to testing for cointegration between the log prices of the pair and imposing the 
restriction that the cointegrating vector is equal to [1, -1]. Ahematively, the Johansen 
procedure may be used to test for cointegration without imposing any restrictions. A 
direct estimate of the cointegrating vector is now obtained as a by-product of the test 
procedure and can be used to estimate the equilibrium price of either stock in the pair 
with respect to the other. Therefore a separate set of results is presented for the trading 
strategy, using the Johansen procedure to test for cointegration and estimate the 
cointegrating vector. The Schwarz criterion is again used to determine the V A R order 
of the model that is assumed to describe the two log prices. Before testing for the 
existence of a stationary linear combination of the pair of prices, the individual series 
must be tested in order to ensure they are not stationary. If either price is foimd to be 
stationary, or the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is accepted, the pair is 
eliminated from the list of candidate pairs. The rest of the pairs are used to simulate the 
trading rule. 
As mentioned above (Sephton & Larsen, 1991), testing for cointegration is 
notoriously complicated. A set of variables may be found to be cointegrated or not by 
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simply changing the length of the period over which the test is conducted. The period 
length chosen to conduct the cointegration tests is 104 weeks. This coincides with the 
length of the price histories that APT used to estimate their model and is therefore 
impounded in the systematic correlation estimates thus maintaining consistency. 
3.2.6 The trading rule 
After eliminating the non-correlated and non-stationary pairs from the list, we 
are left with a shortlist of pairs that have been stationary over the past 104 weeks. Each 
pair's relative price, calculated as the log of the price ratio, should oscillate around a 
mean value. Stationarity confers a certain degree of confidence that large deviations of 
the log ratio from that mean value will eventually get corrected and the ratio will move 
back towards its stationary mean. In other words, when the two prices are found to be 
cointegrated and they start diverging from each other, the built in error correction 
mechanism will ensure that the prices start converging eventually towards their long-
term relative value. A profit can then be made by selling short the relatively expensive 
and buying the relatively cheap stock. The implicit assumption made here is that the 
pair will continue to be cointegrated over the sfrategy's holding period. This is not 
necessarily true for the reasons given in the previous section. What is perceived as a 
relatively large deviation from the mean may be movement towards a new equilibrium 
level or even worse a permanent breakdown in the relationship between the two stocks. 
The situation just described constitutes a main source of risk for the strategy and 
necessitates the imposition of a rule that liquidates a given position when the accrued 
losses exceed a given limit. This rule is known as a stop loss rule. Likewise, aggressive 
profit taking may be enforced by closing positions as soon as their return exceeds a 
certain limit. Section 3.3.4 presents results when a stop loss and a profit taking rule are 
imposed on the strategy. When the strategy is simulated using the A D F test on the 
relative share price, the log of the price ratio is detrended and demeaned using all the 
valid observations in the last 13, 26 and 52 weeks preceding the trading date. The 
p. 
resulting series is the residual from the equation:y, = log(—) = a + S-t + u,, which 
has a zero mean by construction. If the value of the last residual prior to the trading 
date is larger than 3.5 times its standard deviation then on the trading date equal 
nominal amounts of stocks i and j are sold short and bought respectively. If the 
residual value is smaller than minus 3.5 standard deviations then stock i is bought and 
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stock j is sold short. The different periods over which the mean values of the relative 
prices are calculated will result in different, though in the case of stationary pairs, 
unbiased estimates of the true mean. This will assist in testing the robustness of the 
sfrategy as well as its sensitivity to the choice of estimate for the mean relative price 
value. When the strategy is simulated using the Johansen procedure to test for 
cointegration, the cointegrating vector is standardised so that its first element is always 
1 and is then used to estimate the cointegrating equation's residuals: 
M, = log(/^.,)-cv(2) *log(P„) , where cv(2) is the second element of the cointegrating 
vector and P, is the demeaned and detrended price. The value of the last residual prior 
to the trading date is again compared with plus or minus 3.5 standard deviations and 
long and short positions are opened accordingly. Relative prices deviate from their 
mean because either stock starts growing faster than its expected retum would indicate. 
Since any stock is highly correlated with a number of other stocks, when its price starts 
growing faster, more than one of the associated relative prices will also start diverging. 
Any given stock may then be a member of more than one pairs which satisfy the 
trading rule. Trading all these pairs would then result in building a very large position 
in the particular security within a day thus potentially having an adverse effect on its 
price given its liquidity status. The overall portfolio performance would also become 
very sensitive to the behaviour of this stock. In order to prevent this situation only the 
pair with the highest correlation is actually traded for each stock. Finally the pairs of 
positions thus constructed are held until one of the following events occurs: 
(a) The residual described above changes sign or 
(b) The price history for either of a pair's components ends 
3.2.7 Position weighting schemes 
One of the main criticisms of event studies is that their results can be attributed to 
the different risk profiles of the long and the short sides of the investment portfolio. 
Statistically significant excess retums occur because the portfolio has a significant net 
exposure to one or more risk attributes such as size, price/eamings ratio, book value 
etc. In order to assess the impact of such exposure on the performance of the pairs 
trading strategy, three alternative ways of calculating the hedge ratio for each pair are 
employed resulting in three types of investment portfolios. The hedge ratio for a pair is 
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the ratio of the nominal size of the long relative to the short position and can be chosen 
so as to minimise the pair's exposure to a certain attribute. The three types of pairs 
examined in this study are: 
(a) cash-neufral pairs whereby the amount invested in the long side of the pair exactly 
offsets the short side resulting in zero net cash exposure. The hedge ratio is always 1 
and there is no cash held or borrowed as part of the investment portfolio. 
(b) risk-neutral pairs whereby the hedge ratio is chosen to minimise the overall 
systematic risk of the pair at the time of its inception. The systematic risk of the pair is 
calculated using the APT model and finally 
(c) size-neutral pairs whereby the hedge ratio is chosen to eliminate the pair's exposure 
to size. Size is measured by market capitalisation and a pair's exposure to size is 
measured by H R * M C L - 1 * M C S . where H R is the hedge ratio and M C L and MCs are the 
market capitalisation of the long and short securities respectively. 
The maximum nominal value of a pair's long or short side is one milUon yen in 
absolute value. The nominal value of the pair's other component stock is less than or 
equal to one million yen depending on which of the weighting schemes is used. 
3.2.8 Performance evaluation 
At the end of each trading day, a portfolio of pairs is formed using the procedure 
described above. All the positions are actually established when the market opens 
again the following trading day. Individual positions are terminated when either of the 
criteria described in section 3.2.6 is met. Therefore on any given day the overall 
investment portfolio consists of the remaining parts of a number of overlapping 
portfolios formed since the beginning of the simulation period. Jegadeesh & Titman 
(1993) argue that examining portfolios with overlapping periods increases the power of 
the tests applied to the performance of the strategy. They look at portfolios with fixed 
investment horizons whereby each portfolio is held for a fixed period of time. On any 
given day, Jegadeesh & Titman calculate each overlapping portfolio's return as the 
average of the returns of its constituents and the overall portfolio return as the average 
of the returns of all the overlapping portfolios. This calculation assumes that the 
overlapping portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each day so that their relative 
weights remain constant over the entire holding period. The same is assumed for 
individual holdings within each overlapping portfolio. This calculation offers 
computational ease however it is neither realistic nor correct because it ignores the 
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impact of transaction costs. The small adjustments entailed by the continuous 
rebalancing are very costly given the size of the amounts involved and no real life fund 
manager would actually do that. At the end of each day therefore, each security's 
weight with respect to the overall investment portfolio is adjusted to reflect the 
security's performance during that day. Next day's returns are calculated on the basis 
of these new weights. The daily returns used to evaluate portfolio performance are 
measured between the open price of days t-1 and t. Using open prices to calculate 
returns eliminates the bid-ask bias that plagues most studies that use high frequency 
returns. Open prices at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) are determined by an open 
auction whereby individual buy and sell orders are aggregated and then the price that 
equates supply with demand is calculated. 
3.2.9 Summary 
In this section it was shown that securities with similar risk profiles have highly 
correlated expected returns implying that their respective prices move more or less in 
parallel as long as the risk similarities persist. The co-movement of the prices allows 
one to deduce the value of one asset relative to the other. Cointegration techniques are 
most suitable for analysing this relationship and are employed herein to test for its 
stability over time and to estimate the long term equilibrium value of one price as a 
fiinction of the other. This leads to the estimation of a 'fair value' which lends it self to 
comparison with the actual value of the asset. Large deviations between the two values 
have serious implications about the efficiency of the relative pricing of the two assets 
and are exploited by a pairs trading rule described above in detail. A number of 
overlapping buy-and-hold portfolios are created as a consequence, which constitute the 
overall strategy portfolio. The use of overlapping portfolios increases our confidence 
in the tests carried out on the strategy portfolio. Portfolio returns are measured using 
auction-determined open prices thus eliminating the bid ask bias inherent in high 
frequency data. The strategy is simulated entirely out of sample, meaning that no prior 
knowledge of fiiture information is assumed at any point during the simulation. Results 
and inferences are presented in the next section. 
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3.3. Results 
3.3.1 Introduction and preliminary statistics 
This section presents the results of the trading strategy described in section 3.2.6 
above. As mentioned before several variants of the strategy can be implemented 
depending on the method used to test for the stability of the relationship between two 
securities over time. Sub-section 3.3.2 presents the results when the 20-factor APT 
model is used to calculate the systematic correlation matrix of the investment universe 
and the augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to assess the stationarity of the perceived 
relationship between a pair of securities. Sub-section 3.3.3 presents the results when 
the systematic correlation matrix is still calculated using the 20-factor APT model but 
the Johansen methodology is used to both test for the existence and estimate the 
parameters of a possible stationary linear combination of the prices of a pair of highly 
correlated stocks. Sub-section 3.3.4 presents results for the strategy used in sub-
section 3.3.2 when both a stop-loss and a profit taking rule are used in addition to the 
existing criteria for terminating a position. Finally sub-section 3.3.5 examines their 
various sources of all the different portfolio returns. 
As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, the motivation for the pairs 
trading strategy is the observation that the price ratio of highly correlated securities 
oscillates around a mean value. I f these oscillations are wide enough to cover 
transaction costs then an arbitrage profit can be made. An obvious question is whether 
this pattern of behaviour is also displayed by other random combinations of stocks and 
is not an exclusive characteristic of highly correlated pairs of securities, hi order to 
answer it all the possible pairs of securities in the investment universe are ranked in 
order of the systematic correlation of their constituents. The top and bottom percentiles 
of pairs are then allocated into two groups of high and low correlation pairs 
respectively and the daily first difference of the log-price ratio is calculated for each 
pair over the three years preceding the pair formation date. This is equivalent to 
calculating the return of a pair that holds one share of the first security long and one 
share of the second security short. The first order autocorrelation coefficients of these 
returns are an indicator of the presence or lack of mean reversal in the pairs' returns. 








31/12/1996 -0.14567 -0.026937 
31/03/1997 -0.14488 -0.026136 
30/06/1997 -0.14072 -0.022776 
30/09/1997 -0.13387 -0.021447 
31/12/1997 -0.14657 -0.01633 
31/03/1998 -0.16084 -0.0034715 
30/06/1998 -0.16307 -0.014081 
30/09/1998 -0.17156 -0.02279 
31/12/1998 -0.17743 -0.039738 
31/03/1999 -0.1838 -0.042784 
10/07/1999 -0.18177 -0.034359 
10/10/1999 -0.18285 -0.037865 
13/01/2000 -0.18455 -0.036373 
14/04/2000 -0.18783 -0.036631 
28/06/2000 -0.18858 -0.038372 
21/09/2000 -0.18925 -0.044001 
31/12/2000 -0.19391 -0.047113 
28/03/2001 -0.18582 -0.056017 
18/06/2001 -0.18341 -0.056163 
28/09/2001 -0.15345 -0.067605 
19/12/2001 -0.14605 -0.064799 
27/03/2002 -0.14582 -0.062746 
It is evident that the high correlation pairs have on average consistently larger 
autocorrelation coefficients than their low correlation counterparts. Furthermore all the 
coefficients are negative indicating the presence of mean reversion and possible 
arbitrage opportunities which the trading strategy in the next two sections wil l attempt 
to exploit. The table also shows that there are several pair formation dates. On each of 
these dates a new set of factor exposures (for the APT factor model) becomes available 
and, as mentioned in the methodology section, the correlation matrix of the investment 
universe is calculated using the following formula 
V(i,j) CorrHJ)^ 
^^Unj,J) yjx.FX, p.FX. 4x,X,p,jX'. 
as described in section 3.2.4. The ADF test is also conducted on each of these dates for 
all pairs using the last 104 weeks of data. The resulting set of stationary pairs remains 
fixed until the next set of factor exposures becomes available. An implicit assumption 
made here is that these pairs wi l l remain stationary until the next pair formation date. 
To test this assumption the ADF test was conducted again on the pairs that were 
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initially identified as stationary, including the roughly 65 daily observations until the 






























The ADF Pass rate shows the percentage of pairs that still test stationary at the 1% 
level, 65 days after formation. On average 73% of pairs remain stationary between 
formation dates during the entire simulation period. Trading opportunities arise within 
the pool of stationary pairs when a price ratio moves 3.5 times its standard deviation 
away from its estimated mean value. Three sets of mean and standard deviation 
estimates are calculated over the last 13, 26 and 52 weeks respectively resulting in 
three different portfolios of pairs namely PI , P2 and P3. Given the fact that, as wil l be 
shown in the subsequent sections, the average holding period for any of these strategy 
variants is at most 67 days we can be fairly confident that most of the pairs wi l l remain 




P1 (13 Weeks) P2 (26 Weeks) P3 (52 Weeks) 
Portfolio Return Statistics 
Normality Test 848 978 1,855 
Critical Value 5.9910 5.9910 5.9910 
Skewness 0.4320 0.7660 1.0090 
Kurtosis 3.5220 3.5790 4.9680 
Average Return 0.1640% 0.1160% 0.0630% 
T-Statistic (5%) 8.18 5.54 2.88 
Sharpe Ratio 3.3400 2.5800 1.4500 
Average Profit/Loss 276,885 293,937 263,086 
Total Profit/Loss 428,618,224 455,014,112 407,257,893 
Average Portfolio Value 279,084,794 433,494,586 657,962,782 
Historic Daily VAR@5% -1,357,228 -2,075,573 -3,283,463 
STD's Away From The Mean 1.3802 1.3665 1.3261 
Position Return Statis Mcs 
Normality Test 1,790,636 4,839,447 1,634,853 
Skewness 4.9910 7.2580 5.8610 
Kurtosis 62.3040 109.6550 70.3020 
Sharpe Ratio 7.8700 7.2700 7.4300 
Average Daily Return 0.7660% 0.6380% 0.4770% 
T-Statistic (5%) 36.56 30.51 26.85 
Average Total Return 3.9710% 4.7930% 5.2730% 
Total Number of Pairs 10,794 9,493 7,724 
Average Daily Holdings 140 217 331 
Average Holding Period 20.0200 35.3600 66.2600 
Systematic Risk 0.1797 0.1766 0.1752 
Average Pair Beta 0.2445 0.2407 0.2432 
Average MCap Difference -10,890,107 -25,782,369 -47,655,709 
P(Pair Return > 0) 74.4% 74.6% 74.1% 
P(Pair Return < 0) 25.6% 25.4% 25.90% 
3.3.2 Multifactor model, augmented Dickey-FuUer test 
implementation 
Table 42 displays the various performance measures for the three cash-neutral 
portfolios of pairs. Cash neutral pairs are formed by using all the proceeds from the 
sale of the short stock to buy shares of the long stock thus keeping zero cash. The 
nominal amount sold and bought is always 1,000,000 Yen. The upper part of Table 42 
-labelled 'Portfolio Return Statistics' displays attributes of the resulting long-short-
portfolio of equities while the lower part shows various statistics for the individual 
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pairs. The Normality Test line shows the Berra-Jarque statistic and is obvious that the 
all three portfolio returns are highly non-normal. A l l three portfolio returns are 
positively skewed implying that large positive returns are more common than large 
negative returns. The kurtosis estimates for PI and P2 are around 3 which is the 
kurtosis of the normal distribution. Therefore the portfolio returns are not characterised 
by relatively frequent large gains or losses. This is not entirely true for P3 whose 
kurtosis is close to 5. The average daily portfolio return ranges from 0.164% to 
0.116%, to 0.063% for portfolios PI , P2 and P3 respectively and are all statistically 
significant. The annuahsed returns are 42.64%, 30.16% and 16.38% which, at least for 
PI and P2, are also economically significant considering that trading costs have been 
removed. The Sharpe Ratio of the portfolios exhibits the same pattern as the portfolio 
returns: it starts with a large value for PI and finishes with a small value for P3 
reflecting a smaller reward for each unit of risk undertaken. So far it seems that the 
portfolio performance deteriorates substantially as the length of the window over 
which the mean and the standard deviation of the pairs' price ratio are calculated, 
increases. The average daily profit and loss for the three portfolios is 276K, 293K and 
263K Yen respectively. However the total profit figures are just over 400 million yen 
for all portfolios so in that sense P3 performs just as well as PI and P2. It is also 
noticed that the number of pairs decreases and the average holding period for each pair 
increases as we move from PI to P3. In fact portfolio P3 yields a similar outcome by 
turning over 3000 and 2000 fewer pairs than PI and P2 respectively. This outcome 
though is characterised by higher volatility. The associated historical VAR numbers 
are calculated at the 5% confidence level and represent the daily loss that is smaller 
than 95% of all the daily gains and losses that were realised during the simulation 
period for each portfolio. The absolute VaR figure increases as we move from PI to 
P3. Taken at face value this pattern indicates that the potential daily loss is larger for 
P3 than PI and therefore P3 is riskier than PI . This assertion is consistent with the fact 
that the PI portfolio returns have a higher Sharpe Ratio as mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, as Duffie & Pan (1997) suggest, ' i f the main concern is measuring the 
VaR of direct exposure to the underlying market a more relevant measure of tail 
fatness is the number of standard deviations represented by the associated critical 
values of the return distribution'. In this case the 5%> critical value of the daily 
gain/loss distribution is slightly larger for PI than for P3 or P2. This indicates that the 
daily gains and losses are slightly closer to their mean value for P2 and P3 than for PI . 
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In all three cases the critical VaR values represent roughly -1.3 standard deviations, 
fewer than in the case of the normal distribution whose 5% critical value is -1.65 
standard deviations away fi-om the mean. Concentration of potential outcomes around 
their mean is a desirable attribute for any successful investment sti-ategy since there is 
less likelihood of unexpected disastious outcomes occurring. It also indicates that the 
strategy's performance is fairly consistent throughout the simulation period and cannot 
be attributed to a few sporadic and very large gains. This assertion is also reinforced by 
Figure 3 which shows the cumulative gain/loss for each portfolio. The slope of the 
curve at a particular point is equal to the gain or loss of the portfolio at that point in 
time. Al l three curves are smoothly sloping upwards without any protracted periods of 
consistently negative slopes. There are also no large jumps or breaks in the diagrams 
that would indicate the presence of one-off, large gains or losses. 
Comparison of the individual position attributes provides a more detailed 
insight to the strategy's performance. As mentioned before, both the position turnover 
and the total number of positions decrease as we increase the length of the window 
over which the mean value and the standard deviation of the pairs' price ratio is 
calculated indicating that reversal to the mean becomes slower. The average daily 
return for each pair is defined as the total position return divided by the number of 
days over which the pair is held. The numbers shown in the row labelled 'Average 
Daily Return ' in the second part of the table are calculated by taking the cross-
sectional average of this measure over the total number of pairs held in each portfolio 
over the entire simulation period. As is obvious the average daily position return 
declines as we move from PI to P3. The total position return exhibits the opposite 
pattern reflecting merely the fact that pairs are held longer in P3 than in PI . The 
normality test indicates that the distribution of the average daily position returns is not 
normal. However, the distributions of these returns are quite comparable for all 
portfolios as reflected in the skewness and kurtosis numbers which are very close 
across the board. Al l three groups of returns have again positive skewness which 
roughly means that large positive returns are more common than large negative 
returns. The kurtosis numbers also indicate fat tails for the distributions of the three 
groups of returns. The similarity of the position return distributions is further 
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Figure 4 
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The Sharpe Ratio in this case is defined as the ratio of the cross-sectional average and 
the standard deviation of the mean daily position return. The Sharpe Ratio figures are 
again annualised. The last two rows of the table show the proportion of the pairs that 
yield a positive or negative return respectively. These numbers are also quite similar 
for all three portfolios. Portfolio PI has slightly more pairs that have a negative return 
but overall, about 74% of all positions have a positive return after transaction costs are 
accounted for which is quite impressive. This implies that only one in four positions 
held wil l lose money notwithstanding the fact that the whole trading process is devoid 
of any human intervention and that there are no stop loss rules in effect. Human 
supervision could help improve the overall performance by avoiding altogether certain 
positions (for example buying stock faced with imminent bankruptcy) and by 
improving the timing of others. Stop loss rules can help mitigate the magnitude of 
negative outcomes thus both increasing the average gain and decreasing volatility. A 
graphic display of the distributions of the total position return and the daily position 
return for portfolio P2 is given by Figure 4. The top half of the graph plots the total 
returns for all pairs ever held in portfolio P2. The bottom half plots the distribution of 
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the daily returns. For both distributions most of the area under the curve is to the right 
of the zero return vertical line. Furthermore, it can be seen that the total return 
distribution has more extreme negative outcomes (returns less than -50%) than positive 
which reinforces the assertion that the portfolio performance is quite consistent and 
cannot be attributed to a few lucky strikes. It also highlights the necessity of a stop-loss 
rule. 
The average pair systematic risk is equal to about 18% for all three 
portfolios of pairs. The systematic risk of a pair is equivalent to the systematic tracking 
error between the long and the short side of the pair. The average pair beta is negligible 
for all portfolios and so the strategy's performance caimot be attributed to exposure to 
market risk. An intriguing result is that the average pair exposure to size decreases as 
we move from PI to P3. It was mentioned before that the average holding period also 
increases as we move from PI to P3. It would appear therefore that the slower reversal 
to the mean is associated with larger differences in the market capitalisation of the 
pair's constituents. There is a vast body of literature on the so called 'size effect' 
namely the observed over-performance of small capitalisation stocks compared to 
large capitalisation stocks. A l l the cash neutral portfolios have negative exposure to 
size, i.e. the stocks held long have on average smaller market capitalisation than the 
ones sold short. The presence of the size effect would therefore intensify the out-
performance of the short by the long side thus improving the overall portfolio 
performance. This might indicate that part of the portfolios' performance could well be 
attributed to the size difference between the pairs' constituents. However this exposure 
has to be very large on average in order to affect performance. Portfolio P3 which has 
the largest absolute exposure seems to be the worst performing portfolio. Moreover the 
two middle quartile points for the average market capitalisation of all the companies in 
the investment universe over the entire simulation period are 13,762,682,000 and 
104,567,588,000. This means that 50% of the investment universe has an average size 
difference that is larger than 90,804,906,000 which is almost 2000 times the average 
exposure of P3. Therefore the average size exposure of all three portfolios is rather 
small to have any effect. A more systematic way to determine how size differences 
affect performance is to simulate the strategy again by forming size neufral pairs. The 
magnitudes of the long and the short side of the pair are chosen in a proportion that 
eliminates the pair's net size exposure. The new proportions assign a larger weight to 
the long side of the pair to compensate for its smaller market capitalisation. The 
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constituent pairs of the size neutral portfolios PI , P2 and P3 are identical to their cash 
neutral counterparts. The only thing that is different is the hedge ratio between the long 
and the short side of each pair. Table 43 displays the results. 
Table 43 
Size-Neutral Portfolios 
PI (13 Weeks) P2 (26 Weeks) P3 (52 Weeks) 
Portfolio Return Statistics 
Normality Test 618 437 1,349 
Critical Value 5.9910 5.9910 5.9910 
Skewness 0.1840 0.4950 0.8050 
Kurtosis 3.0730 2.4070 4.2800 
Average Return 0.1750% 0.1310% 0.0720% 
T-Statistic (5%) 8.73 6.52 3.48 
Sharpe Ratio 3.4200 2.8500 1.6700 
Average Profit/Loss 217,255 238,801 207,540 
Total Profit/Loss 336,310,575 369,664,108 321,272,072 
Average Portfolio Value 205,323,266 317,297,866 480,795,247 
Historic Daily VAR@5% -1,152,684 -1,764,684 -2,929,138 
STD's Away From The Mean 1.3646 1.3811 1.4248 
Posit on Return Statistics 
Normality Test 2,986,438 5,353,176 3,783,186 
Skewness 5.5160 7.0240 7.0620 
Kurtosis 80.7370 115.4840 107.4970 
Sharpe Ratio 6.8600 6.7300 6.3000 
Average Daily Return 0.8120% 0.6690% 0.5020% 
T-Statistic (5%) 32.47 29.22 24.4 
Average Total Return 4.1880% 5.2510% 5.5930% 
Total Number of Pairs 10,794 9,493 7,724 
Average Daily Holdings 140 217 331 
Average Holding Period 20.0200 35.3600 66.2600 
Systematic Risk 0.2078 0.2045 0.2020 
Average Pair Beta 0.4706 0.4699 0.4649 
Average MCap Difference 0 0 0 
P(Pair Return > 0) 71.1% 70.8% 69.2% 
P(Pair Return < 0) 28.9% 29.2% 30.79% 
As is evident, the average daily returns and the Sharpe Ratios are marginally increased 
for all portfolios. This means that the portfolio returns have become slightly less 
volatile. The kurtosis numbers are smaller for the size-neutral portfolios meaning that 
the portfolio returns exhibit relatively fewer extreme outcomes. This in turn results in 
smaller historical VAR numbers for the size-neutral portfolios. The individual position 
returns present a slightly different story. The average total position return is again 
slightly increased for all portfolios but the standard deviation as well as the kurtosis of 
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those returns has also increased resulting in a smaller return-standard deviation ratio. 
Nevertheless the main qualitative characteristics of the return distributions remain the 
same both at the portfolio and at the individual position level. A l l returns 
exhibit positive skewness and large kurtosis numbers as in the cash neutral case. The 
proportion of the positions exhibiting a positive return is slightly lower than before. 
The smaller number of positive outcomes coupled with their larger average size 
reflects the larger standard deviation of these outcomes. This might in turn imply that 
the size-portfolios are slightly riskier than their cash neutral counterparts, an assertion 
also supported by the larger systematic risk numbers. The average pair betas are also 
larger than before but still small for all portfolios. 
Table 44 
Risk-Neutral Portfolios 
P1 (13 Weeks) P2 (26 Weeks) P3 (52 Weeks) 
Portfolio Return Statistics 
Normality Test 840 1,339 2,183 
Critical Value 5.9910 5.9910 5.9910 
Sl^ewness 0.4740 0.8820 1.0820 
Kurtosis 3.4810 4.2010 5.4000 
Average Return 0.1610% 0.1110% 0.0590% 
T-Statistic (5%) 8.17 5.35 2.68 
Sharpe Ratio 3.3600 2.5100 1.3700 
Average Profit/Loss 228,848 240,361 215,987 
Total Profit/Loss 354,256,361 372,078,141 334,348,317 
Average Portfolio Value 231,865,308 361,235,637 546,882,617 
Historic Daily VAR @ 5% -975,377 -1,508,250 -2,465,164 
STD's Away From The Mean 1.3802 1.354 1.3331 
Posit on Return Statistics 
Normality Test 1,320,128 3,213,581 2,556,605 
Skewness 4.7970 6.8880 6.5120 
Kurtosis 53.3220 89.0770 88.1720 
Sharpe Ratio 7.5800 7.0000 7.0700 
Average Daily Return 0.7300% 0.6100% 0.4570% 
T-Statistic (5%) 35.59 29.74 26.09 
Average Total Return 3.9360% 4.7200% 5.1150% 
Total Number of Pairs 10,794 9,493 7,724 
Average Daily Holdings 140 217 331 
Average Holding Period 20.0200 35.3600 66.2600 
Systematic Risk 0.1417 0.1396 0.1384 
Average Pair Beta 0.2459 0.2440 0.2414 
Average MCap Difference -11,497,120 -30,516,284 -51,664,975 
P(Pair Return > 0) 73.0% 73.3% 72.1% 
P{Pair Return < 0) 27.0% 26.7% 27.9% 
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Finally, Table 44 presents results for the risk-neutral portfolios of pairs. The hedge 
ratio of risk neutral pairs is chosen so as to minimise the total systematic risk of the 
pair as measured at inception by the APT 20 factor model. As before, the constituent 
pairs of the risk neutral portfolios PI , P2 and P3 are identical to their cash and size 
neufral counterparts and only the proportion of the amount bought relative to the 
amount sold for each pair is different. Starting with the portfolio return statistics, the 
Sharpe Ratio values are comparable to all the other cases examined so far and, like 
before, decline as we move from PI to P3. The same holds true for the average daily 
portfolio returns. A l l portfolios display positive skewness and kurtosis which grows 
larger as we move from PI to P3. As mentioned before, positive skewness indicates a 
larger concentration of outcomes to the right of the mean. Portfolio P3's relatively 
large skewness is also accompanied by large kurtosis. Therefore, although P3 may 
have relatively more and larger positive outcomes, it also has more frequent and 
relatively large negative outcomes thus making the portfolio inherently riskier and with 
a smaller average return. This is also reflected in the historical daily VAR numbers. 
P3's VAR is more than double that of portfolio PI . Compared to the cash and size 
neutral portfolios, the risk neutral portfolios have lower VARs than their peers. It 
might therefore appear that the VAR numbers improve as we increase the number of 
risk factors with respect to which the exposure of the portfolios is minimised. The 
average pair systematic risk is also naturally smaller for the risk neufral portfolios. 
Nevertheless, these portfolios have also slightly lower average returns thus resulting in 
similar or slightly lower Sharpe ratios than their cash or size neutral counterparts. The 
proportion of profitable positions is again around 72% and the average pair beta is still 
very small. 
To summarise, so far in this section three groups of portfohos of pairs were 
formed with varying levels of exposure to risk factors. Cash neutral portfolios portfolio 
were not optimised in any way, size neutral portfolios consisted of pairs that had zero 
exposure to size and risk neufral portfolios contained pairs whose systematic risk, as 
measured by the APT 20 factor model, was minimised. Each group consisted of three 
portfolios, PI P2 and P3, whose pairs were formed by comparing each pair's current 
price ratio to its historic average measured over a period of 13, 26 and 52 weeks 
respectively. Portfolios PI and P2 are characterised by large positive Sharpe ratios and 
in contrast to portfolio P3 that appears to be more volatile. A l l portfolios have 
statistically significant average portfolio as well as pair returns, negligible average pair 
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betas and are neutral with respect to market risk. The performance of the risk neutral 
portfolios is not hampered by minimising the risk exposure of the constituent pairs and 
is comparable to the performance of the cash and the size neutral portfolios. When 
comparing the day to day total portfolio returns, PI appears the best performing 
portfoho in all three groups. It yields the highest Sharpe ratio but the largest total 
number of pairs held over the simulation period. PI also exhibits by far the smallest 
historical daily VAR number in all groups. However all portfolios have similar 
proportions of positive outcomes across all groups. P3 is the worst performing 
portfolio across all groups both at the portfolio and at the discrete position level. P3 
comprises the smallest total number of pairs with larger on average total position 
returns which are also more volatile. So the portfolio performance appears to 
deteriorate as the length of the period over which historical averages are measured is 
increased. 
3.3.3 Multifactor model, Johansen test implementation 
So far the ADF test was used to identify pairs of securities whose price ratio is 
stationary over a period of time. The coefficient vector of the linear combination of the 
prices that was tested for stationarity was thus fixed to be [1 -1]. The Johansen test not 
only tests for co-integration between the stock prices but also provides estimates of the 
coefficient vector associated with the stationary linear combination of the prices. Table 
45 presents portfolio results for the case where the strategy is implemented using the 
Johansen methodology to test for co-integration between a highly correlated pair of 
securities. The coefficient estimates produced by the Johansen test are used to calculate 
the actual value of the stationary linear combination of the log-prices every day over 
the next 3 months until the new factor set becomes available. The value of the linear 
combination thus calculated is compared with its 13, 26 and 52 week average and 
standard deviation in order to identify trading opportunities. When the new set of 
factor exposures arrives, the universe of highly correlated securities is refreshed and 
the Johansen test is applied again to identify new pairs of co-integrated securities and 
estimate their coefficient vectors. The results are remarkably similar to those of the 
ADF implementation, cash-neutral coimterparts both at the portfolio and at the 
individual position level. 
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Table 45 
Cash-Neutral Portfolios, Johansen Test 
PI (13 Weeks) P2 (26 Weeks) P3 (52 Weeks) 
Portfolio Return Statistics 
Normality Test 610 1,433 2,366 
Critical Value 5.9910 5.9910 5.9910 
Skewness 0.4780 0.7970 1.0140 
Kurtosis 2.9240 4.4360 5.7070 
Average Return 0.1680% 0.1210% 0.0580% 
T-Statistic (5%) 8.76 6.06 2.92 
Sharpe Ratio 3.6900 2.8200 1.4500 
Average Profit/Loss 272,806 304,687 242,202 
Total Profit/Loss 422,304,257 471,655,226 374,928,982 
Average Portfolio Value 270,433,547 427,154,825 663,057,998 
Historic Daily VAR@5% -1,164,055 -1,875,412 -3,254,121 
STD's Away From The Mean 1.365 1.3554 1.4112 
Position Return Statistics 
Normality Test 357,278 6,071,694 2,381,661 
Skewness 3.5660 7.6350 6.5710 
Kurtosis 27.5470 123.3420 85.2020 
Sharpe Ratio 8.1600 7.0700 6.9400 
Average Daily Return 0.7400% 0.6260% 0.4630% 
T-Statistic (5%) 35.76 30.58 27.36 
Average Total Return 3.9880% 5.0000% 4.8750% 
Total Number of Pairs 10,590 9,434 7,691 
Average Daily Holdings 136 215 335 
Average Holding Period 19.8600 35.2400 67.4400 
Systematic Risk 0.1801 0.1777 0.1763 
Average Pair Beta 0.0089 0.0148 0.0160 
Average MCap Difference -17,874,659 -18,650,501 -43,875,837 
P(Pair Return > 0) 73.9% 74.2% 72.7% 
P(Pair Return < 0) 26.1% 25.8% 27.3% 
Portfolio P3 is yet again the worst performer and it is still characterised by the smallest 
total number of pairs and the longest average holding period. The VAR numbers are 
only slightly smaller for PI and P2 than those of their ADF counterparts leading to 
slightly improved Sharpe Ratios. The numbers of pairs held are almost identical to 
those of the ADF portfolios. The average pair systematic risk is still around 18% and 
the average pair beta is negligible. Finally the proportion of positive outcomes is still 
around 74%. The results therefore are not substantially affected when the restriction 
that the coefficient vector of the stationary linear combination of the prices is [1 -1] is 
relaxed. It appears that both the ADF and the Johansen tests identify very similar pools 
of stationary pairs of securities. 
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Table 46 
Cash-Neutral Portfolios with Stop Loss and Profit Taking 
P1 (13 Weeks) P2 (26 Weeks) P3 (52 Weeks) 
Portfolio Return Statistics 
Normality Test 944 493 941 
Critical Value 5.9910 5.9910 5.9910 
Skewness 0.2680 0.4870 0.6790 
Kurtosis 3.7880 2.5870 3.5700 
Average Return 0.2250% 0.1820% 0.1260% 
T-Statistic (5%) 9.92 7.73 5.28 
Sharpe Ratio 4.2400 3.6100 2.6000 
Average Profit/Loss 218,751 227,417 196,529 
Total Profit/Loss 338,627,157 352,040,999 304,226,673 
Average Portfolio Value 176,746,780 224,712,944 267,080,027 
Historic Daily VAR@5% -750,724 -960,015 -1,253,220 
STD's Away From The Mean 1.2693 1.2398 1.2735 
Position Return Statistics 
Normality Test 427,911 353,343 203,962 
Skewness -1.0030 -1.0140 -0.7140 
Kurtosis 29.3800 26.4130 19.8120 
Sharpe Ratio 5.2900 5.1400 4.8800 
Average Daily Return 1.2470% 1.2540% 1.1890% 
T-Statistic (5%) 25.51 24.48 24.35 
Average Total Return 2.8600% 2.9130% 2.4520% 
Total Number of Pairs 11,842 12,084 12,407 
Average Daily Holdings 89 114 137 
Average Holding Period 11.6900 14.6600 17.0400 
Systematic Risk 0.1811 0.1793 0.1786 
Average Pair Beta 0.2450 0.2424 0.2447 
Average MCap Difference -11,426,347 -28,260,089 -43,785,830 
P(Pair Return > 0) 76.9% 78.4% 77.7% 
P(Pair Return < 0) 23.1% 21.6% 22.34% 
3.3.4 Casli-Neutral Portfolios with Stop Loss and Profit Taking 
It was mentioned above that applying a stop loss rule combined with more aggressive 
profit taking could improve the strategy's performance. Table 46 displays the results 
when such a rule is imposed. Positions are now closed whenever one or more of the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) the log price ratio of the two securities crosses it's mean 
(b) the return of the position exceeds 7% (profit taking) 
(c) the return of the position is less than -20% (stop loss limit) 
As expected these rules increase the portfolio turnover. Indeed the average holding 
period for the three portfolios is reduced fi-om 20, 35 and 66 days to 11, 14 and 17 days 
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respectively. The total number of pairs on the other hand is increased from 10794, 
9493 and 7724 to 11842, 12084 and 12407 respectively. The performance of all 
portfolios is improved significantly despite the increased turnover combined with the 
punitive fransaction costs (0.4% roundtrip) imposed on the sfrategy. The average daily 
portfolio return is increased by 0.06% for all portfolios. The Sharpe ratio is also 
increased by around 1 across the board. Portfolio P3 is still performing poorly relative 
to PI and P2, however its Sharpe ratio is now a respectable 2.6 compared with 1.45 
before. The higher Sharpe ratios indicate that portfoUo returns have become both larger 
in magnitude and less volatile. The lower volatility is also confirmed by the VAR 
numbers which are decreased by more than 50%. The distances of the lower VAR 
numbers from their respective mean returns are also shorter indicating that the 
portfolio returns are more concenfrated around their mean value and hence less risky. 
A l l average portfolio and position returns are again significantly larger than zero and 
the average pair beta and systematic risk remain very low. Finally the proportions of 
positions with positive outcomes are slightly higher than before and close to 78%. 
Figure 5 displays the distributions of the total and daily position returns for portfolio 
P2. Both distributions appear now to be bimodal, reflecting the fact that a number of 
positions are closed when the stop loss criterion is met. Therefore there appears to be a 
relatively higher concentration of returns around the -20%) and the 7.5% points. 
However the largest area under both curves is to the right of the zero return vertical 
line. 
To conclude this section, it was shown that the performance of the pairs trading 
sfrategy was significantly improved by infroducing a stop loss rule combined with 
more aggressive profit taking. This resulted in higher portfolio turnover but also higher 
portfolio returns characterised by lower volatility and hence higher Sharpe ratios. It 
must be noted that the trading rule is still fully automated and requires no human 
intervention. This leaves open the possibility that performance can be fiirther improved 
by adjusting the decision making process to take account of information that is not yet 
impounded in the statistical model. For example a shift in the sfrategic objectives of a 
company will affect its correlation with its competitors. This shift wi l l eventually be 
reflected in the share price but it wi l l take several observations for the statistical model 
to detect it. An alert trader on the other hand wil l immediately consider the altered 
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3.3.5 The Sources of Profit and the Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) provided an ingenious mechanism for identifying 
ex-ante the sources o f the profit derived f rom a contrarian strategy. Their analysis w i l l 
be used in this section to estimate the expected profit associated with a pairs trading 
rule as well as to attribute this profit to its various sources. Pairs trading is for all 
intents and purposes a contrarian strategy since it calls for selling short a security 
which is deemed to be overvalued relative to another highly correlated security which 
is held long. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) examine the profitability o f short term horizon 
contrarian strategies and develop a generalised fi-amework for identifying the different 
sources o f contrarian profits based on how prices respond to information. They assume 
that stock returns are determined according to the fol lowing multifactor model: 
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r,, = + X ( 6 o , a / a + ,^',a/.-u) + ^,v (3-3 .5 .1) 
This model facilitates the separate examination o f price reactions to common 
factors f , i^, lagged realisations o f common factors /,_, and firm specific information 
e,-,, where / denotes the unexpected factor realisation. The same model can be used 
to examine differences in the returns o f two related securities as in the case o f highly 
correlated pairs. The return o f a pair o f securities , , which consists o f one share long 
in the first security and one share short in the second, is given by the difference o f the 
two security returns, r^ , = r,., - / v , . By substituting 3.3.5.1 for and r^ . , we get: 
= / ^ . + i ( ^ o , M / a +^ ' ,M/'-U ) + ^ . , ' ( 3 .3 .5 .2 ) , 
where jUp,= M i , , - M j j , K.k=Kk-b'j,k and e ,^, = e,,, - . Equation 3 .3 .5 .2 now 
describes how pair returns are affected by common factor realisations. Jegadeesh and 
Titman reasonably assume that: 
(a) the factors are orthogonal and unrelated to their lagged values and 
(b) cov(e.,,e^. ,_,)=0 for all i pij. 
It then follows that: 
K 
cov^.,,r,.) = ) • (3 .3 .5 .3 ) 
However assumption (b) is not generally true in the case o f pair returns since some 
pairs may contain the same security. The residual returns o f those pairs w i l l then be 
cross-serially correlated thus violating the assertion that cov(e, . , ,e^ . )=0 for all i T^j. 
One way to get around this problem is to confine the analysis to distinct pairs o f 
securities that do not share members. The residual returns o f such pairs are then cross-
serially uncorrelated and the cross-serial covariance between two pairs o f securities is 
given by 3 .3 .5 .3 where i and j now signify pairs rather than individual securities. 
Jegadeesh and Titman examine a strategy where the portfolio weight for stock i at time 
t i s : 
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where is the equally weighted index return and N is the number o f stocks. The 
contrarian profit is then given by: 
= - — a n d 







The same weights can be applied to a strategy where individual securities are now 
replaced by pairs o f securities. The equally weighted market index is now an equally 
weighted index o f pair returns, hidividual pair returns are compared against this 
benchmark before long or short positions are taken. 
The expected contrarian profit £'(;r,) is decomposed into three components: 
The component, - c r^x lO ' , measures the part o f the return attributed to the cross-
sectional variation o f pair returns which is induced by the crossectional variation in 
stock returns. Stocks wi th higher than average expected returns tend to have higher 
than average realized returns and therefore reduce contrarian profits. The term 
- Q x l O ^ measures the part o f the return due to overreaction to firm specific 
information. Overreaction to firm specific information w i l l lead to over-valuation o f a 
certain security relative to the market and its peers. By taking a hedged position that 
holds this security short and a highly correlated security long, a riskless profit can be 
made when relative values adjust to their equilibrium levels. This profit w i l l be entirely 
attributable to overreaction to firm specific news. Finally, the component 
- Scr^„ X10^ is the contribution o f delayed reaction o f stock prices to common factor 
realizations. I f prices overreact initially to firm specific news and subsequently adjust 
to equilibrium levels, Q w i l l be negative and w i l l have a positive contribution to 
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contrarian profits. The term measures the cross-sectional covariance o f 
contemporaneous and delayed factor sensitivities and may be either positive or 
negative. Therefore, while overreaction to firm-specific information contributes to 
contrarian profits, overreaction to common factors can either increase or reduce them. 
Table 47 
Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition - Stationary Pairs 
Factor Date - C T ^ x l O ^ - Q x l O ' - ^ C T ^ „ X 1 0 ^ Total 
31/12/1995 -0.0009 0.1144 0.0014 0.012% 
31/03/1996 -0.0009 0.1109 0.0020 0.011% 
30/06/1996 -0.0010 0.1254 0.0018 0.013% 
30/09/1996 -0.0009 0.0993 0.0018 0.010% 
31/12/1996 -0.0008 0.1072 0.0021 0.011% 
31/03/1997 -0.0007 0.0984 0.0025 0.010% 
30/06/1997 -0.0010 0.0998 0.0024 0.010% 
30/09/1997 -0.0018 0.1468 0.0020 0.015% 
31/12/1997 -0.0012 0.1633 0.0024 0.017% 
31/03/1998 -0.0012 0.2197 0.0048 0.022% 
30/06/1998 -0.0016 0.2640 0.0038 0.027% 
30/09/1998 -0.0019 0.3331 0.0060 0.034% 
31/12/1998 -0.0021 0.3467 0.0055 0.035% 
31/03/1999 -0.0021 0.3438 0.0049 0.035% 
10/07/1999 -0.0039 0.4028 0.0031 0.040% 
10/10/1999 -0.0027 0.4222 0.0062 0.043% 
13/01/2000 -0.0035 0.4577 0.0039 0.046% 
14/04/2000 -0.0022 0.4373 0.0031 0.044% 
28/06/2000 -0.0030 0.4262 0.0027 0.043% 
21/09/2000 -0.0025 0.3711 0.0023 0.037% 
31/12/2000 -0.0023 0.3880 0.0025 0.039% 
28/03/2001 -0.0021 0.3098 0.0021 0.031% 
18/06/2001 -0.0022 0.3439 0.0028 0.035% 
28/09/2001 -0.0022 0.3111 0.0019 0.031% 
19/12/2001 -0.0098 0.1781 -0.0010 0.017% 
27/03/2002 -0.0015 0.2603 0.0014 0.026% 
Table 47 shows the components o f the estimated contrarian profits for the largely 
overlapping sets o f highly-correlated and stationary pairs o f securities corresponding to 
the various factor dates. Pair returns are measured over a period starting 104 weeks 
prior to pair formation and ending 13 weeks after the pair formation date (i.e. the date 
the new factor exposures become available). 13 weeks is roughly the length o f time 
between two consecutive pair formation dates. It is evident that the largest component 
of the expected profit by far is the one attributed to overreaction to firm specific news 
(101.68% on average). This is true for all sets o f pairs. Furthermore all components 
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retain their sign throughout the simulation period indicating that the contributions o f 
the various sources o f profit remain consistent over time 
More specifically the cross-sectional variation o f pair returns has a small 
negative contribution to the strategy's profits while a small part o f the profits can be 
attributed to delayed reaction to factor realisations. Delayed reaction can contribute to 
the trading profit when for example the price o f a sector leading stock A reacts 
instantaneously to a factor realisation while the price o f its highly correlated peer stock 
B remains initially unaffected. However stock B has similar factor exposures to A and 
its price should sooner or later react to the unexpected factor realisation and adjust to a 
new equilibrium level. This adjustment can be profitably exploited since the price o f B 
w i l l at some point start moving faster toward equilibrium than that o f A which is 
aheady adjusted to the new factor exposures. The average o f the total profi t estimate 
over the entire simulation period is 0.022% which coincidentally is almost equal to the 
average portfolio return o f the cash neutral portfolio P I when the stop loss rule is 
applied. 
Table 48 presents the Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition o f highly-correlated sets 
of pairs regardless o f whether they are stationary or not. A t any given date these pairs 
are chosen as the top 5% o f all possible pairs o f securities when sorted in descending 
order o f their systematic correlation. As is evident the total expected profit is positive 
during the entire period and almost all o f i t is attributed to overreaction. However the 
estimated profit is consistently lower than that o f the stationary pairs indicating that 
highly correlated stationary pairs are on average more profitable than highly correlated 
pairs in general. Finally Table 49 presents the Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition o f 
sets o f pairs that exhibit low correlation. A t any given date these pairs are chosen as 
the bottom 5% of all possible pairs o f securities when sorted in descending order o f 
their systematic correlation. As anticipated the expected profit o f the low correlation 
pairs is consistently lower than that o f the high correlation pairs except for the last two 
sets that correspond to the period during which the expected performance o f the high 
correlation pairs starts to deteriorate. 
So far the Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition suggests that almost all o f the 
contrarian profit fi-om pairs trading is attributed to overreaction to firm specific news. 
This appears to be in accord with the results in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 which show that 
all pair positions have negligible betas and systematic risk on average. 
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Table 48 
Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition - l-ligh Correlation 
Pairs 
Factor Date - Q x l O ' Total 
31/12/1995 -0.0012 0.0809 0.0008 0.008% 
31/03/1996 -0.0020 0.0894 0.0014 0.009% 
30/06/1996 -0.0054 0.0934 0.0022 0.009% 
30/09/1996 -0.0014 0.0826 0.0015 0.008% 
31/12/1996 -0.0020 0.1036 0.0020 0.010% 
31/03/1997 -0.0019 0.0835 0.0010 0.008% 
30/06/1997 -0.0019 0.1015 0.0009 0.010% 
30/09/1997 -0.0033 0.0968 -0.0017 0.009% 
31/12/1997 -0.0039 0.1388 -0.0019 0.013% 
31/03/1998 -0.0018 0.1888 0.0022 0.019% 
30/06/1998 -0.0066 0.2576 0.0061 0.026% 
30/09/1998 -0.0029 0.2831 0.0038 0.028% 
31/12/1998 -0.0026 0.2614 0.0025 0.026% 
31/03/1999 -0.0036 0.3127 0.0020 0.031% 
10/07/1999 -0.0046 0.3372 0.0022 0.034% 
10/10/1999 -0.0041 0.3480 0.0029 0.035% 
13/01/2000 -0.0044 0.3796 0.0022 0.038% 
14/04/2000 -0.0039 0.3652 0.0010 0.036% 
28/06/2000 -0.0034 0.2977 0.0020 0.030% 
21/09/2000 -0.0046 0.3402 0.0012 0.034% 
31/12/2000 -0.0042 0.3199 0.0003 0.032% 
28/03/2001 -0.0027 0.2680 0.0005 0.027% 
18/06/2001 -0.0030 0.2289 0.0016 0.023% 
28/09/2001 -0.0081 0.2477 -0.0013 0.024% 
19/12/2001 -0.0268 0.2605 0.0047 0.024% 
27/03/2002 -0.0031 0.2645 0.0015 0.026% 
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Table 49 
Jegadeesh-Titman Decomposition - Low Correlation 
Pairs 
Factor Date - Q x l O ' Total 
31/12/1995 -0.0059 0.0162 0.0022 0.001% 
31/03/1996 -0.0074 0.0392 0.0035 0.004% 
30/06/1996 -0.0077 0.0331 0.0053 0.003% 
30/09/1996 -0.0037 0.0080 0.0030 0.001% 
31/12/1996 -0.0042 0.0376 0.0046 0.004% 
31/03/1997 -0.0037 0.0226 0.0019 0.002% 
30/06/1997 -0.0040 0.0250 0.0044 0.003% 
30/09/1997 -0.0060 0.0422 0.0011 0.004% 
31/12/1997 -0.0045 0.0237 -0.0010 0.002% 
31/03/1998 -0.0061 -0.0222 -0.0001 -0.003% 
30/06/1998 -0.0065 0.0606 -0.0012 0.005% 
30/09/1998 -0.0111 0.1075 0.0023 0.010% 
31/12/1998 -0.0076 0.1786 0.0148 0.019% 
31/03/1999 -0.0124 0.1578 0.0119 0.016% 
10/07/1999 -0.0092 0.1458 0.0089 0.015% 
10/10/1999 -0.0107 0.1121 0.0079 0.011% 
13/01/2000 -0.0120 0.1714 0.0012 0.016% 
14/04/2000 -0.0128 0.2360 -0.0051 0.022% 
28/06/2000 -0.0087 0.2066 -0.0058 0.019% 
21/09/2000 -0.0069 0.1862 -0.0115 0.017% 
31/12/2000 -0.0071 0.0608 -0.0054 0.005% 
28/03/2001 -0.0052 0.1610 -0.0147 0.014% 
18/06/2001 -0.0052 0.2073 -0.0134 0.019% 
28/09/2001 -0.0067 0.1997 -0.0107 0.018% 
19/12/2001 -0.0055 0.2960 -0.0094 0.028% 
27/03/2002 -0.0132 0.3010 -0.0085 0.028% 
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Table 50 
Regressions of Portfolio Returns on the Value Weighted 
Market Return and its Lag 
Constant Market Lag Market R-Square 
Cash-Neutral Portfolios ADF Test 
P1 0.002 (7.90) -0.037 (-1.76) 0.001 (0.04) 0.004 
P2 0.001 (5.30) -0.041 (-1.92) -0.000 (-0.00) 0.005 
P3 0.001 (2.68) -0.043 (-1.98) -0.016 (-0.57) 0.008 
Risk-Neutral Portfolios ADF Test 
P1 0.002 (7.90) -0.031 (-1.48) 0.000 (0.00) 0.003 
P2 0.001 (5.13) -0.041 (-1.86) 0.004 (0.16) 0.006 
P3 0.001 (2.50) -0.041 (-1.89) -0.013 (-0.45) 0.007 
Size-Neutral Portfolios ADF Test 
P1 0.002 (8.44) -0.047 (-2.22) 0.001 (0.02) 0.005 
P2 0.001 (6.23) -0.046 (-2.17) -0.008 (-0.34) 0.007 
P3 0.001 (3.25) -0.044 (-2.08) -0.025 (-0.96) 0.009 
Cash-Neutral Portfolios Johansen Test 
P1 0.002 (8.51) -0.017 (-0.91) -0.004 (-0.20) 0.001 
P2 0.001 (5.90) -0.029 (-1.32) 0.013(0.55) 0.003 
P3 0.001 (2.77) -0.031 (-1.52) -0.003 (-0.13) 0.004 
Cash-Neutral Portfolios with Stop Loss and Profit Taking 
P1 0.002 (9.93) -0.009 (-0.41) 0.024 (1.06) 0.001 
P2 0.002 (7.73) -0.009 (-0.40) 0.031 (1.23) 0.003 
P3 0.001 (5.22) -0.026 (-1.28) 0.034 (1.24) 0.005 
This should also translate into a small beta for the respective portfolio returns. Table 
50 shows the results o f the regressions o f the returns o f the various portfolios 
examined so far, on the market return and its first lag. The numbers in brackets are t-
statistics corrected for serial correlation using the Newey-West formula. 
As is evident the market beta for all portfolios is negative and negligible in size. 
The highest absolute value attained is 0.047. The associated T-statistics show that the 
market beta is not significant for the Johansen test, cash neutral portfolios and the 
cash-neutral portfolios with stop-loss and profit taking. A l l the A D F test portfolios 
appear to have statistically significant although very small betas. However the 
importance o f statistically significant betas should not be over-stated. The explanatory 
power o f the regression is very weak as shown by the R-Square value. The R-Square is 
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an estimate o f the proportion o f the total variance o f the portfolio return explained by 
the market return and its lag. In this case, the proportion is at best 0.9% and thus 
unimportant. The coefficient o f the market lag is also negligible and not significant for 
all portfolios. Therefore all portfolio returns appear not to be correlated with state o f 
the market. 
h i this section the Jegadeesh-Titman analysis o f contrarian profits is applied on 
the returns o f pairs o f securities. It is shown that the overwhelming part o f the profit 
fi-om the pairs strategy is attributed to overreaction to stock specific news. This is in 
accordance with the results o f previous sections which showed that pair positions have 
negligible betas and systematic risk. The expected profit remains positive during the 
entire simulation period and is higher for stationary pairs among the class o f all highly 
correlated pairs. The expected profit is also higher for pairs that exhibit high rather 
than low correlation. 
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Conclusion 
The efficient market hypothesis has been under intense scrutiny since its 
introduction in 1970 by Fama. A consequence o f the efficient market hypothesis is the 
law of one price whereby equal fiiture payoffs wi th identical risk profiles should carry 
the same price. Pairs trading is a trading strategy based on the law o f one price. 
Practitioners have been engaging in trading pairs o f highly correlated securities whose 
relative prices appear to diverge fi^om their perceived equilibrium level i n the belief 
that the law o f one price w i l l eventually drive the two prices back to a level justified by 
their risk profiles. The aim of this chapter is to develop a fi-amework for analysing such 
pairs o f securities, to examine whether pairs trading is profitable using Japanese stock 
market data and to examine the sources o f these profits. 
It has been shown that securities wi th similar risk profiles have highly correlated 
expected returns and therefore their respective prices move more or less in tandem. 
Cointegration techniques can be used to study this co-movement o f prices and to 
deduce the value o f one asset relative to the other. This leads to the estimation o f a 
'relative fair value' which lends i t self to comparison wi th the actual relative value o f 
the assets. Large deviations f rom the fair value may be profitably exploited by a pairs 
trading rule that calls for buying the relatively cheap and selling short the relatively 
expensive asset. The overall strategy portfolio consists o f a number o f pairs o f 
securities which are formed on each day during the simulation period and have 
overlapping holding periods. The use o f overlapping holding periods increases the 
confidence in the tests carried out on the strategy portfolio. Portfolio returns are 
measured using auction-determined open prices thus eliminating the bid ask bias 
inherent in high fi-equency data. The strategy is simulated entirely out o f sample, 
meaning that no prior knowledge o f fiiture information is assumed at any point during 
the simulation. More specifically, three types o f portfolios o f pairs were examined wi th 
varying levels o f exposure to risk. The cash neutral portfolio contained pairs that were 
not optimised in any way, the size neutral portfolio consisted o f pairs that had zero 
exposure to size and finally the risk neutral portfolio contained pairs whose systematic 
risk, as measured by the APT 20 factor model, was minimised. The simulated 
portfolios were also distinguished by the length o f the period used to estimate each 
pair's fair value. For example three cash neutral portfohos, P I P2 and P3, were 
examined corresponding to an estimation period o f 13, 26 and 52 weeks respectively. 
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Nine portfolios were examined in total, three for each risk profile. Portfolios P I and P2 
were characterised by large positive Sharpe ratios while portfolio P3 appeared to be 
more volatile. A l l portfolios had statistically significant average portfolio as well as 
pair returns, negligible average pair betas and were neutral wi th respect to market risk. 
The performance o f the risk neutral portfolios was not hampered by minimising the 
risk exposure o f the constituent pairs and was comparable to the performance o f the 
cash and the size neutral portfolios. When comparing the day to day total portfolio 
returns, P I appeared to be the best performing portfolio in all three groups. It was 
characterised by the highest Sharpe ratio as well as the largest total number o f pairs 
held over the simulation period. P I also exhibited by far the smallest historical daily 
V A R number in all groups. However all portfolios had similar proportions o f positive 
outcomes. P3 was the worst performing portfolio both at the portfolio and at the 
discrete position level. P3 comprised the smallest total number o f pairs wi th larger on 
average total position returns which were also more volatile. So the portfolio 
performance appeared to deteriorate as the length o f the period over which historical 
averages were measured was increased. 
The performance o f the pairs trading strategy was significantly improved by the 
implementation o f a stop loss rule combined wi th more aggressive profit taking. This 
resulted in higher portfolio turnover but also higher portfolio returns characterised by 
lower volatility and higher Sharpe ratios. A l l portfolios were subject to a trading rule 
that was fiiUy automated and required no human intervention leaving open the 
possibility that performance could be fiirther improved by taking into account 
information not yet impounded in the statistical model. For example a shift in the 
strategic objectives o f a company would affect its correlation wi th its competitors. This 
shift would eventually be detected by the statistical model after several observations 
became available. A n alert trader on the other hand would immediately consider the 
altered circumstances when making a trading decision. 
By applying the Jegadeesh-Titinan analysis o f contrarian profits i t was shown 
that the overwhelming part o f the pairs strategy profit was attributed to overreaction to 
stock specific news. This was consistent wi th the negligible betas and systematic risk 
exhibited by pair positions. It was also shown that the expected profit remained 
positive during the entire simulation period and was higher for stationary pairs among 
the class o f all highly correlated pairs. The expected profit was also higher for pairs 
that exhibited high rather than low correlation. 
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It appears therefore that the law o f one price forces assets to be valued in 
accordance to their risk profile. In the short term though, relative asset valuations are 
not always consistent wi th their relative risk exposures. Such short term deviations 
f rom fair relative values can be profitably exploited by engaging in a form o f riskless 
arbitrage namely pairs trading. When simulated using Japanese stock market data, this 
strategy appeared to generate economically significant profits despite the hefty 
transaction costs imposed and the realistic assumptions that were made regarding the 
prices at which trades occurred. Furthermore, practitioners have been engaging in such 
trading undeterted for years, which in itself is an indication that i t is a profitable 
activity. This raises serious doubts about the efficiency o f the Japanese stock market. 
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
The emergence o f asset pricing models in the late nineteen sixties has changed 
fiindamentally the way financial markets operate. Asset pricing models provided a 
systematic link between risk and reward and thus a platform for assesing the efficiency 
of capital markets. The definition o f efficient markets was formalised in the efficient 
market hypothesis. The weak form of the E M H stipulates that efficient markets are 
characterised by the absence o f arbitrage opportunities. Very soon after the advent o f 
the first asset pricing model, the CAPM, a multitude o f studies attempted to either give 
support or disprove the E M H . To this day, researchers keep discovering 'anomalous' 
patterns in asset returns that cannot be explained by asset pricing models. The 
existence o f such empirical anomalies suggests either that the empirical forms o f asset 
pricing models are miss-specified and/or that capital markets are not efficient. The 
term 'and/or' in the previous statement epitomises the difficulties associated wi th 
testing for market efficiency. The E M H is a joint hypothesis and therefore the resuhs 
of empirical efficiency tests are always open to debate. Nevertheless such tests can still 
be used to reveal the relative strengths and weaknesses o f capital markets. 
This thesis has endeavoured to examine various aspects o f efficiency o f the 
Japanese stock market by examining three different types o f irregular return patterns. 
The first type is best represented by three related pricing anomalies which are 
associated with size, price and book value to market. The second type is the observed 
reversal in stock returns. The third irregular return pattern is typified by the oscillation 
of the relative prices o f highly correlated assets around a mean value. We sought to 
improve the conventional methodology used to analyse these phenomena in various 
ways thus improving the robustness o f our results. The three most significant 
improvements were the use o f tradable, out o f sample prices to assess the profitability 
o f the simulated trading strategies, the imposition o f realistic trading costs and finally 
the examination o f optimised portfolios and individual positions. We focused on Japan 
because despite having the second largest capital market in the world i t has received 
scant attention by the academic community and because o f the accumulated personal 
experience as a professional participant o f the Japanese stock market. 
We started by examining the presence o f the size effect, probably the most 
analyzed 'anomaly' to this date and historically one o f the first to be identified, and 
found no evidence in support o f it. This is in contrast to earlier studies on Japan. 
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However those studies used a much older sample than ours which ends in August 
2003. The source o f our data is also different compared to earlier studies. Our finding 
appears to lend support to Dimson & Marsh (1999) who argue that once an anomaly 
receives widespread publicity it attracts the interest o f investors and eventually it 
disappears. We also examined the ability o f price and book value to market to 
differentiate future stock returns and found both effects to be very strong and 
significant. We noticed that the higher observed returns o f the small price portfolio are 
characterised by higher risk compared to the large price portfolio. However the 
average return o f the large price portfolio is negative and thus smaller than the risk free 
rate which is positive. It would therefore appear that the return differential o f the price 
portfolios cannot be entirely attributed to risk differences and, to a certain extent, price 
constitutes an anomaly. This is also true for the book value to market portfolios, where 
the small book value to market portfolio not only has a negative return on average but 
also appears to be slightly riskier than the PIO portfolio thereby negating the claim that 
return differences are accounted for by risk differences. 
We found evidence o f correlation between the state o f the economy and the two 
effects and so concluded that price and book value to market are not pure anomalies. 
We showed that when conditioned on macroeconomic variables, the price premium 
and to a lesser extent the book value to market premium are indeed associated wi th the 
state o f the underlying economy. Scenarios that are representative o f expansionary 
periods in the economy are linked wi th larger premiums compared to recessionary 
periods. This finding is also in agreement to that o f K i m and Bumie, (2002) who 
examined the relation o f the small cap premium to the economic cycle using US data. 
The two effects therefore are linked to macroeconomic risk factors but are not entirely 
explained by them. 
Both the book value to market and price effects were found to be seasonal. 
They were positive during the first half o f the year and negative thereafter. The 
evidence suggested that the "January" effect which has been identified by a multitude 
o f studies in the US market was also present in Japan. However the January effect in 
the US is linked to the financial year end which is in December. In contrast most 
Japanese companies report year end results in March and Apr i l . The price effect 
appeared strongest in February and May while the book value to market premium 
attains its largest values in February and May through July. The bimodal nature o f the 
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effect may be explained by the participation o f international investors in the Japanese 
market who have a different year end to that o f Japanese investors. 
We found evidence o f moderate correlation between the stock rankings 
according to price and book value to market implying that the respective portfolio 
returns were also correlated. In order to examine the net price and book value to 
market effects we used two established procedures to form price portfolios that were 
neutral in terms o f their exposure to book value to market and vice versa. The net price 
effect appeared weaker but still statistically significant. The premixmi o f the large book 
value to market portfolio on the other hand was imaffected by the elimination o f large 
price differences in the constituents o f the portfolios. 
Having established the absence o f a significant size effect and the presence o f 
rather strong price and book value to market effects in the sample, we proceeded to 
examine another anomaly that has attracted renewed academic as well as investor 
interest in recent years. The anomaly in question is the observed reversals in stock 
returns which induce negative serial auto-correlation. This implies that past returns can 
predict fiature returns and thus runs contrary to the E M H . Despite being observed as 
early as the 1960's return reversals have attracted renewed interest due to DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) who sought an alternative explanation to those given for the 
phenomenon up to that date. According to DeBondt and Thaler naive investors become 
overly enthusiastic about stocks that performed wel l in the past, buy them up and these 
stocks become overpriced. In a similar manner, they overreact to stocks that had a poor 
performance in the past and these stocks become under-priced. This behaviour is 
summed up in the over-reaction hypothesis. More sophisticated investors eventually 
step in and prices return to their equilibrium levels. A tacit admission o f the over-
reaction hypothesis is that agents do not behave rationally and so an important 
assumption o f the E M H is violated. However the same return pattern results when 
investors react wi th delay to factor realisations. A distinction has to be made therefore 
between these two sources o f contrarian profits. The term contrarian refers to action 
that is contrary to that taken by naive investors. A multitude o f studies over the last 20 
years indicate that this phenomenon can be exploited economically wi th empirical 
estimates suggesting that contrarian strategies can consistently yield substantial profits. 
Inevitably this research attracted the attention o f hedge fiinds and other investment 
professionals. 
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We sought to examine the existence o f significant contrarian profits in the 
Japanese stock market by first implementing the analytical fi-amework provided by 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1995). We presented evidence suggesting that the Jegadeesh & 
Titman strategy can lead to significant contrarian profits and that he main source o f 
these profits is over-reaction to firm specific events. However their strategy maximised 
expected return wi th no regard for risk and so the strategy portfolio was not necessarily 
on the efficient fi-ontier. Furthermore the assumptions made by Jegadeesh & Titman 
regarding trading costs and execution prices can lead to significant positive biases in 
the estimated profits. We then continued to examine our own implementation o f a 
contrarian strategy that used portfolios on the efficient fi-ontier. We also tested two 
different sets o f execution prices which were net o f trading costs. These were the open 
and volume weighted average prices o f the trading day fol lowing the date on which the 
trading signal was generated thus ensuring that the strategy was simulated entirely out 
of sample. The portfohos were optimal wi th respect to their expected Sharpe Ratio 
thus maximising their expected return while at the same time minimizing their 
volatility. The first such portfolio employed a simple market model to generate the 
inputs to the optimisation process and had a much higher Sharpe ratio than the original 
Jegadeesh & Titman portfolio. The second portfolio used an APT type multifactor 
model to generate the optimisation inputs and resulted in an even higher Sharpe ratio, 
almost twice as large as that o f the Jegadeesh & Titman portfolio. We therefore 
established that the Sharpe ratio o f the strategy increased as the asset pricing model 
became more complex and the quality o f the inputs to the optimisation process got 
better. A corollary o f this finding is that the profitability o f a contrarian strategy is 
strongly dependent on its implementation. As noted in the introduction to the thesis 
hedge fiinds performed rather badly on average in recent years. Our contention is that 
this does not necessarily imply more efficient markets. Weak average performance 
may also be due to the existence o f a large number o f badly managed fiinds. Our 
results showed that the main source o f profits for all portfolios was over-reaction to 
firm specific events and that minimal amounts were attributed to lagged factor 
realisations. Ex-post attribution o f profits to their various sources also showed that 
more than 98% o f the portfolio returns were due to residual stock returns. Contrarian 
profits could not therefore be explained away by the assumption that higher systematic 
risk was associated with the strategy. Our evidence lent overwhelming support to the 
overreaction hypothesis instead. 
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We then proceeded to show that iUiquid stocks are more prone to over-reaction 
than Uquid stocks since their prices are more responsive to demand surges or supply 
squeezes. lUiquid stock prices are driven more by firm specific events rather than the 
market and thus have a smaller market beta on average than liquid stocks. Nevertheless 
liquid stocks still generate significant contrarian profits despite the imposition of 
realistic trading costs and prices. The existence of such profits raises questions about 
the short term efficiency of the Japanese stock market. 
The final chapter examined the profitability of another contrarian strategy which 
is also popular with hedge fiinds, namely pairs trading. Pairs trading exploits perceived 
anomalies in the way assets are priced relative to each other. The strategy is based on 
the law of one price which was originally developed in options pricing theory and 
states that equal fiiture payoffs with identical risk profiles should carry the same price. 
Violation of the law of one price is equivalent to violation of the no arbitrage condition 
of the EMH and so the examination of the pairs trading strategy provided us with an 
alternative aspect to the efficiency of the Japanese stock market. Pairs trading amounts 
to buying the relatively cheap and selling the relatively expensive, of a pair of highly 
correlated assets whose relative price appears to diverge fi-om its equilibrium level. 
The expectation is that the law of one price wi l l eventually drive the two prices back to 
a level justified by their risk profiles thus leaving the investor with an arbitrage profit 
that carries minimal risk. 
We started by showing that securities with similar risk profiles have highly 
correlated expected returns. As a result the respective prices of such assets move more 
or less in tandem and so lend themselves to analysis by cointegration techniques. We 
simulated three different versions of the pairs trading strategy that were distinguished 
by the risk characteristics of the chosen pairs. The three types of pairs were cash, size 
and risk neutral pairs. For cash neutral pairs the yen amount of the long side of the pair 
was equal to the yen amount of the short side of the pair. Size and risk-neutral pairs in 
contrast were characterised by long and short amounts that were held in a proportion 
that entailed zero net pair exposure to size and systematic risk respectively. Systematic 
risk was calculated using the same APT type model used in the examination of the 
return reversal strategy. A l l portfolios had statistically significant average portfolio as 
well as pair returns, negligible average pair betas and were neutral with respect to 
market risk. The performance of the strategy was not affected by the risk 
characteristics of the individual pairs. A l l portfolios had similar success rates, as 
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measured by the proportion of pairs that result in profit. The implementation of a stop 
loss rule and more aggressive profit taking affected the performance of the strategy 
significantly. It entailed higher portfolio turnover but also higher portfolio returns 
characterised by lower volatility and thus higher Sharpe ratio. By applying the 
Jegadeesh-Titman analysis of contrarian profits it was shown that the overwhelming 
part of the pair strategy profit was attributed to over-reaction to stock specific news. 
This was consistent with the negligible betas and systematic risk exhibited by pair 
positions. It was also shovra that the expected profit remained positive during the 
entire simulation period. We demonstrated among all the highly correlated pairs, 
stationary pairs had the highest expected profit and that high correlation pairs had 
higher expected profit than low correlation pairs. This finding reinforced the 
conviction that our results are systematic rather than coincidental. 
We tested the robustness of our results by applying two alternative 
cointegration techniques. We also used three alternative estimates of the equilibrium 
relative price of a pair. They were calculated over time periods of 13, 26 and 52 weeks 
respectively. We found that the choice of cointegration method had only a small but 
insignificant quantitative effect on the results which were otherwise unaltered. In 
contrast longer estimation periods for the relative pair price entailed more volatile 
strategy payouts and smaller turnover. However the total strategy profit and loss did 
not change significantly implying that the average payoff per pair became larger as the 
estimation period got longer. The success rate of the strategy also remained unaffected. 
Overall the strategy appeared to be fairly robust to the different implementations that 
were tested. The robustness of the results was also enhanced by the following facts: (a) 
individual positions had overlapping holding periods which increased the confidence 
in the tests carried out on the strategy portfolio, (b) portfolio returns were measured 
using auction-determined open prices thus eliminating the bid ask bias inherent in high 
fi-equency data, and (c) the strategy was simulated entirely out of sample. 
In general, the apparent profitability of the strategy implied that the law of one 
price forced assets to be eventually valued in accordance to their risk profile. Pairs 
trading appeared to generate economically significant profits despite the hefty 
transaction costs imposed meaning that relative asset valuations were not always 
efficient in the short term. Our simulation results coupled with the fact that 
practitioners have been engaging in such trading undeterred for years, is in itself an 
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indication that it is a profitable activity. This again raises doubts about the short term 
efficiency of the Japanese stock market. 
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that as a developed stock market, Japan is 
both efficient and inefficient. It displays short term inefficiencies that can be profitably 
exploited by contrarian investors. However, as the investing public becomes more 
aware of them, such inefficiencies disappear in the long term thus affording the 
Japanese stock market a certain degree of efficiency. Market efficiency is therefore 
improved by wider investor participation and the faster dissemination of reliable 
information. This entails two important policy implications. 
The first is that financial information should become available in a 
straightforward, timely and relatively inexpensive manner so that it reaches as wide a 
part of the investing public as fast as possible. Market efficiency is a muMfaceted 
concept and defines an ideal state of affairs which is not always, i f ever, attainable. 
Capital markets are operated by humans and as such are subject to behavioural biases. 
Despite thousands of years of evolution humans still engage in massive destruction of 
wealth as recent market failures demonstrated. The assumption that investors are 
rational is therefore clearly and repeatedly violated. The depth and breadth of such 
failures is mitigated by technological advances that make the dissemination and 
analysis of information ever faster. Consequently better informed participants make 
capital markets more efficient as attested by the fact that market failures in the early 
1900's were far more catastrophic than recent incidents. In order for investors to be 
better informed, information should be straightforward so that non-experts can easily 
understand it and thus react to it appropriately. Recent scandals help highlight the 
catastrophic consequences of creative but otherwise legal accounting practices that 
purport to obfiiscate the true financial position of a company. Information should also 
be inexpensive so that it becomes more symmetrically distributed. A market where 
wealthy investors are also better informed and benefit at the expense of ordinary 
investors, can not be efficient because it is not fair. Such a market is undermined by 
the fact that a large part of the investing public feels disadvantaged and so chooses not 
to participate. For the same reason, information should reach everyone more or less 
simultaneously. 
A closely related second policy implication is that public participation to capital 
ma:rkets should be encouraged. This can be achieved by education and by 
strengthening the public's trust to the markets. Markets characterised by weak investor 
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participation are susceptible to manipulation and pricing distortions. Education wi l l 
help demystify the investing process and encourage people to assume a calculated risk 
in return for a reward. Trust to the markets is strengthened when markets are believed 
to be fair in the sense that they provide equal opportunities for wealth enhancement to 
everyone. As noted above, fairness is promoted when all investors have the 
opportunity to correctly asses the risk they undertake by ensuring access to reliable and 
intelligible information. This wi l l help dispel the notion that investing is tantamount to 
gambling. It wi l l also help undermine the perception that capital markets are the 
exclusive preserve of wealthy individuals. In a nutshell, wider participation of better 
informed individuals wi l l result in more efficient markets in terms of resource 
allocation thus benefiting individuals in particular and society as a whole. 
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